United States v. Schrode
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18278
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Schrode committed predatory sexual assault of a four‑year‑old (state conviction, 18 years' imprisonment) and later pled guilty in federal court to: receipt (count 1), two productions (counts 2 & 3) of child pornography involving the same child, and possession (count 4) of other child pornography; he pled to all counts.
- FBI seized over 200 images and four videos from Schrode’s computer (June 2013); separate home videos of assaults on the same child (Feb. & Mar. 2013) were later provided to FBI.
- District court grouped offenses (production counts ungroupable) and found the state rape relevant conduct to the two production counts but not to the receipt and possession counts.
- Court imposed 60 months (receipt), 363 months each (production counts, adjusted to an aggregate 330 months after crediting time served), and 240 months (possession), for an aggregate federal term of 630 months; some terms were ordered to run consecutively to the state sentence.
- Court imposed lifetime supervised release with discretionary conditions requiring compliance with probation instructions, sex‑offender treatment "as deemed necessary by probation," substance‑abuse treatment/testing until probation approves cessation, and mental‑health treatment until probation approves cessation.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentencing rulings except for a limited remand to correct a calculation error ensuring compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (production offense statutory maximum of 360 months).
Issues
| Issue | Schrode's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state conviction was relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 and thus § 5G1.3(b) should control concurrency for all counts | State offense is relevant conduct to all federal counts (grouping effects and § 4B1.5 pattern) so federal time should run concurrently | Relevant conduct requires same course of conduct/common scheme; possession/receipt involved different victims and different time, so not relevant | No clear error: court properly found state conduct relevant only to production counts, not to receipt/possession; affirmed |
| Whether district court erred by applying § 5G1.3(b) to some counts and § 5G1.3(d) to others (must be all‑or‑nothing) | Once § 5G1.3(b) applies to some federal counts, it must apply to all counts | Each offense of conviction is assessed separately; § 5G1.3 analysis can vary by count | Affirmed: § 5G1.3 applied correctly by count; no error in using (b) for production counts and (d) for others |
| Whether district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) by imposing lifetime supervised release without separate § 3553(a) consideration | Court failed to separately articulate reasons for supervised release term as required by § 3583(c) | Court may give one overarching explanation tethered to § 3553(a); district court gave adequate reasons covering imprisonment and supervision | Affirmed: district court complied with § 3583(c) by providing overarching § 3553(a)‑based reasons for supervised release |
| Whether discretionary supervised‑release conditions improperly delegate judicial power to probation (Article III non‑delegation) | Conditions ("as deemed necessary by probation"; "at direction of probation"; follow probation’s instructions) unconstitutionally delegate sentencing decisions to probation | Defendant waived these challenges by expressly withdrawing objections at sentencing; court provided notice and reasons; conditions fall within permissible supervisory discretion | Waiver applies; challenges forfeited. Court noted particular concern about treatment condition but declined review due to waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Conley, 111 F.3d 910 (7th Cir.) (standard for de novo review of § 5G1.3 applicability)
- United States v. Johnson, 342 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.) (relevant conduct factual determinations reviewed for clear error)
- United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824 (7th Cir.) (sufficient factual overlap required to treat prior sentence as relevant conduct under § 5G1.3)
- United States v. Orozco‑Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844 (7th Cir.) (§ 5G1.3(b) no longer requires prior conduct to have increased offense level)
- United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir.) (one overarching § 3553(a)‑tethered explanation may suffice for imprisonment and supervised release)
- United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir.) (discussion of separation of considerations for imprisonment vs supervised release)
- United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859 (7th Cir.) (review of adequacy of sentencing explanation)
- United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir.) (requirements for § 3583(c) explanation and notice regarding supervised release conditions)
- United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 897 (7th Cir.) (withdrawing objections at sentencing constitutes waiver)
- United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426 (7th Cir.) (delegation of serious sentencing decisions to non‑judicial officers deprives defendant of substantial right)
- United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.) (plain error where probation officer discretion made condition indefinite)
- United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (3d Cir.) (plain error where condition allowed probation officer discretion to require treatment)
- United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir.) (probation officers have broad authority to administer supervision; ministerial vs substantive delegations)
- United States v. Hinds, 770 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.) (general silence at sentencing does not always constitute waiver)
- United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 342 (7th Cir.) (vagueness of condition can preclude waiver)
- United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir.) (no objection at sentencing where there was no surprise; waiver found)