United States v. Tyvon Taylor, 973 F.3d 414

Taylor pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms arising from incidents on Aug. 12–15, 2017; ballistics linked two seized handguns to shootings on Aug. 12 and 13.
The PSR described the attempted-murder-related conduct and listed four pending Louisiana state charges (July 31, Aug. 12, Aug. 13, Aug. 15, 2017).
Guidelines calculation used the attempted-murder guideline, yielding an advisory range of 110–137 months, capped at the 120‑month statutory maximum; the district court sentenced Taylor to 120 months and three years supervised release.
At sentencing the court stated the federal sentence would “run concurrently with any sentence imposed by state authorities” and orally/writtenly referenced July 9, 2018 as the date for credit/commencement.
Taylor appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred by attempting to backdate the sentence or grant credit (which only BOP may do) and (2) the concurrency ordering was ambiguous about which state sentence(s) govern. The Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for clarification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't)	Held
Whether the district court could effectively backdate the federal sentence or award credit for pre‑sentence federal custody	Court intended to start sentence July 9, 2018 or give credit for time served, reducing sentence length	District court lacks authority to compute/award credit or backdate commencement; only BOP may do so; Taylor invited the error	Court: Invited‑error review; limited remand ordered for district court to state whether it would have imposed the same sentence knowing it could not backdate or award credit; if not, vacate and resentence; if yes, affirm
Whether the sentence is ambiguous as to which state sentence(s) the federal term runs concurrent with	Sentence should run concurrent with the state sentences on the related conduct; ambiguity prejudices Taylor	Any ambiguity does not plainly affect substantial rights; procedural default/forfeiture considerations	Court: Sentence is ambiguous because “conduct described” is unclear; plain‑error posture; limited remand ordered for the district court to clarify which state sentence(s) or state whether it would have imposed the same sentence despite ambiguity

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (BOP exclusively authorized to grant credit for time served)
United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840 (federal sentence cannot commence before pronouncement)
United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128 (sentences ambiguous as to time/manner may be illegal)
United States v. Garza, 448 F.3d 294 (criminal sentences must reveal intent with fair certainty)
United States v. Salazar, 751 F.3d 326 (invited‑error doctrine; no reversal absent manifest injustice)
United States v. Lemaire, 712 F.2d 944 (definition/standard for manifest injustice)
Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (limited remand mechanisms to determine whether error affected sentencing outcome)
United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960 (example of limited remand to ask district court whether it would have imposed a different sentence)