United States v. Scudder
2011 WL 3331823
8th Cir.2011Background
- Scudder pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(a)(2).
- The district court held Scudder had three ACCA predicates: a Missouri drug conviction and two Indiana felony child-molestation convictions.
- The court sentenced Scudder to 188 months, bottom of the Guidelines range, as an armed career criminal under § 924(e)(1).
- To classify the Indiana convictions, the district court relied on the statute and an affidavit of probable cause from an interview with a victim, submitted at sentencing.
- Scudder argued the Indiana convictions are categorically non-violent and that the district court erred in considering facts outside the statute, including the affidavit.
- The Eighth Circuit applied the categorical approach and held the Indiana offenses are violent felonies under the ACCA residual clause, affirming the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Indiana child-molestation convictions violent felonies under ACCA? | Scudder contends they are non-violent under the statute. | United States argues the convictions are violent under ACCA residual clause. | Yes; convictions qualify as violent felonies under the residual clause. |
| May the district court rely on the sentencing affidavit to classify a conviction as violent? | Scudder argues the court cannot consider extrinsic facts at sentencing. | Government contends the residual-clause inquiry permits use of record evidence to determine risk. | No; the court may rely on the record to determine risk under the residual clause. |
| Is a categorical approach required to determine ACCA violent felonies? | Scudder urges purely statutory, without looking to underlying facts. | Government relies on the residual-clause risk analysis with some factual inputs when overinclusive. | Yes; the court uses the categorical approach, resorting to record only if the statute is overinclusive. |
| Do the two Indiana offenses fall within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) residual clause as presenting a serious risk of physical injury? | Scudder argues they do not. | Government argues they do by their intentional nature and risk profile. | Yes; they are categorically similar in risk to listed offenses and thus qualify. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Abari, 638 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2011) (de novo review of violent-felony determination under ACCA)
- United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2009) (categorical approach to ACCA violent felonies)
- United States v. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (categorical approach; residual-clause interpretation)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (categorical approach under ACCA)
- United States v. Lee, 625 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2010) (when to consult judicial record for violent-felony predicate)
- United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (application of residual clause and record evidence)
- United States v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005) (statutory-sexual offenses present serious risk under ACCA)
- United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999) (concept of risk in violent-felony analysis)
- Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (physical-force standard; residual clause distinct inquiry)