United States v. Sathon Evans
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23419
| 6th Cir. | 2012Background
- Evans pled guilty to felon in possession of a firearm and received a 92-month sentence.
- District court treated Evans’s 2004 Ohio cocaine trafficking conviction as a controlled substance offense and his 2000 Ohio assault on a police officer conviction as a crime of violence, applying a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(2).
- PSR calculated base offense level at 24 with two qualifying prior felonies, despite Evans’s later dispute, and total offense level of 23 with CH VI; recommended 92–115 months.
- Evans objected that the trafficking conviction could not categorically be a controlled substance offense and the assault conviction could not categorically be a crime of violence.
- District court found both prior convictions qualified, resulting in a base offense level of 24 and a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, 92 months.
- Evans appealed arguing the two prior convictions do not meet the categories and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Evans’s two prior felonies support a § 2K2.1(a)(2) enhancement | Evans | Government | Two qualifying priors established; base level 24 correct. |
| Whether Ohio § 2903.13(A) assault on a police officer is a crime of violence | Evans | Government | Yes, categorically a crime of violence under 4B1.2(a)(1) and residual clause. |
| Whether Ohio § 2925.03(A)(1) trafficking is a controlled substance offense | Evans | Government | Yes, offering to sell constitutes a controlled substance offense under 4B1.2(b) and 2K2.1(a)(2). |
| Whether the sentence is substantively reasonable | Evans | Government | The within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable; district court did not abuse discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (Supreme Court 2010) (defined physical force for § 4B1.2(a)(1))
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court 2008) (residual clause standard for ACCA; controls comparison approach)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (Supreme Court 2011) (limits Begay residual-clause analysis to risk-based approach)
- McMurray v. United States, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (courts analyze crime-of-violence categorically via § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012) (aggravated assault qualifies as violent felony under ACCA via § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2011) (aggravated robbery falls under 'use of force' concept)
- State v. Cabrales, 886 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 2008) (distinguishes intent to sell from mere offer to sell for Ohio § 2925.03(A)(1))
- Montanez, 442 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2006) (Ohio statutes criminalizing sale/offers to sell controlled substances discussed)
- Mendieta-Robles v. Gonzales, 226 F. App’x 564 (6th Cir. 2007) (interprets § 2925.03(A)(1) offering to sell in Ohio context)