Gamalier Concepcion consented to the search of his apartment, where agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration found cocaine. He pleaded guilty to possession of that drug with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and received 41 months’ imprisonment, reserving for appeal his objection to the validity of his consent. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Concepcion does not deny giving consent (he signed a form), and does not renew on appeal the argument, which did not persuade the district judge, that the consent was involuntary.
Concepcion contends that his consent is the fruit of two unlawful searches. After arresting him, the agents seized his possessions, including his keys. They found the nameplate “Concepcion” on the mailbox of a nearby apartment building. One of Concepcion’s keys opened the outer door. Inside the common area, the agents used the key to unlock apartment 1C. They opened the door an inch but immediately closed and locked it without looking inside. Next they asked Concepcion to consent to the search of apartment 1C. Concepcion denied knowing anything about the apartment; after the agents told him that his key opened the lock, that his name was on the mailbox, and that they had watched him most of the day and seen him use the apartment building, Concepcion relented and signed the consent form. The district court concluded that neither the entry into the common area nor the insertion of the key into the lock was an unreasonable search.
The district court believed that neither step was an unreasonable search because neither was a search at all. As the court observed, a “search” is the invasion of a sphere in which society recognizes
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reasonable expectations of privacy.
United States v. Jacobsen,
Strange as it may seem, the entry of the key into the lock presents a harder question than the entry of the agents into the hallway. A keyhole contains
information
— information about who has access to the space beyond. As the fourth amendment protects private information rather than formal definitions of property, see
Arizona v. Hicks,
Because the agents obtain information from the inside of the lock, which is both used frequently by the owner and not open to public view, it seems irresistible that inserting and turning the key is a “search”.
Hicks
provides a close parallel, holding that turning over a phonograph to read its serial number is a search. The bottom of a turntable is no more a storehouse for personal secrets than are the innards of a lock, yet the Court held the fourth amendment applicable. It does not follow, however, that the agents need a warrant or even probable cause to put a key into a lock.
Hicks
said that a warrant was unnecessary. The fourth amendment requires that searches be
reasonable,
and although a warrant may be an essential ingredient of reasonableness much of the time, for less intrusive searches it is not. E.g.,
California v. Acevedo,
— U.S. -,
Consider what information the “search” of the lock revealed. It told the agents that
Gamalier
Concepcion was the
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tenant of an apartment bearing the name “Concepcion”. This information induced him to consent. Where Gamalier Concepcion lived was something the agents could have ascertained in many other ways. They could have looked him up in the telephone book or conducted a computer search of drivers’ licenses. If they did not find him (or if they found too many persons of the same name), they could have visited the landlord and asked who lived in apartment 1C. Instead of asking the landlord who lived there, they could have shown the landlord the key in their possession and asked the landlord to compare it with the key issued to the tenant. So too the agents could have followed Concepcion around to learn his residence (as they did; the key just confirmed what they thought they knew). The information the agents obtained from putting the key in the lock thus was no secret. What the officers learned from inverting the turntable in
Hicks
they could not have come by in any other way; these agents thus invaded less of Concepcion’s interest in security of information when they used the key to verify his address. How much cause agents need to do something depends on how deeply they invade the zone of privacy.
United States v. Chaidez,
Affirmed.
