139 F. Supp. 3d 734
E.D. Va.2015Background
- Defendants Standberry and Wright indicted on Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) (Counts One, Three, Four) and related firearms-in-furtherance charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts Two, Five).
- Defendants moved to dismiss Counts Two and Five, arguing Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) (the force clause).
- The parties agreed, and the court accepted with reservation, to apply categorical analysis (and noted the modified categorical approach might be available) even though the superseding indictment pleads violent factual allegations (brandishing, threats, discharge).
- Central legal question: whether the statutory elements of Hobbs Act robbery necessarily include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force such that § 924(c) firearm counts are valid.
- Court reviewed precedent on the categorical approach (Taylor, Johnson) and circuit authority on Hobbs Act robbery and related statutes, and analyzed mens rea and the objective standard for fear/intimidation in Fourth Circuit law.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a categorical “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Hobbs Act robbery necessarily involves fear of physical force or threatened force; statute's language and common-law robbery imply force | Hobbs Act allows convictions based on fear of injury that need not involve violent physical force; categorical approach requires element of violent physical force | Held: Hobbs Act robbery does qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A); motion to dismiss denied |
| Whether "fear of injury" element requires intentional employment of physical force (mens rea) | Statutory and Fourth Circuit standards use an objective test for intimidation/fear; intimidation need not show subjective intent to inflict physical force beyond that required for robbery | Argues Garcia requires an element of intentional employment of physical force or threat for a § 924(c) predicate | Held: Fourth Circuit objective standard suffices; robbery requires acts reasonably calculated to produce fear, which imports use/threat of physical force |
| Whether the court should rely on the residual clause § 924(c)(3)(B) post-Johnson (vagueness) | Not necessary because § 924(c)(3)(A) is dispositive; court declines to analyze residual clause | Defendants alternatively challenged residual clause as vague after Johnson | Held: Court avoids § 924(c)(3)(B) because force clause applies; no need to reach residual clause |
| Whether modified categorical approach should be applied | Government notes indictment alleges brandishing, threats, and discharge; modified approach can use limited record if statute is divisible | Defendants focus on categorical-level inquiry and assert statute can be violated without violent force | Held: Court notes Hobbs Act may be divisible and modified approach could apply, but finds indictment allegations alone satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A) |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (explains and originates categorical/modified categorical approach)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (addresses vagueness of ACCA residual clause and reiterates categorical approach)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (interprets "physical force" as violent force in ACCA context)
- United States v. Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.) (discusses categorical approach and limits when offense results in injury but lacks threatened use of force)
- United States v. Phan, 121 F.3d 149 (4th Cir.) (conspiracy to commit robbery constitutes a separate predicate crime of violence)
- United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.) (bank robbery intimidation element does not require proof of subjective intent to intimidate)
- United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59 (1st Cir.) (Hobbs Act conspiracy is a crime of violence for § 924(c) purposes)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (supports reading "fear" and threatening conduct in context as involving force)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (contextual reading of statutory language concerning physical force)