United States v. Tommy Goodson
700 F. App'x 417
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Goodson pleaded guilty to three federal bank robberies (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) after admitting he passed robbery notes threatening death to obtain cash.
- His plea agreement acknowledged he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and contained an appellate-waiver (waiver not enforced by government here).
- The PSR applied the career-offender enhancement based on prior Michigan bank-robbery convictions and a federal bank-robbery conviction; Goodson didn’t object and was sentenced to 151 months.
- Goodson later moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming counsel failed to file a timely appeal; the district court granted relief and allowed a delayed appeal.
- On appellate review Goodson argued that, in light of Johnson and related decisions, Michigan bank robbery no longer qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ residual clause, so his career-offender status should be removed.
- The Sixth Circuit held the Michigan statute divisible, examined Shepard documents, concluded Goodson’s prior convictions were for the assaultive ("put in fear") variant, and affirmed that Michigan bank robbery qualifies under the Guidelines’ residual clause, so the sentence stands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Michigan bank robbery is divisible for categorical analysis | Goodson: statute is divisible; his convictions should be assessed under the assaultive variant | Govt: statute may create single offense; but court examined state law | Court: statute is divisible (assaultive vs. safecracking), so modified categorical approach applies |
| Whether Goodson’s Shepard documents show prior convictions were assaultive bank robbery | Goodson: charging papers use “put in fear,” implying assaultive variant | Govt: charging papers support conviction variant; conceded residual-clause reliance | Court: Shepard documents show the convictions were for the "put in fear" (assaultive) variant |
| Whether Michigan assaultive bank robbery is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ residual clause | Goodson: post-Johnson challenge; residual clause may be invalid or not applicable | Govt: residual clause (as interpreted post-Beckles) valid; bank robbery involves serious risk of physical injury | Court: Beckles forecloses vagueness challenge to §4B1.2(a)’s residual clause; Michigan bank robbery qualifies under that residual clause |
| Whether use-of-force clause also applies (alternate ground) | Goodson: argued prior convictions might not satisfy use-of-force clause | Govt: conceded residual clause; did not press use-of-force here | Court: did not decide use-of-force issue; affirmed under residual-clause analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873 (6th Cir.) (de novo review framework for crimes-of-violence questions)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines’ residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing alternative elements from alternative means)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible documents for the modified categorical approach)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (residual-clause analysis focuses on risk posed by the offense in the ordinary case)
- United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir.) (prior Sixth Circuit holding that Guidelines’ residual clause implicated vagueness concerns, later abrogated by Beckles)