United States v. Shane Floyd
872 F.3d 760
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Arise! Academy (Ohio charter) paid Global Educational Consultants $420,919 for management/consulting; Global was owned by Carl Robinson and allegedly used to funnel kickbacks to Superintendent Shane Floyd and Board Chair Christopher Martin.
- Floyd, Robinson, and Martin were tried together; prosecution relied heavily on cooperating witness Mike Ward and FBI Special Agent Jeffrey Rees (who introduced bank records and read portions of Martin’s pre-proffer statements to the jury).
- During deliberations two African‑American jurors (A.R., M.S.) initially doubted guilt; the white jury foreperson made racially charged comments accusing them of protecting the defendants because of race, leading to an intervention by the marshal and deputy clerk and later apology by the foreperson.
- Defense counsel violated local rules by having a private investigator interview A.R. and M.S. after verdict; the district court excluded those interviews under Local Rule and Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) and denied a new‑trial motion as untimely and procedurally improper.
- Defendants raised multiple appellate claims: juror racial animus (invoking Pena‑Rodriguez), improper outside influence (Remmer), coercive Allen charges, improper lay‑opinion testimony by the FBI agent, Bruton/Confrontation Clause error from Martin’s out‑of‑court statements, admission of non‑admitted demonstratives, and sentencing loss calculation.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it held Pena‑Rodriguez did not apply on these facts and that procedural violations, harmless‑error standards, and precedent supported affirmance on the other claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror racial animus / Pena‑Rodriguez inquiry | Plaintiffs (Govt) argued juror conduct did not require new trial | Defendants argued foreperson’s racial remarks (and marshal/deputy interventions) showed animus affected verdict and required inquiry/new trial under Pena‑Rodriguez | Affirmed: Pena‑Rodriguez not triggered — remarks were not a "clear statement" that racial animus was a significant motivating factor for the verdict; interviews were improperly obtained and district court did not abuse discretion |
| Outside influence / Remmer hearing | N/A (Govt defended trial) | Defendants argued marshal/deputy clerk intervention improperly pressured jurors and required Remmer hearing | Affirmed: even assuming contact, conduct calmed a volatile confrontation; insufficient showing that contact likely affected verdict and evidence was barred by procedural rules |
| Allen charges coercion | N/A | Defendants claimed multiple Allen charges and judge’s remarks coerced verdict | Affirmed: Allen charges were pattern instructions given in response to jury notes; context and lack of timely objection limit reversal (plain‑error review) |
| Agent Rees lay‑opinion and "kickback" language | N/A | Robinson argued Rees improperly gave opinions and ‘‘spoon‑fed’’ the government theory | Affirmed: Rees’s words explained why he investigated (permitted lay testimony); limited objections trigger deferential review; court cured fact/opinion concerns with jury instructions |
| Bruton / Confrontation Clause (Martin’s statements) | N/A | Robinson argued Martin’s out‑of‑court confessions (read/redacted) indirectly incriminated him | Affirmed: redactions and Richardson v. Marsh framework allowed admission; statements were at most incriminating by connection and did not violate Bruton |
| Non‑admitted demonstratives to jury | N/A | Martin argued sending bullet points/flowchart (not admitted) to jury was error | Affirmed (harmless): aids duplicated testimonial evidence, limiting instruction given, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Sentencing loss amount | N/A | Floyd argued actual loss should be offset by value of legitimate services Global provided | Affirmed: district court reasonably used full contract amount given evidence could support that the contract was a sham; claim forfeited below so reviewed for plain error and none shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (Sixth Amendment permits juror‑testimony inquiry when a juror makes a clear statement showing reliance on racial stereotypes or animus to convict)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (out‑of‑court confession by a co‑defendant that incriminates another defendant raises Confrontation Clause concerns)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (post‑Bruton: properly redacted confessions that eliminate any reference to codefendant’s existence may be admissible)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (unauthorized contact with juror triggers inquiry where contact presents a likelihood of affecting the verdict)
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (trial courts may instruct a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating, but instructions must avoid coercion)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory strikes based on race violate Equal Protection and undermine jury fairness)