282 F. Supp. 3d 421
D.D.C.2017Background
- Charles F. Roy, Jr. pleaded guilty (2003–2004) to cocaine-base distribution and a § 924(c) firearm count; sentenced in 2004 as a Career Offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to 271 months (guideline range 151–188 + consecutive 10-year § 924(c) term).
- The Career Offender designation rested on two prior Massachusetts assault and battery convictions (1997 and 1998) treated as predicate "crimes of violence."
- In 2016 Roy filed a § 2255 petition invoking Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) — which invalidated the ACCA residual clause — arguing the identical residual clause in the pre-Booker mandatory career-offender Guideline is void for vagueness.
- The government relied on Beckles (holding advisory Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenges) and argued Beckles bars Roy’s claim and that any Johnson-based rule is not retroactive to his pre-Booker sentence.
- The court, applying First Circuit precedent (including Moore), found Beckles limited to post-Booker advisory Guidelines, held Johnson II applies to the identically-worded residual clause in the pre-Booker career-offender Guideline, and that Johnson’s rule is retroactive on collateral review.
- The court further found Roy excused from procedural default (cause shown) and demonstrated prejudice because Shepard-approved record did not establish that his Massachusetts convictions necessarily involved the reckless form of assault that would qualify under the force clause; therefore at least one predicate could not be counted and resentencing was ordered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Roy) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson II voids the career-offender Guideline residual clause as applied to pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines | Johnson II applies to the Guideline residual clause because it is identical to the ACCA clause and mandatory pre-Booker Guidelines "fixed" sentences | Beckles controls: advisory-Guidelines holding defeats vagueness challenge and applies to pre-Booker sentences; mandatory Guidelines did not "fix" statutory sentencing bounds | Court: Beckles limited to advisory Guidelines; under First Circuit precedent Johnson II applies to pre-Booker career-offender residual clause and voids it for vagueness |
| Retroactivity of the Johnson II rule to Roy's collateral § 2255 petition | The Johnson rule is substantive and retroactive (per Welch) and applies to the identical Guideline residual clause | Even if applicable, the rule would be procedural and not retroactive to pre-Booker cases | Court: Johnson II's substantive rule applies retroactively; application to the pre-Booker Guideline residual clause is proper |
| Procedural default: whether Roy can raise this claim in § 2255 (cause and prejudice) | Roy: Johnson II created a novel rule excusing default (cause); he also shows prejudice because without the residual clause he would not be a Career Offender | Government: Roy could have raised vagueness earlier; even without residual clause, the prior convictions qualify under the force clause so no prejudice | Court: Cause exists (Johnson overruled prior precedent); prejudice established because Shepard-approved records do not prove the convictions qualified under the force clause; default excused |
| Whether Roy’s Massachusetts assault-and-battery convictions qualify as "crimes of violence" under the force clause | Roy: Massachusetts statute is divisible and can cover non-violent (offensive-touching) intentional batteries; Shepard documents do not show he was convicted of the reckless (violent) form | Government: PSR factual statements and police reports show violent conduct qualifying as force-based predicates | Court: Under Descamps/Mathis/Sheard framework and First Circuit decisions, Shepard prohibits reliance on police reports; no Shepard-approved document shows the reckless form — convictions cannot be treated as predicates for Career Offender enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct.) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Sup. Ct.) (holding Johnson II retroactive on collateral review)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Sup. Ct.) (advisory Sentencing Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenges)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (Sup. Ct.) (making the Guidelines advisory)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (Sup. Ct.) (categorical/modified-categorical approaches for predicate-offense analysis)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishing divisible statutes for modified-categorical approach)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (Sup. Ct.) (limits documents courts may consult to identify prior-conviction elements)
- Faust v. United States, 853 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (analyzing Massachusetts assault-and-battery under ACCA/career-offender framework)
- Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.) (holding Johnson II applies to pre-Booker career-offender residual clause for collateral review)
- Wilder v. United States, 806 F.3d 653 (1st Cir.) (prejudice standard to excuse procedural default under § 2255)