United States v. Taylor
848 F.3d 476
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 20, 2013, postal carrier Fai Wu was violently attacked, shot in the wrist, beaten, kidnapped in his mail truck, and escaped by jumping from the moving truck; the attacker fled and discarded Wu’s uniform.
- Investigators tied a white U-Haul van to the crime by surveillance, physical evidence (blood, purple nitrile gloves), and rental records; Taylor’s DNA and blood were found on clothing and along the flight path; Wu’s blood was found on the van.
- Taylor and co-defendant Maurice Gittens were charged federally with conspiracy, assault on a federal employee, robbery/attempted robbery, kidnapping/attempted kidnapping, and use of a firearm in a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); Gittens pleaded guilty; Taylor was tried and convicted on all counts.
- At trial the court excluded a government letter identifying Kemron Roache as an unindicted co-conspirator (the “Roache Letter”) and excluded a police-quoted statement by Gittens that he picked up Roache at 6:00 p.m. (the "Gittens Statement"); Taylor argued misidentification (Roache, not Taylor, committed the offense).
- Taylor objected at sentencing to treating a prior Massachusetts larceny-from-person conviction as a crime of violence for career-offender calculation; the court treated him as a career offender, computed Guidelines at 360 months–life, but varied downward and imposed 235 months plus a consecutive 120 months for § 924(c).
- On appeal the First Circuit affirmed convictions, rejected evidentiary and closing-argument claims, held § 111(b) (assault with a dangerous weapon / inflicting bodily injury) qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the § 924(c) force clause, but found the Guidelines career-offender calculation erroneous and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Taylor's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Roache Letter | Admissible as non-hearsay admission of party-opponent to show Roache was co-conspirator (supporting misidentification defense) | Letter would confuse issues and invite a mini-trial; probative value low | Even if exclusion were error, it was harmless given overwhelming inculpatory evidence; conviction stands |
| Exclusion of Gittens Statement | Admissible as statement against penal interest (Rule 804(b)(3)) or under completeness doctrine | Made to police with motive to lie; insufficient corroboration and not required for completeness | Trial court did not abuse discretion; statement was untrustworthy and exclusion proper |
| Prosecutor's closing remarks | Improperly commented on Taylor's failure to testify/produce evidence and attacked defense counsel | Prosecutor argued lack of record support for defense theory; comments targeted record evidence, not defendant’s silence | No plain error: remarks were fair rebuttal to defense theory and not natural implication of comment on silence |
| §924(c) predicate: are convictions "crimes of violence"? | Residual clause vague; robbery/kidnapping insufficient; assault not a proper predicate | Even if residual clause problematic, § 111(b) (use of weapon or inflicting injury) meets force-clause definition of crime of violence | § 111(b) is a crime of violence under the § 924(c) force clause; Taylor's § 924(c) conviction affirmed |
| Constructive amendment (indictment vs jury instruction) re: §924(c) predicates | Jury instructions allowed conviction on assault though assault not listed as §924(c) predicate in indictment, so indictment was constructively amended | Grand jury had found use of a firearm during the assault; any error was forfeited and not shown prejudicial under plain error review | Forfeited; no prejudicial plain error because grand jury had found the assault-based conduct |
| Sentencing Guidelines (career-offender) | Prior Massachusetts larceny-from-person was wrongly treated as a crime of violence; Guidelines range therefore inflated | Government conceded error was clear or obvious but argued sentence would be same regardless | Error prejudicial under plain-error framework; remand for resentencing so district court can reconsider sentence with correct Guidelines calculation |
Key Cases Cited
- Burgos-Montes v. United States, 786 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings and factual presentation when sufficiency not challenged)
- Jiménez v. United States, 419 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Rose v. United States, 104 F.3d 1408 (1st Cir. 1997) (harmless-error standard: "highly probable" error did not contribute to verdict)
- Wilkerson v. United States, 411 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (plain-error standard and when prosecutor comments violate Fifth Amendment)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force" as violent force for ACCA analysis)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical/modified categorical approaches to determine elements of an offense)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (prejudice from incorrect Guidelines range: reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Brandao v. United States, 539 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2008) (analysis of constructive amendment and plain-error forfeiture)