United States v. Vance, 893 F.3d 763

Background

On Sept. 18, 2015, Detective Rael observed James Vance on I-40 pass from center to left lane, then ‘‘dart’’ from left through the center into the right lane without pausing in the center lane. A white car in the center lane momentarily blocked Vance’s view of the right lane; the right lane itself was unoccupied and no vehicle had to brake.
Rael pulled Vance over, issued a warning for improper lane change under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317(A), smelled marijuana, obtained consent to search, and discovered large quantities of methamphetamine.
Vance moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the traffic stop was invalid because his lane change did not violate § 66-7-317(A) (he could see no nearby traffic) and, alternatively, that if the statute is ambiguous, Rael’s application of it was an unreasonable mistake of law under Heien v. North Carolina.
The government initially argued Rael made a reasonable mistake of law but later contended at the suppression hearing that Rael stopped Vance for an unsafe lane change—i.e., a failure to ascertain safety because the white car blocked Vance’s view.
The district court credited Rael’s testimony, found Vance could not have ascertained safety because the white car blocked his view, concluded there was a statutory violation, and denied suppression. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Vance's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Vance’s lane change violated § 66-7-317(A) absent actual disruption to other traffic	§ 66-7-317(A) requires actual effect on or hazard to other traffic; no such effect occurred	Statute requires drivers to first ascertain safety of movement; violation may rest on failure to ascertain safety even without actual disruption	Court: Vance waived the argument; on the merits § 66-7-317(A) does not require actual disruption; finding of violation upheld
Whether Rael’s belief that Vance violated § 66-7-317(A) was an unreasonable mistake of law (Heien issue)	Statute unambiguous—only unsafe movements that affect others violate it; thus Rael’s legal view was unreasonable	Even if ambiguity existed, Rael’s interpretation (failure to ascertain safety constitutes a violation) was reasonable under Heien	Court: Heien analysis unnecessary because court found no mistake of law; Rael’s view was reasonable in any event
Whether Rael had reasonable suspicion to stop Vance for failing to ascertain safety of the lane change	Rael’s conclusion was speculative; Vance could have checked before passing the white car and no nearby vehicle was affected	Rael observed facts (white car blocking view, several trucks, busy commute) that reasonably supported suspicion Vance could not ascertain safety	Court: Accepting district court’s factual findings, Rael had reasonable suspicion; stop valid
Procedural waiver: whether Vance can raise statutory-interpretation claim on appeal despite not pressing it below	Vance argues change in government position justified raising it on appeal	Government points to Rule 12 and Tenth Circuit waiver doctrine	Court: Vance waived the actual-disruption argument by not raising it below and failed to show good cause; appellate review denied

Key Cases Cited

Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. 2014) (reasonable mistake of law can supply reasonable suspicion for a stop)
United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for suppression denials; accept district court factfinding unless clearly erroneous)
United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 2011) (failure to timely raise suppression issues in district court results in waiver)
United States v. Lopez, 849 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2017) (government bears burden to prove reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2009) (reasonable suspicion standard does not require ruling out innocent conduct)
United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2007) (government bears burden to prove officer’s suspicion that a traffic regulation was violated)