Lead Opinion
Petition for review granted; reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge FLOYD wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge WYNN joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a separate concurring opinion.
In this appeal, we consider whether Sayed Gad Omargharib’s conviction under Virginia’s grand larceny statute, Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-95, constitutes an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) answered this question-in the affirmative using the so-called modified categorical approach, as clаrified by Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -,
Consistent with our prior precedent on this issue, however, we conclude that mere use of the disjunctive “or” in the definition of a crime does not automatically render it divisible. We further hold that, under our recent decisions construing Descamps, the Virginia crime of larceny is indivisible as a matter of law. As such, we agree with Omargharib that the modified categorical approach has no role to play in this case. Instead, the categorical approach applies, and under that approach Omargharib’s grand larceny conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony under the INA. We therefore grant Omargharib’s petition for review, reverse the BIA’s ruling, and remand with instructions to vacate the order of removal.
I.
Omargharib, an Egyptian native and citizen, entered the United States in 1985 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 2011, he was convicted in Virginia state court of grand larceny under Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-95 for “tak[ing], stealing], and carry[ing] away” two pool cues valued in excess of $200 following a dispute with his opponent in a local pool league. J.A. 452. Omargharib received a suspended sentence of twelve months.
Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought Omar-gharib’s removal, contending that his сonviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the INA—namely, “a theft offense ... for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U.S.C.
Under the categorical approach, it is thus possible that Omargharib’s grand larceny conviction rested on facts amounting to fraud, not theft. It is undisputed that Omargharib’s conviction does not constitute a fraud, offense under the INA.
The IJ agreed that Virginia’s definition of larceny is broader than the INA’s corresponding “theft offense” crime and thus that the two crimes are not a categorical match.
Omargharib appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. On September 6, 2013, the BIA dismissed Omargharib’s appeal and affirmed the IJ’s decision in all respects. Like the IJ, the BIA concluded that the modified categorical approach applied because Virginia law defines larceny in the disjunctive to include “wrongful or fraudulent” takings. J.A. 3. Omargharib then timely petitioned this Court for review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
II.
The central issue before us is whether Omargharib’s 2011 grand larceny convic
We review the BIA’s determination on this issue de novo. Karimi v. Holder,
To qualify as an aggravated felony, Om-argharib’s conviction must have been “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Because we conclude that his crime of conviction did not constitute a “theft offense” under the INA, we reverse without reaсhing Omargharib’s alternative argument that his term of imprisonment was for less than one year.
A.
In order to determine whether a state law conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for removal purposes, we use the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States,
By contrast, the INA expressly distinguishes between theft and fraud offenses. Unlike the INA’s theft offense, which is not tied to any dollar threshold, the INA’s fraud offense only applies if the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft) with id. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (fraud). Consistent with this distinction, we have previously held that a conviction for credit card fraud for less than $10,000 under Virginia law does not amount to a “theft offense” or “fraud offense” for purposes of the INA. Soliman,
In short, Virginia law treats fraud and theft as the same for larceny purposes, but the INA treats them differently. As such, Virginia larceny “sweeps more broadly” than the INA’s theft offense. Descamps,
B.
The government claims a different rеsult is warranted under the modified categorical approach. As Descamps recently clarified, the modified categorical approach applies only if a state crime consists of “multiple, alternative elements” creating “several different crimes,” some of which would match the generic federal offense and others that would not. 133
According to the government, the BIA correctly applied the modified categorical approach and so properly examined the underlying facts of Omargharib’s conviction to determine that he was convicted of theft, not fraud.
After Descamps, we may apply the modified categorical approach only if the state crime at issue is divisible. Id. at 2283. A сrime is divisible only if it is defined to include “potential offense elements in the alternative,” thus rendering “opaque which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction.” Id. Stated differently, crimes are divisible only if they “set out elements in the alternative and thus create multiple versions of the crime.”
The government asserts that the Virginia common-law crime of larceny is divisible because it purportedly lists the elements of theft and fraud in the altérna-tive. See Britt,
As we have previously held, however, use of the word “or” in the definition of a crime does not automatically render the crime divisible. See United States v. Royal,
Our decision in Royal is particularly instructive. In that case we addressed a crime defined in the alternative—assault under Maryland law—and held that it was indivisible under Descamps.
