United States v. Thomas Faulls, Sr.
821 F.3d 502
4th Cir.2016Background
- Thomas Faulls was convicted of kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)), interstate domestic violence (18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), (b)(4)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); jury also found aggravated sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(2)) as an underlying crime of violence.
- Facts: after a volatile separation, Faulls confronted and threatened his wife Lori on multiple occasions (the Mineral and Williamsburg incidents); on August 22, 2012 he restrained Lori, transported her interstate, and she later escaped and reported him.
- At trial, Faulls’s counsel’s cross-examination of a bartender elicited testimony that Lori appeared free to leave; the court found this opened the door to admit a government domestic-violence expert on psychological dynamics of intimate partner violence.
- The district court admitted testimony about the prior Mineral and Williamsburg incidents under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) with limiting instructions, and the jury convicted Faulls on all counts; sentencing included an enhancement for obstruction and the requirement that Faulls register under SORNA.
- On appeal Faulls challenged (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (opening the door to expert testimony; failing to object to jurors staying late), (2) admission of prior-act 404(b) evidence, and (3) the district court’s SORNA sex-offender registration determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (opening door to expert; failure to object to late jury) | Faulls: counsel erred on cross-exam and by not objecting to keeping jury late, prejudicing trial | Government: record does not conclusively show ineffectiveness on direct appeal | Declined to decide on direct appeal; claim not conclusively established on the face of the record — may be raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 |
| Admission of domestic-violence expert after cross-exam | Faulls: expert should have been barred; counsel’s questions did not open the door | Government: bartender’s testimony raised both physical and psychological issue of whether victim could flee, permitting rebuttal expert | Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; expert testimony was permissible rebuttal to psychological component raised on cross-exam |
| Admission of prior acts (Mineral & Williamsburg) under Rule 404(b) | Faulls: prior incidents irrelevant or unduly prejudicial (impermissible propensity evidence) | Government: prior acts relevant to motive, plan, control/domination, and victim’s state of mind; limiting instruction given | Affirmed — evidence was relevant, necessary to explain victim’s state of mind and motive, reliable, and probative value not substantially outweighed prejudice given limiting instruction |
| SORNA sex-offender registration based on interstate domestic violence conviction | Faulls: § 2261(a)(2) is not categorically a sex offense; SORNA requires a conviction of an offense with an element involving a sexual act or contact | Government: jury found aggravated sexual abuse as the underlying crime of violence; that conviction satisfies SORNA’s element-based definition | Affirmed — applying the modified categorical approach to the divisible statute, the jury found aggravated sexual abuse (an element involving a sexual act), so SORNA registration was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542 (4th Cir.) (standard for viewing evidence in government’s favor)
- United States v. Campbell, 259 F.3d 293 (4th Cir.) (Apprendi/elemental analysis for penalty enhancements in circuit precedent)
- United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (4th Cir.) (divisibility and modified categorical approach guidance)
- United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700 (4th Cir.) (applying categorical/modified categorical frameworks to SORNA analyses)
- Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.) (categorical-match principle and comparison to generic federal offenses)
- United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir.) (purpose and limits of categorical inquiry)