United States v. Tyrone Davis
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10661
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Tyrone Davis pleaded guilty in 2005 under a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea that stipulated drug quantity and a specific 216‑month sentence tied to Guidelines calculations; the district court accepted the plea and later reimposed the same sentence on resentencing.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) lowered the crack/powder sentencing ratio and the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines retroactively, enabling § 3582(c)(2) reductions for sentences "based on a sentencing range" later lowered by the Commission.
- Davis moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking a sentence reduction; the district court denied relief, concluding his sentence was based on the binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement rather than the Guidelines and that Freeman’s Sotomayor concurrence controlled.
- The Ninth Circuit initially followed United States v. Austin (holding Sotomayor’s concurrence controlled Freeman) but granted en banc review to reconsider Marks–Freeman interaction.
- The en banc majority held no single rationale in Freeman commanded a majority (Freeman was fractured 4–1–4), so lower courts are bound only by Freeman’s result and may adopt the plurality’s reasoning where persuasive; it overruled Austin and held Davis eligible to seek § 3582(c)(2) relief because the court’s acceptance of the plea was "based on" the Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How should Marks be applied to fractured Supreme Court decisions (reasoning-based vs. results-based)? | Marks should be applied so that a concurring opinion controls only if its rationale is the "narrowest grounds" logically subset of broader opinions (reasoning-based approach). | The fractured decision’s controlling rule is the rule that would produce outcomes a majority of Justices would agree on (results/votes-focused approach). | The court adopts a reasoning-based Marks test: a concurrence controls only if its rationale is a logical subset of other opinions; when no common rationale exists, lower courts are bound only by the case’s specific result. |
| Whether a defendant sentenced under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea is eligible for reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) | Davis: his plea and the district court’s acceptance were rooted in Guidelines calculations; thus the sentence was "based on" a subsequently lowered Guidelines range and he is eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief. | Government/district court: a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding agreement is itself the basis of the sentence, so sentences under such agreements are not "based on" Guidelines and are ineligible unless the agreement expressly ties the sentence to a Guidelines range. | Bound by Freeman’s ultimate result (not its concurrence): the court adopts Freeman plurality’s approach and holds Davis is eligible to seek a § 3582(c)(2) reduction because the court’s decision to accept and impose the agreed sentence was based on the Guidelines; remanded to determine whether a reduction should be granted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (fractured Supreme Court decision holding defendants sentenced under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) are not categorically barred from § 3582(c)(2) relief; plurality, concurrence, and dissent offered different rationales)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (when no rationale commands a majority, holding is position of those concurring on the narrowest grounds)
- United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concluded Freeman lacked a controlling opinion and adopted the Freeman plurality approach)
- United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2012) (prior Ninth Circuit panel holding Sotomayor’s Freeman concurrence controlled; overruled en banc)
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (illustrates courts sometimes look to dissents/concurrences to identify controlling rules from fractured decisions)
- National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (example where combining votes from concurrences and dissents produced a binding rule on jurisdictional limits)