United States v. Sykes
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19612
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Sykes pled guilty in 2004 to distributions of cocaine base counts carrying mandatory minimums of 5 and 10 years.
- Original sentencing in 2004 set a Guideline range of 121–151 months and imposed 121 months; the court did not state a mandatory minimum at that hearing.
- Amendment 706 in 2008 lowered crack-base offense levels; retroactivity was applied by May 3, 2008.
- Sykes moved in 2009 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking a reduction based on Amendment 706.
- District court in 2010 reduced the sentence to 120 months under § 3582(c)(2), applying the 120-month statutory minimum from § 841(b)(1)(A).
- Sykes appeals, arguing that applying the 120-month minimum in § 3582(c)(2) was a resentencing and violated Dillon and Apprendi.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying the 120-month statutory minimum in § 3582(c)(2) constitutes a new sentence. | Sykes contends it is a resentencing under Dillon. | Government argues § 3582(c)(2) permits only a limited sentence modification. | Not a new sentence; § 3582(c)(2) permits modification within amended range. |
| Whether Amendment 706 reductions can lower the sentence below the mandatory minimum in § 841(b)(1)(A). | Amendment 706 should permit a reduction below the statutory minimum. | Minimums remain binding; court cannot reduce below them. | District court could modify to 120 months within amended range; below-minimum reduction not allowed. |
| Whether the pre-FSA (Fair Sentencing Act) scheme applies retroactively to Sykes' § 3582(c)(2) modification. | FSA retroactive effects could alter exposure. | FSA not retroactive to pre-August 3, 2010 sentences. | FSA does not retroactively apply to Sykes' pre-2010 sentence; no due process violation. |
| Whether the delay between original sentencing and modification raises Sixth Amendment concerns. | Sixth Amendment speedy-trial/due-process issues due to delay. | Modification is not a new sentence; no delay issue. | No Sixth Amendment plain-error violation; modification is not a new sentencing. |
| Whether the modification implicates double jeopardy as an implicit conviction for a lesser offense. | New sentence could imply conviction for a lesser included offense. | No new sentence; no implicit conviction. | No double jeopardy violation; not a new conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (limits § 3582(c)(2) to a limited sentence modification, not plenary resentencing)
- Hollis, 490 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (drug quantity and crack determinations; Apprendi-context not retroactive)
- Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (when mandatory minimum governs, § 3582(c)(2) does not reduce below minimum)
- Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi retroactivity limitations in retroactive applications)
- DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011) (Abrogated Hollis; clarifies cocaine-base meaning under § 841)
- Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines advisory; governs earlier firm mandatory-minimum context)
- United States v. Fox, 631 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (policy statement limits below-range modifications in § 3582(c)(2))