United States v. Thomas McCoy
981 F.3d 271
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background
- Multiple defendants were convicted of Hobbs Act robberies and multiple § 924(c) firearms counts in single prosecutions, receiving extremely long consecutive "stacked" mandatory sentences imposed before the First Step Act.
- The First Step Act (2018) eliminated § 924(c) sentence-stacking for convictions in the same case and amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants (not just the BOP) to file compassionate‑release motions for "extraordinary and compelling reasons."
- Defendants moved under the amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking reductions to time served, relying chiefly on the extraordinary length of their § 924(c) sentences and the large disparity between those sentences and what would be imposed post–First Step Act.
- District courts granted relief after individualized § 3553(a) analyses, emphasizing youth at offense, limited criminal history, rehabilitation in custody, substantial time served, and the sentencing disparity created by the First Step Act.
- The government appealed, arguing (1) the Sentencing Commission’s Guideline § 1B1.13 (and its catch‑all note) remains an "applicable policy statement" limiting courts to BOP‑approved reasons, and (2) the First Step Act’s change to § 924(c) cannot serve as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason because it was not made retroactive.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed: no applicable Commission policy governs defendant‑filed motions, and district courts permissibly treated sentence severity and statutory‑change disparity as extraordinary and compelling in individualized cases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is an "applicable policy statement" that binds courts on defendant‑filed compassionate‑release motions | § 1B1.13 predated First Step Act and is not applicable to defendant‑filed motions; BOP gatekeeping language conflicts with amended statute | § 1B1.13 applies and limits courts to BOP‑approved "other reasons" under App. Note 1(D) | § 1B1.13 is not an "applicable" policy statement for defendant‑filed motions; courts may independently assess "extraordinary and compelling" reasons until the Commission updates guidance |
| Whether unusually long § 924(c) sentences (and the disparity created by the First Step Act) can be "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for release | The sentencing disparity and extreme length are extraordinary and can justify relief after individualized § 3553(a) review | Consideration would effectively apply § 403 retroactively and is inappropriate because Congress did not make that change retroactive | Courts may consider sentence severity and the gap between imposed sentences and post‑First Step Act norms as extraordinary and compelling in particular cases |
| Whether courts must await the Sentencing Commission or be constrained by the lack of a new policy statement | Courts should act; absence of an "applicable" policy statement frees courts to decide | Only the Commission may define "extraordinary and compelling"; courts lack authority if no policy statement exists | Courts are authorized to act when no applicable Commission statement exists; "consistent with" requirement is inapplicable to nonexistent guidance |
| Whether consideration of these factors usurps executive clemency or violates separation of powers | Relief is statutory (compassionate release), not clemency; courts operate within § 3582(c)(1)(A) | Grants amount to judicial clemency or retroactive resentencing reserved to other branches | No separation‑of‑powers violation: courts exercised congressionally delegated authority under § 3582(c)(1)(A) with individualized findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (holding earlier rule treating § 924(c) convictions in the same prosecution as "second or subsequent" for enhanced penalties)
- Zullo v. United States, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (defendants may seek compassionate release; § 1B1.13 not "applicable" to defendant‑filed motions)
- United States v. Jordan, 952 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2020) (First Step Act § 403 clarifies § 924(c) stacking and is not retroactive to previously final sentences)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (courts must ensure reductions are consistent with applicable policy statements where such statements exist)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (statutes prevail over Sentencing Guidelines where conflict exists)
- United States v. Black, 737 F.3d 280 (4th Cir. 2013) (limits of § 3582(c)(2) reductions where statutory minimums change)
- United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2020) (severe stacked § 924(c) sentence plus disparity may be "extraordinary and compelling")
- United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (analysis of post–First Step Act compassionate‑release process and § 1B1.13 applicability)