We likewise conclude here that Virginia juries are not instructed to agree “unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt” on whether defendants charged with larceny took property “wrongfully” or “fraudulently.” Rather, as in Royal, it is enough for a larceny conviction that each juror agrees only that either a “wrongful or fraudulent” taking occurred, without settling on which. By way of example, the Virginia model jury instruction for grand larceny requires only a finding that “the taking was against the will and without the consent of the owner.” 2-36 Virginia Model Jury Instructions—Criminal G36.100 (2014). The model instruction does not tell the jury to distinguish between wrongful and fraudulent takings—rather, it only requires a finding of a taking “without the consent of the owner.” Id. Moreover, Virginia law has long used the “wrongful” versus “fraudulent” distinction as two different means of satisfying the “without consent” element:
The common law had substantial difficulty with cases in which the thief, intending permanently to deprive the possessor of his chattel, obtained possession of it with the apparent consent of the possessor by use of some fraud. Such conduct, called larceny by trick, was assimilated into larceny on the theory that consent obtained by fraud was not true consent and hence that the taker had trespassed upon the chattel without consent of the possessor. The Virginia definition [of larceny], by use of the word “fraudulent” has adopted this doctrine and often applied it. This is the theory upon which cashing a forged check becomes larceny.
Ronald J. Bacigal, Larceny and Receiving, in Virginia Practice Series, Va. Prac. Criminal Offenses & Defenses L3 (2014); see also John Wesley Bartram, Note, Pleading for Theft Consolidation in Virginia: Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses and § 19.2-28b, 56 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 249, 260-61 (1999) (noting that Virginia incorpоrates larceny by trick into its common law larceny definition through the use of the word “fraudulent”); Skeeter,
In summary, we conclude that larceny in Virginia law is indivisible as a matter of law. That means only the categorical approach applies. And as established above, Omargharib’s larceny conviction is not categorically an INA-theft offense. The government makes no meaningful argument to rebut this analysis other than pointing to the disjunctive “or” in Virginia’s definition of larceny.
III.
Because Omargharib’s 2011 conviction for grand larceny, in violation of Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-95, was not a “theft offense” under the INA, the BIA erred as a matter of law in relying on that conviction as a basis to order his removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we grant Omargharib’s petition for review, reverse the BIA’s decision, and remand the action with instructions to vacate Omargharib’s order of removal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Notes
. Omargharib later filed a motion to reconsider his sentence (which the trial court denied), but did not appeal his conviction. He also-filed habeas motions in both state and federal court, all of which were likewise denied.
. The INA’s theft offense is not tied to аny dollar threshold—a theft of even one penny will suffice as long as the term of imprisonment is at least one year. In contrast, the INA’s fraud offense only applies if the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000.
. The record reflects that the two pool cues were together valued between $525 and $800—well below the INA's $10,000 fraud threshold. Accordingly, the government does not argue that Omargharib's conviction constitutes a fraud offense under the INA.
. At the hearing, the IJ first issued an oral decision devoid of any legal analysis. Omar-gharib appеaled the oral decision to the BIA, which remanded back to the IJ to explain his reasoning. The IJ issued a written order on December 26, 2012.
.If Omargharib’s state law conviction had been classified as a crime under the INA other than an aggravated felony he could have sought certain discretionary relief from removal, such as asylum or cancellation of removal. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, - U.S. -,
. Although Taylor discussed divisibility in the сontext of a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), we have held that it applies equally in the immigration context to determine whether an alien is removable under the INA as a result of a prior conviction. See Karimi,
. The elements-based categorical approach thus avoids the "daunting ... practical difficulties and potential unfairness" of a facts-based approach. Id. at 2289. Among other problems, a facts-based approach would require sentencing courts "to expend resources examining (often aged) documents for evidence that a defendant admitted in a plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial, facts that, although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an element of the relevant generic offense. The meaning of those documents will often be uncertain. And the statements of fact in them may be downright wrong. A defendant, after all, often has little incentive to contest facts that are not elements of the charged offense...."). Id. at 2289.
