53 F. Supp. 3d 450
D. Mass.2014Background
- After the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and subsequent identification of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, FBI agents obtained and executed multiple warrants in April–July 2013: searches of 410 Norfolk St. (Apr. 19, May 5), UMass Dartmouth dorm room (Apr. 21, July 26), a Sony VAIO laptop (Apr. 23), Yahoo! accounts (Apr. 19), and Gmail accounts (July 3).
- The April 19 Norfolk Street and April 21 dorm warrants listed broad categories of evidence (bomb-making materials, communications, financial records, digital evidence) and were executed; the FBI seized numerous items.
- On June 27 UMass staff, with an FBI agent present, collected the defendant’s remaining dormitory belongings after the academic term ended; no warrant was obtained for that entry.
- The defendant moved to suppress fruits of the physical and digital searches, challenging standing, warrant particularity, scope of seizure, lawfulness of the June 27 entry, probable cause for electronic-search warrants, and the procedures used to search digital data.
- The court denied suppression motions in full, holding defendant had standing to challenge some searches, found the warrants sufficiently particular (or subject to Leon good-faith), upheld the June 27 entry (defendant lacked standing with respect to the room), and rejected the claim that digital-search procedures required additional filtering or a taint team.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge Norfolk St. search | N/A (government contested) | Government: defendant had moved to dorms and was only an occasional overnight guest; abandoned residual privacy | Court: defendant has standing—warrant application treated apartment as his residence; absence at school did not effect abandonment |
| Particularity of physical-search warrants | N/A | Warrants too broad (generic categories, "including but not limited to", paras 8–12) enabling general rummaging | Court: read in context the warrants were sufficiently particular; even if some categories too broad, Leon good-faith precludes suppression |
| Scope of seizure / items seized beyond warrant | N/A | Seizures (e.g., textbooks, pizza box) suggest items outside warrant scope | Court: seizure of some non-responsive items does not invalidate entire search; admissibility to be resolved at trial; plain-view may apply |
| Warrantless June 27 UMass entry & agent presence | N/A | Defendant: UMass officials had no right to consent; he had not abandoned room or belongings | Court: defendant lacked objectively reasonable expectation in room after lease/occupancy ended; UMass could admit agent; observations lawful |
| Probable cause for digital warrants (Yahoo!, Sony, Gmail) | N/A | Defendant: warrants insufficient to show nexus to accounts/laptop; some reliance on contested hospital statements taints warrants | Court: magistrates could reasonably infer active use and nexus; contested hospital statements not sole basis; warrants supported probable cause; Leon good-faith applies |
| Search procedures for electronically stored information | N/A | FBI should have used filter/taint team or other minimization — otherwise risk of general rummaging | Court: execution consistent with Rule 41(e)(2)(B)'s two-step approach; no legal requirement for filtering here; officers’ choices within discretion |
| Request for evidentiary hearing | N/A | Defendant: factual disputes about over-seizure and extent of digital rummaging require live testimony | Court: defendant failed to show material factual disputes that cannot be resolved on paper; hearing denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (particularity requirement prevents general exploratory rummaging)
- Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (search must conform to warrant)
- Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (execution details generally left to executing officers)
- Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (warrant language read in context)
- Kuc v. United States, 737 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (particularity analyzed in context; limits on "general tail")
- Woodbury v. United States, 511 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2007) (deference to magistrate's probable-cause determination)
- Rodrigue v. United States, 560 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (practical, commonsense nexus inquiry)