United States v. Roof
225 F. Supp. 3d 438
D.S.C.2016Background
- On June 17, 2015 Dylann Roof entered Emanuel AME Church in Charleston and murdered nine worshippers and attempted to kill others; federal grand jury returned a 33‑count indictment charging offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 249, 247, and 924(c)/(j).
- Counts 1–12: racially motivated hate crimes resulting in death or attempted killing under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)).
- Counts 13–24: obstruction of religious exercise resulting in death or attempt to kill under the Church Arson Prevention Act (18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2)), which applies when the offense is "in or affects interstate or foreign commerce."
- Counts 25–33: nine § 924(c)/(j) counts charging use of a firearm causing death during a predicate "crime of violence," with §§ 249 and 247 alleged as predicates.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing: (1) § 249 exceeds Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power; (2) the Attorney General’s certification prerequisite to § 249 prosecutions is invalid; (3) § 247 exceeds Commerce Clause authority or lacks sufficient interstate nexus as applied; and (4) §§ 249 and 247 cannot qualify as "crimes of violence" under § 924(c).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 249 under the Thirteenth Amendment | § 249 is a valid exercise of § 2 power to abolish badges and incidents of slavery (Congress rationally identified racial violence as such a badge) | § 249 improperly intrudes on state police powers and fails McCulloch/Boerne congruence and proportionality standards | Court: § 249 is constitutional under Thirteenth Amendment (Jones governs; racially motivated violence is a badge/incident of slavery; Boerne proportionality concerns inapplicable here) |
| Validity of Attorney General certification for § 249 prosecutions | Certification here (public interest, substantial justice; state lacks jurisdiction) meets statutory requirement; review limited and deferential | Certification is invalid or not judicially reviewable; challenges scope and sufficiency | Court: Certification is reviewable in limited, deferential fashion and is valid for this prosecution (facts implicate substantial federal interest) |
| Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 247 under the Commerce Clause (facial and as‑applied) | § 247 is constitutional: it reaches acts "in or affecting interstate commerce," includes a jurisdictional element, and may regulate channels/instrumentalities or activities substantially affecting commerce | § 247 is facially overbroad / lacks jurisdictional nexus; as‑applied, a purely intrastate non‑economic crime by a resident lacks interstate commerce nexus | Court: § 247 is facially valid; alleged interstate nexuses here (Internet, interstate travel, firearms/ammunition manufactured out‑of‑state, national prominence of church) suffice to survive dismissal |
| Whether §§ 249 and 247 qualify as predicate "crimes of violence" for § 924(c) | Violations of §§ 249(a)(1) and 247(a)(2) necessarily involve intentional use of violent physical force and thus qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Defendant contends statutes may encompass non‑violent conduct and so cannot categorically qualify; invokes Johnson vagueness/residual‑clause concerns | Court: Both statutes are categorically crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because they require intentional causation of bodily injury or obstruction by force resulting in death; Johnson residual‑clause issues need not be reached |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (recognizing Congress may eliminate "badges and incidents" of slavery under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (setting congruence and proportionality limits on § 5 Fourteenth Amendment legislation)
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (outlining three categories of commerce‑clause regulation)
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (applying limits on Commerce Clause for non‑economic activity)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defining "physical force" as violent force for force‑clause analysis)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (describing the categorical approach to determining predicate offenses under federal sentencing statutes)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (explaining the difficulty of prevailing on a facial constitutional challenge)