United States v. Taylor
272 F. Supp. 3d 127
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Taylor pled guilty (Alford) in 2003 to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Court sentenced him to 180 months under ACCA § 924(e) based on three prior convictions (MD assault with intent to rape (AWIR), D.C. assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW), D.C. cocaine distribution).
- At sentencing the ACCA and then-mandatory Guidelines enhancements applied; Taylor did not appeal his sentence.
- Johnson v. United States (2015) held the ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; Welch (2016) made Johnson retroactive on collateral review. Taylor filed a § 2255 motion asserting he no longer qualifies for ACCA treatment.
- The Government contested timeliness, reliance on the residual clause, and procedural default; also argued the state offenses still qualify under the ACCA elements clause.
- The court applied the categorical approach, considered state statutory elements and caselaw, and analyzed whether AWIR and ADW satisfy the ACCA elements clause (use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force).
- Held: Maryland AWIR qualifies as an ACCA violent felony; D.C. ADW does not (because it can be grounded on reckless conduct or weapons/means that do not require violent physical force). Court granted § 2255 and ordered resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Taylor's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor may rely on Johnson (2015) to challenge his ACCA sentence | Court did not necessarily rely on the residual clause; claims untimely or procedurally defaulted | Johnson (2015) is the new right; claims timely and not procedurally defaulted | Court: Johnson (2015) applies; Taylor need only show the court may have relied on the residual clause; claims timely and cause/prejudice overcome default |
| Timeliness: is Taylor's claim based on earlier Johnson (2010) making it untimely | Claims derive from Johnson (2010) and should have been raised earlier | Claims are properly based on Johnson (2015) because residual clause invalidation made the challenge viable | Held timely under §2245(f)(3) because Johnson (2015) created the new right |
| Procedural default / cause & prejudice for not raising issue on direct appeal | Taylor waived or procedurally defaulted by plea and failure to appeal | Johnson (2015) was unforeseeable; futility excused default; improper ACCA sentence caused prejudice | Court finds cause (novelty of Johnson) and prejudice (improper 15‑year mandatory minimum) and reaches merits |
| Do MD AWIR and D.C. ADW qualify as ACCA "violent felonies" under the elements clause? | Both prior convictions qualify as violent felonies under elements clause | Neither (or ADW at least) lacks the required violent-force element; ADW permits reckless theory and weapons that may not require violent force | Court: MD AWIR qualifies as a violent felony; D.C. ADW does not (can be committed recklessly or by means not involving violent physical force). Result: only two qualifying priors, ACCA enhancement improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" in elements clause means violent force)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines rendered advisory)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (definition of "use of physical force" in §922(g)(9), domestic-violence context)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility/elements v. means distinction)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless misdemeanor domestic-assault counts under §922(g)(9))
- United States v. Redrick, 841 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (analysis distinguishing offenses requiring the use of a weapon and violent force)