United States v. State of Alabama
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2201
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. §20302) requires states to transmit validly requested absentee ballots to absent military/overseas (UOCAVA) voters 45 days before "an election for Federal office," subject only to a limited undue-hardship waiver in §20302(g).
- MOVE Act (2009) amended UOCAVA to add the 45-day transmission rule, a hardship waiver process, and a runoff-specific written-plan requirement in §20302(a)(9).
- Alabama law schedules primary runoffs 42 days after primaries, making compliance with the 45-day transmission deadline for federal runoffs impossible under the State’s calendar.
- The United States sued Alabama seeking to enjoin the State from holding federal runoffs 42 days after primaries as inconsistent with UOCAVA; the district court granted summary judgment for the United States.
- On appeal, Alabama argued §20302(a)(9)’s requirement to "establish a written plan" that gives voters "sufficient time" in runoffs permits the State to set a shorter, state-determined timeline (i.e., less than 45 days).
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: §20302(a)(8)(A)’s 45-day transmission requirement applies to any federal election (including runoffs) unless the State obtains a §20302(g) undue-hardship waiver; §20302(a)(9) requires only a written runoff plan and does not create a temporal exception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §20302(a)(8)(A)’s 45-day transmission requirement applies to federal runoff elections | The United States: 45-day rule applies to any "election for Federal office," including runoffs, absent a §20302(g) waiver | Alabama: §20302(a)(9) allows states to provide absentee ballots in "sufficient time" for runoffs, meaning states may set a shorter timeline | Held: 45-day requirement applies to all federal elections (including runoffs) unless a §20302(g) waiver is granted |
| Whether §20302(a)(9) creates an independent timing exception for runoffs | U.S.: (a)(9) only mandates a written plan for runoffs, not a temporal exception to (a)(8)(A) | Alabama: (a)(9)’s "sufficient time" language permits state-determined shorter timelines for runoffs | Held: (a)(9) requires a written plan describing procedures (the manner) for runoffs and does not override (a)(8)(A)’s 45-day rule |
| Whether courts should read an unenumerated runoff exception into the statute | U.S.: No—Congress enumerated only one exception (the hardship waiver), so courts should not imply another | Alabama: Lacks separate argument beyond textual reading of (a)(9) | Held: Court refuses to imply an additional exception; statutory text and structure show Congress intentionally limited exceptions to (g) |
| Whether legislative history supports Alabama’s interpretation or warrants deviation from plain text | U.S.: Legislative history does not evidence intent to exempt runoffs from 45-day rule; MOVE Act reflects concern for military disenfranchisement | Alabama: Argues Congress could have meant "sufficient time" to allow shorter timelines in runoffs | Held: Legislative history is consistent with the court’s plain-text interpretation and does not show a contrary congressional intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (statutory-construction begins with ordinary meaning)
- Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (statutory inquiry ends when language is unambiguous)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (expressions omitted in one provision are intentional)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (explicit exceptions imply exclusion of others)
- Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (courts should not imply exceptions beyond those Congress listed)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (specific statutory language controls within its scope)
- RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (general/specific canon usage)
- Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241 (indefinite article construed as "any" in context)