United States v. Thompson
842 F.3d 1002
7th Cir.2016Background
- DEA and Chicago PD surveilled a suspected drug trafficking operation; agents saw Marvin Bausley meet with a man (later identified as Thompson) who entered Bausley’s car wearing a backpack, returned to an apartment building, and later appeared in the lobby without the backpack.
- Special Agent Reynolds encountered Thompson in the building lobby, asked questions, told him he was not under arrest, and performed a patdown; Reynolds recovered Thompson’s key ring and an elevator fob.
- Thompson twice denied being on the ninth floor or living in the building; Reynolds used the fob to ride to the ninth floor with Thompson’s assent.
- At 901 the agents mistakenly entered and swept the wrong unit with guns drawn; at 902 Reynolds used Thompson’s key to open the door, conducted a 30–45 second protective sweep (no contraband found), then asked Thompson for consent to search.
- Inside, after reading and signing a written consent form, Thompson admitted locations of a gun, ~1 kg cocaine, and $10,000; he later pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Thompson) | Defendant's Argument (Gov’t) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of initial stop in lobby | Stop was an unlawful seizure; agents lacked reasonable suspicion | Agents had reasonable suspicion based on surveillance linking Thompson to Bausley and recent activity | Stop constitutional — reasonable suspicion existed (Terry) |
| Legality of frisk (patdown) | Frisk was unconstitutional; no basis to believe armed/dangerous | Frisk justified because suspected drug traffickers often carry weapons and Thompson lied about ninth floor | Frisk constitutional — articulable suspicion he might be armed |
| Taking keys and escort to ninth floor; effect on custody | Taking keys and escort converted encounter into arrest without probable cause | Thompson consented to go; he was told he was not under arrest; agents had probable cause to arrest for false statements | No Fourth Amendment violation; even if arrest, probable cause existed (false statements under 18 U.S.C. §1001) |
| Entry/sweep of unit 902 before consent | Opening lock and sweep were unlawful searches, tainting later consent | Use of key to verify address is low-intrusion; brief protective sweep was permissible to ensure safety | Search and sweep reasonable and limited (protective sweep doctrine); consent thus not tainted |
| Voluntariness of consent to search | Consent was coerced/tainted by prior violations | Consent was knowing and voluntary: warned twice, short detention, no force, read and signed form | Consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes reasonable-suspicion standard for investigative stops)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (objective-suspicion inquiry for stops)
- Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (permissible scope of protective sweeps)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntary consent)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (valid arrest need not be for the offense the officer actually had in mind)
- United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (placing a key in a lock is a search but low privacy interest)
- United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901 (recognizing guns as tools of the drug trade in assessing officer safety)
- United States v. Beltran, 752 F.3d 671 (false statements to federal agents can supply probable cause)