40 F.4th 797
7th Cir.2022Background
- Thomas Thayer pled guilty in Minnesota to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for groping his 14‑year‑old daughter while she slept; Minnesota required ten years of sex‑offender registration.
- Thayer later moved to Wisconsin and did not register; he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failing to comply with SORNA (34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq.).
- Thayer moved to dismiss, arguing his Minnesota conviction did not qualify as a SORNA "sex offense"; the district court applied a categorical analysis to parts of SORNA and dismissed the indictment as misaligned with Minnesota law.
- The government appealed, arguing the district court erred by using the categorical method for (1) § 20911(5)(A)(ii) as applied through § 20911(7)(I) and (2) the Romeo‑and‑Juliet exception in § 20911(5)(C).
- The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding both § 20911(5)(A)(ii) as applied through § 20911(7)(I) and § 20911(5)(C) must be analyzed under a circumstance‑specific approach; it affirmed Rogers on the Romeo‑and‑Juliet provision and joined other circuits on § 20911(7)(I).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Thayer) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 20911(5)(A)(ii) as applied through § 20911(7)(I) requires a categorical or circumstance‑specific analysis | § 20911(5)(A)(ii)/(7)(I) should be treated categorically; statute defines qualifying offenses as categories | The layered language focuses on the "conduct" of the particular offense, so circumstance‑specific analysis applies | Circumstance‑specific approach required |
| Whether the Romeo‑and‑Juliet exception in § 20911(5)(C) requires a categorical or circumstance‑specific analysis | § 20911(5)(C) (the close‑in‑age carve‑out) should be analyzed categorically, producing misalignment with Minnesota statute | Prior precedent (Rogers) and the statute's focus on conduct mandate circumstance‑specific analysis | Circumstance‑specific approach required; Rogers affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (explains circumstance‑specific inquiry focuses on the specific conduct underlying a conviction)
- Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (framework for whether statutory text requires categorical or conduct‑specific approach)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopts categorical method for certain cascading statutory definitions)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (discusses limits of residual clauses and categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (analyzes meaning of "offense" and when to apply categorical method)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (addresses when statutory language points to conduct‑specific inquiry)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (clarifies formal vs modified categorical approaches)
- United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015) (holds § 20911(5)(C) Romeo‑and‑Juliet exception requires circumstance‑specific analysis)
- United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2019) (interprets SORNA tiering provisions and explains hybrid analysis for tiers)
- United States v. Dailey, 941 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2019) (holds § 20911(5)(A)(ii)/(7)(I) requires circumstance‑specific approach and reached similar conclusion)
- United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 2015) (same conclusion regarding § 20911(7)(I))
- United States v. Hill, 820 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2016) (same conclusion regarding § 20911(7)(I))
- United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (same conclusion regarding § 20911(7)(I))