United States v. Steven Flowers, 963 F.3d 492

Background

In 2004 Flowers pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute >50g of crack; plea limited government’s allegations of prior convictions so the mandatory minimum was 20 years (rather than life).
Under the then-mandatory Guidelines Flowers was a career offender, yielding a Guidelines range of 262–327 months; the district court sentenced him to 262 months.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) reduced the statutory mandatory minimum for his offense from 20 to 10 years; it was not retroactive until the First Step Act (2018) authorized discretionary resentencing.
In 2019 Flowers moved under the First Step Act, arguing (1) he is eligible because the Fair Sentencing Act changed the statutory penalties, (2) his sentence should be reduced because a later Ohio statutory amendment would mean he is no longer a career offender (thus lowering his Guidelines range), and (3) his prison education and behavior support a reduction.
The government conceded technical eligibility but opposed reducing the sentence because Flowers’ Guidelines range remained unchanged; alternatively, it argued the original sentence remained reasonable if the court considered a Booker-era variance.
The district court denied Flowers’ motion, stating the Guidelines range had not changed, it had not relied on the now-reduced mandatory minimum at the original sentencing, and Flowers’ post-conviction record did not warrant a reduction. Flowers appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Eligibility under the First Step Act	Flowers: First Step Act eligibility depends only on statutory change under the Fair Sentencing Act, not on whether Guidelines changed.	Government: Flowers is "technically" eligible but his unchanged Guidelines range means no relief.	Court: Flowers is eligible; any district-court suggestion otherwise was harmless because it denied relief on the merits.
Whether district court erred by refusing to consider Ohio law change re: career-offender status	Flowers: Court should consider change in state law as reflecting community views and as relevant to §3553(a) analysis (not relitigation of original classification).	Government/District Court: Ohio amendment was not retroactive and does not alter the Guidelines calculation for his original conviction.	Court: District court permissibly declined to apply the non-retroactive state amendment to alter Guidelines; it did consider §3553(a) factors and did not err.
Reliance on original mandatory minimum at resentencing	Flowers: At original sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, so the court could not consider the lower statutory minimum then; pointing to the court’s not relying on the mandatory minimum is improper.	Government: District court only noted it had not relied on the mandatory minimum—ruling that this reason for resentencing was absent—not using it as independent basis to deny relief.	Court: Comment was explanatory, not a legal error; district court correctly treated this as one factor and did not abuse discretion.
Weight given to post-conviction rehabilitation (education, discipline)	Flowers: Significant prison education and limited infractions warrant a reduced sentence.	Government/District Court: Record shows only some education and minor infractions; not sufficient to warrant reduction.	Court: District court’s factual assessment and weighting were within its broad discretion; no clear error or abuse of discretion.

Key Cases Cited

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding Guidelines advisory)
Beamus v. United States, 943 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act eligibility turns on statutory amendment by Fair Sentencing Act)
Alexander v. United States, 951 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act permits resentencing to effectuate Fair Sentencing Act changes)
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (harmless error and prejudicial effect in sentencing)
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (scope of district-court explanation in sentence-reduction proceedings)
Landrum v. Anderson, 813 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion standard explained)