Lawrence LANDRUM, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carl ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 14-3591
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 12, 2016
April 12, 2016
813 F.3d 330
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Lawrence Landrum appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for habeas corpus under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Landrum argues that, in light of Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), the alleged ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel enables us to examine the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion, and that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. For grounds other than those relied on by the district court, we affirm.
I.
Landrum was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder for breaking into eighty-four-year-old Harold White‘s apartment and killing him in September 1985. The jury found two death penalty specifications: (1) Landrum committed aggravated murder to escape detection for committing burglary, and (2) Landrum was the principal offender in an aggravated murder while committing or attempting burglary. Evidence at trial established that Landrum and Grant Swackhammer entered White‘s apartment to burglarize it. After White returned to his apartment and threatened to call the police, Swackhammer struck White repeatedly on the head with a railroad bolt, causing White to fall. Landrum then got on top of him, searched his pockets, and told Swackhammer to get a knife from the kitchen. Later that night, Landrum told friends that he had slit White‘s throat, but at trial, he testified that he left the room and returned to discover that Swackhammer had killed White. Landrum and Swackhammer took about $80 and pills from White‘s apartment. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Landrum‘s conviction and sentence in 1990. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1991.
Landrum filed a petition for state post-conviction relief in 1996. The trial court denied Landrum‘s petition; the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court denied further review.
In 1998, Landrum applied to reopen his appeal under
Landrum filed a petition in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus in 1996, an amended petition in 1999, and a second amended petition in 2000. The district court ruled, inter alia, that Landrum did not procedurally default his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because Rule 26(B) was not firmly established and regularly followed in Ohio capital cases. The district court granted Landrum a conditional writ on the basis that his counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase for failing to introduce testimony from Rameal Coffenberger that Swackhammer had confessed to cutting White‘s throat (the Coffenberger claim). Coffenberger was an acquaintance of Swackhammer and Landrum, and had allegedly encountered Swackhammer shortly after the murder, though there is evidence that Coffenberger told police he had not seen Swackhammer after the murder. According to Landrum‘s trial attorney, Coffenberger, who was incarcerated at the time, reached out to him to disclose “information that could potentially help [Landrum].” Trial Tr. Vol. 7, 128, Feb. 21, 1986, ECF No 282-2.
On appeal, this court reversed the district court‘s decision to grant Landrum relief based on the Coffenberger claim. Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 2010). We held that Landrum procedurally defaulted this claim and did not show cause for his default or prejudice to his defense. Id. at 916-19. Landrum‘s
In 2012, Landrum filed a motion under
Because we conclude Landrum has not presented a “substantial claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the district court‘s judgment on alternative grounds. See Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting this court‘s power “to affirm on alternative grounds not reached by the court below“).1
II.
This court reviews a district court‘s decision to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 2014); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2006). “Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Burrell v. Henderson, 434 F.3d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Amernational Indus., Inc.
III.
A.
As a preliminary matter, the Warden argues that the district court erred in initially granting Landrum‘s Rule 60(b) motion. Landrum responds that because the Warden did not raise the issue in a cross appeal, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. It is true that, absent a cross-appeal, the appellee “may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.” Smith v. Ky. State Univ., 97 F. App‘x 22, 25 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924)). However, this court may consider any arguments that support the lower court‘s judgment, even if a cross appeal is not filed. Id.; see also Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. at 435-36 (“[T]he appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record.... [Appellee] does not attack, in any respect, the decree entered below. It merely asserts additional grounds why the decree should be affirmed.“) (emphasis added); Harrah‘s Entm‘t, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 100 F. App‘x 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The Warden‘s argument simply gives additional reasons why this court should affirm the district court‘s denial of relief, so we will consider this argument.
B.
A movant seeking relief under
Landrum argues that, in light of Martinez and Trevino, ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel enables us to examine the merits of the Coffenberger claim. In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance or lack of collateral counsel may constitute cause to excuse the procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 132 S.Ct. at 1320.
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. Id. A substantial claim is one that has some merit or that has some factual support. Id. at 1318-19 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Trevino applied the Martinez exception to Texas “where ... state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.” 133 S.Ct. at 1921.
This court has not yet determined whether Trevino justifies Rule 60(b) relief under Ohio law. Henness, 766 F.3d at 557; McGuire, 738 F.3d at 751-52. However, we need not decide the issue here because, just as in Henness and McGuire, Landrum has failed to demonstrate a “substantial claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Henness, 766 F.3d at 557; McGuire, 738 F.3d at 752.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Landrum must show both that his counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel‘s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Abby v. Howe, 742 F.3d 221, 226 (6th Cir. 2014); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2006). Such performance prejudices a defendant in the guilt phase if “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Hinton v. Alabama, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1089, 188 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). To determine whether a defendant was prejudiced, the court must consider all of the evidence presented to the jury. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Jackson v. Bradshaw, 681 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2012). “[A] verdict ... only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Jackson, 681 F.3d at 760-61 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
Landrum may have a claim for deficient performance but he cannot establish prejudice arising therefrom. Landrum‘s counsel believed that Swackhammer‘s statement to Coffenberger was inadmissible hearsay that was more objectionable in the guilt phase than the sentencing phase. Trial counsel‘s failure to attempt to introduce this statement during the guilt phase cannot be seen as a strategic choice because counsel overlooked strong arguments that Coffenberger‘s statement was admissible.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Swackhammer‘s statement was admissible in the penalty phase as a declaration against interest under
The content of Swackhammer‘s statement corresponds to much of Landrum‘s testimony about how White was killed. Landrum testified that Swackhammer struck White from behind. Landrum struggled with White on the floor as Swackhammer ran into the kitchen and returned with a knife. Landrum threatened White with the knife and went through his pockets. Landrum put the knife down, left the room, and told Swackhammer to watch White. When Landrum returned, there was blood everywhere and White was dead. No blood was found on the clothes Landrum was wearing when he was arrested, two days after the murder. However, Swackhammer‘s statement does not correspond to the statements of five witnesses who said that Landrum told them he cut White‘s throat. And there was conflicting testimony regarding whether Landrum changed clothes after the murder. In sum, a case can be made that Coffenberger‘s testimony would have been admissible during the guilt phase as an admission against interest under
Nevertheless, considering all of the evidence introduced at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that, had Coffenberger testified about Swackhammer‘s confession, a factfinder would have acquitted Landrum of the crimes or failed to find that he was the principal offender.2 Landrum maintained at trial that he did not kill White, but five witnesses testified that Landrum told them that he cut the victim‘s throat and would cut the throat of anyone who told what he had done. Further, though there was no blood on Landrum‘s clothing at the time of his arrest, there was inconsistent testimony regarding whether he wore those clothes on the day of the murder. This is not a verdict “only weakly supported by the record.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Rather, there is substantial evidence that Landrum, not Swackhammer, killed the victim. Coffenberger‘s testimony could have created some doubt that Landrum was the principal offender, but on balance, we do not believe that claim is substantial. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1319.
IV.
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Landrum‘s Rule 60(b) motion for reasons other than those relied on by the district court.