United States v. Shawn Parrish, 942 F.3d 289

Investigators traced peer-to-peer downloads of child pornography to an IP address at 87 Daugherty Circle; Shawn Parrish lived there with others and had a prior North Carolina conviction for indecent liberties with a child.
A magistrate issued a search warrant authorizing search of the residence and “any computers or digital media located therein” and for visual depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct.
During execution, agents interviewed Parrish in a mobile forensic lab, read Miranda warnings, and obtained his cell phone after Parrish volunteered that it contained nude videos of his 12‑year‑old daughter; Parrish changed the phone passcode at the agents’ request.
Forensic analysis showed most videos originated from the daughter’s phone but also showed Parrish recorded at least one video of her and repeatedly viewed and screenshotted the material.
A jury convicted Parrish of receiving child pornography; the possession charge was dismissed; he received a 180‑month mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) based on his prior state conviction.
Parrish appealed, challenging (1) the legality of the phone search, (2) vagueness of the statutory phrase “lascivious exhibition,” and (3) the applicability of the sentencing enhancement.

Issue	Parrish's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the warrant authorized searching Parrish’s cell phone	Warrant omitted persons; phone on person not authorized	"Digital media" and warrant scope include cell phones found on premises	Court did not decide narrow construction; acknowledged ordinary meaning could include phones
Whether officers reasonably relied on the warrant (Leon)	Reliance unreasonable if warrant didn’t authorize phone search	Officers reasonably believed “digital media” covered cell phones	Officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance; Leon applies; evidence admissible
Whether Parrish voluntarily consented to search/seizure of his phone	Consent coerced by officers’ show of authority and custody	Interview was voluntary; Miranda given; Parrish cooperated and changed passcode	District court’s factual finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous; consent valid
Whether § 2256(2)(A)(v) ("lascivious exhibition") is unconstitutionally vague	Phrase too vague given alleged circuit splits	Supreme Court precedent and circuit law give fair notice; not vague	Statute not void for vagueness; prior precedents render argument insubstantial
Whether prior NC indecent‑liberties conviction qualifies for § 2252(b)(1) enhancement	Parrish: prior conviction not within “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor”	NC statute elements match generic abusive‑sexual‑conduct definition	Prior conviction "relates to" abusive sexual conduct; enhancement applies

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (warrant reliance/good‑faith exception)
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (scope of searches incident to warrants)
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (vehicle/containers and warrant scope principles)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent standard)
United States v. X‑Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (construction of child‑pornography statute; vagueness argument rejected)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (due process/vagueness framework)
United States v. Mateen, 806 F.3d 857 (Sixth Circuit on categorical approach under § 2252)
United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963 (reasonably well‑trained officer standard for warrant scope)
United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315 (Second Circuit definition of abusive sexual conduct)
United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667 (Eighth Circuit definition of abusive sexual conduct)
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (statutory‑text analysis of list modifiers in § 2252)