377 F. Supp. 3d 618
W.D. Va.2019Background
- Kelly George Stanback was convicted in 2003 of (1) conspiracy to distribute ≥50 g cocaine base, (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense (924(c)), and (3) three counts of distributing ≥5 g cocaine base. He received a 420‑month sentence (later reduced to 248 months after guideline amendments).
- The PSR attributed ~1.5 kg of cocaine base to Stanback; jury convicted on the 50‑gram threshold for the conspiracy count.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) increased cocaine‑base quantity thresholds that trigger mandatory minimums; the First Step Act (2018) allows district courts to reduce sentences for qualifying pre‑2010 offenses consistent with the Fair Sentencing Act.
- Stanback moved under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act to reduce his sentence to time served; the government argued he is ineligible because PSR drug quantity (1.5 kg) makes him subject to pre‑Fair mandatory minimums, and alternatively urged denial in the court’s discretion.
- The court held that for First Step Act eligibility it must look to the drug quantity established by the jury verdict/conviction (not judge‑found PSR quantities) consistent with Alleyne/Apprendi principles as applied in the First Step Act context, and rejected the government’s speculative argument about how Stanback would have been charged post‑FSA.
- Applying § 3553(a) factors and the now‑advisory guidelines, the court found time served (with a 4‑year term of supervised release) sufficient and reduced Stanback’s aggregate sentence accordingly; the order was stayed 10 days for BOP processing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility under First Step Act: which drug quantity controls | Stanback: eligibility should be based on statute of conviction (jury finding of ≥50 g), not judge‑found PSR quantity | Gov’t: PSR drug weight (1.5 kg) governs eligibility, making him ineligible | Court: Eligibility is determined by the drug quantity established by conviction/jury, not PSR judge‑findings; Stanback eligible |
| Retroactivity of Apprendi/Alleyne on collateral review | Stanback: Alleyne/Apprendi principles apply to determine present eligibility under First Step Act | Gov’t: Apprendi/Alleyne are not retroactive on collateral review; court should look to conduct/PSR | Court: Although not retroactive on collateral attack, Alleyne/Apprendi govern First Step Act eligibility now and require relying on jury‑found elements |
| Whether to exercise discretion to reduce sentence | Stanback: Guidelines were mandatory at original sentencing; now advisory, court should exercise discretion to reduce to time served given §3553(a) factors | Gov’t: Even if eligible, reduction should be denied or limited; current guideline range equals what FSA would produce; reduction would create unwarranted disparities | Court: Exercising discretion under §3582 and §3553(a), reduction to time served warranted given served time, rehabilitation, and other factors |
| Scope of resentencing/remedies available | Stanback: Court may modify sentence under First Step Act and consider §3553(a) factors | Gov’t: Full resentencing not authorized (citing Dillon); relief should be limited | Court: Did not reach full resentencing issue; considered §3553(a) and reduced sentence to time served plus modified supervised release |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (Sixth Amendment requires jury finding for facts that increase statutory maximum)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (Facts that raise mandatory minimums are elements that must be submitted to a jury)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory to avoid constitutional violation)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (Limits on scope of relief for retroactive guideline reductions)
- Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (prior practice on judge‑found facts increasing mandatory minimums; later effectively overruled by Alleyne)
- United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. treatment of Apprendi’s retroactivity question)
- United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 190 (4th Cir.: district court may consider §3553(a) factors in post‑conviction sentence modifications)