United States v. Shaun Chapman
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14360
3rd Cir.2017Background
- While incarcerated, Shaun Chapman mailed and wrote multiple threatening communications (including to the President and a federal judge); he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) for mailing a letter threatening to injure court personnel and was later charged again under § 876(c).
- At sentencing for the 2015 § 876(c) conviction, the PSR and the government sought the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on Chapman’s instant and prior § 876(c) felony convictions.
- Chapman argued § 876(c) is not a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) because it does not require the use of "violent physical force."
- The District Court applied the career-offender enhancement, concluding § 876(c) qualifies as a crime of violence; Chapman appealed.
- The Third Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 876(c)’s "threat to injure the person" element satisfies the Guidelines’ requirement that the offense "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (threat to injure) is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Chapman: § 876(c) does not require "violent physical force" and can sweep to non-forceful harms, so it is not a crime of violence | Government: The statute’s "threat to injure the person" element plainly tracks the Guidelines’ "threatened use of physical force" and therefore qualifies | Held: § 876(c) (threat to injure) is a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes |
| Whether indirect means of causing harm (e.g., poison, weapons) qualify as "use of physical force" | Chapman: Castleman is inapplicable to felony context; only direct striking satisfies the force requirement | Government: Castleman’s reasoning applies; employing a device or means to cause bodily harm qualifies as use of physical force | Held: Castleman applies; intentional employment of something capable of causing physical harm (even indirect) is "use of physical force" |
| Proper analytic approach — categorical or modified categorical (divisibility) | Chapman: § 876(c) may sweep more broadly than the Guidelines’ definition and not be divisible by mens rea | Government: § 876(c) is divisible into alternative versions; Shepard documents identify which alternative applies | Held: § 876(c) is divisible; use of the modified categorical approach is appropriate here and the indictment charged the "threat to injure" variant |
| Whether a minimal quantum of force is required or reputational/nonphysical harms could qualify | Chapman: Threats might include nonphysical harms (reputational) and thus sweep beyond "physical force"; a higher quantum of force should be required | Government: Threats to injure a person plainly imply bodily harm; Johnson only excludes the slightest offensive touching — not threats to wound or kill | Held: Threats to injure the body implicate physical (violent) force; reputational-harm argument was waived and insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining "use" as intentional employment of force)
- United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014) (categorical approach for career-offender "crime of violence")
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explaining categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (materials permissible under the modified categorical approach)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means "violent force" capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and categorical-approach guidance)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (holding indirect means of causing bodily harm can constitute use of force)