. Although Omargharib was convicted of grand larceny under Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-95, that statute does not define the elements of larceny in Virginia. Rather, it merely categorizes larceny of more than $200 as "grand larceny” and defines the punishment for that crime. Id. The statute thus incorporates Virginia’s common-law recitation of the elements for larceny. And although Descamps addressed a state crime defined by statute, we have since held that the Descamps analysis applies to state crimes that, as here, are defined by common law rather than by statute. United States v. Hemingway,
. As these cases demonstrate, a "wrongful” taking means a taking without the victim's consent; a "fraudulent” taking means a taking with the victim's consent that has been obtained fraudulently. As set forth below, both wrongful and fraudulent takings satisfy the "without consent” element of larceny under Virginia law. In contrast, under the generic federal definition of "theft,” fraudulent takings do not constitute takings "without consent.” See Soliman v. Gonzales,
.These documents derive their name from the Supreme Court's decision in Shepard v. United States,
.Because we find that the modified categorical approach does not apply, we need not address Omargharib's alternative argument that he would also prevail under that approach because the Shepard documents purportedly do not demonstrate whether he was convicted of a "theft offense.”
.An indivisible crime, by contrast, contains the same elements as the federal crime (or omits an element entirely), but construes those elements expansively to criminalize a "broader swath of conduct” than the relevant federal law. Descamps,
. Although Virginia law does distinguish certain types of fraud offenses from general larceny, see Va.Code Ann. §§ 18.2-111 (proscribing embezzlement), 18.2-178 (proscribing obtaining money by fаlse pretense), the above authorities clearly demonstrate that larceny by trick—a fraud-based offense—is included within Virginia’s general definition of larceny.
. The government's policy argument that a ruling in Omargharib's favor will end deportations for theft and fraud crimes in Virginia is not well-founded. Although Virginia larceny convictions will no longer support an "aggravated felony” finding under the INA, "escaping aggravated felony treatment does not mean escaping deportation.... It means only avoiding mandatoiy removal.” Moncrieffe,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I am pleased to concur in Judge Floyd’s well-crafted opinion, especially in light of the existing state of the law regarding when to apply the modified categorical approach. Because of the ever-morphing analysis and the increasingly blurred articulation of applicable standards, we are being asked to decide, without clear and workable standards, whether disjunctive phrases in a criminal law define alternative elements of a crime or alternative means of committing it.
More particularly, in this case, we are called upon to decide whether a wrongful taking and a fraudulent taking are alternative elements defining two versions of the crime of larceny or alternative means of committing larceny. While Judge Floyd concludes that the applicable Virginia law defines alternative means, thereby precluding use of the modified categorical approach under current law, I find it especially difficult to comprehend the distinction. Virginia’s law could just as easily be viewed as prescribing two crimes: (1) larceny by wrongful taking, and (2) larceny by fraudulent taking.
Whatever a statute lists (whether elements or means), the documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard ... [will] reflect the crime’s elements. So a court need not parse state law in the way the dissent suggests: When a state law is drafted in the alternative, the court merely resorts to the approved documents and compares the elements revealed there to those of the generic offense.
Id. Respectfully, this purportedly comforting language hardly clarifies. Indeed, in dissent, Justice Alito stated:
While producing very modest benefits at most, the Court’s holding will create several serious problems.... To determine whether a statute contains alternative elements, as opposed to merely alternative means of satisfying an element, a court ... will be required to look beyond the text of the statute, which may be deceptive.... The only way to be sure whether particular items are alternative elements or simply alternative means of satisfying an element may be to find cases concerning the correctness of jury instructions that treat the items one way or the other. And such cases may not arise frequently.
Id. at 2301-02 (Alito, J., dissenting). In Justice Alito’s view, a more practical approach is required.
Similarly, in his separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed that “the dichotomy between divisible and indivisible state criminal statutes is not all that clear” and suggested that the Court’s decision would require state legislatures to amend
The relevant Virginia conviction for grаnd larceny in this case could have been obtained either by showing that the defendant wrongfully took property, which Judge Floyd notes would constitute a generic theft conviction, or by showing that the defendant fraudulently took property, which he notes would not constitute generic theft. One would think that whether the defendant was convicted of a wrongful taking or a fraudulent taking could appropriately be resolved by looking at the documents identified in Shepard v. United States,
Were the Supreme Court willing to take another look at this area of law, it might well be persuaded, when focusing on the goals of the categorical approach, to simply allow lower courts to consider Shepard documents in any case where they could assist in determining whether the defendant was convicted of a generic qualifying crime. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez,
The applicable statute prohibits "simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more,” Va.Code Ann. § 18.2—95(ii), leaving “larceny”