United States v. Roof
225 F. Supp. 3d 394
D.S.C.2016Background
- Dylann Roof, indicted on federal charges including death-penalty eligible counts for killing nine people; trial counsel (David I. Bruck) originally appointed and later designated as standby counsel when Roof moved to self-represent.
- On Nov. 28, 2016, after a Faretta colloquy, the Court found Roof knowingly and intelligently waived counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se; standby counsel was appointed.
- During voir dire, standby counsel repeatedly filed motions and sought voir dire questions contrary to Roof’s expressed positions, creating confusion over who spoke for the defense.
- The Court orally limited standby counsel to a primarily consultative role ("elbow advice," communications facilitation, and consultation) and prohibited standby counsel from filing motions or speaking for Roof unless Roof requested and the Court authorized specific assistance.
- Roof later moved to reappoint counsel for the guilt phase only (permitting him to resume pro se for any penalty phase); the Court granted that request on Dec. 5, 2016.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a capital defendant has an unwaivable right to standby counsel or limits on refusing counsel under the Eighth Amendment | Standby counsel: Eighth Amendment and heightened reliability in capital cases require standby counsel or limit waiver of counsel | Court: Faretta governs; no constitutional right to standby counsel; self-representation applies in capital cases | No unwaivable Eighth Amendment right to standby counsel; Faretta applies in capital cases |
| Scope of trial court discretion to limit standby counsel’s role | Standby counsel: Court should permit reasonable limited assistance to pro se capital defendant (including some active functions) | Court/Government: Trial court has broad discretion to define standby counsel’s role to avoid hybrid representation that disrupts proceedings | Court has broad discretion to restrict standby counsel; hybrid/co-counsel role rejected |
| Whether complexity of capital cases removes Faretta right or requires different rule | Standby counsel: Complexity and uniqueness of capital sentencing undermine a lay defendant’s ability to meet Eighth Amendment reliability without active counsel | Court: Competence to waive is distinct from competence to represent; complexity does not negate Faretta or require forced counsel | Complexity does not abrogate Faretta; defendant may waive counsel despite complexity |
| Whether defendant may switch between counsel for guilt phase and pro se for penalty phase after trial begins | Government/Standby counsel: allowing switches is disruptive; self-representation may be untimely if asserted late | Roof: requested counsel for guilt phase and pro se for penalty phase (requested post-voir dire but before empanelment originally; later reaffirmed) | Court granted reappointment of counsel for guilt phase only and allowed anticipated post-verdict self-representation for penalty phase as timely in these circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (court may limit standby counsel to preserve defendant’s control over presentation)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence required to waive counsel differs from competence to represent oneself)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (states may insist on representation where defendant lacks capacity to conduct trial proceedings)
- United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir.) (no right to standby counsel; trial court broad discretion to limit standby role)
- United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250 (4th Cir.) (trial court has broad supervisory powers to define standby counsel assistance)
- United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir.) (appointment of independent counsel over pro se defendant’s objection conflicts with Faretta)
- Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. en banc) (discusses risks of manipulable hybrid representation)
- Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir.) (Faretta applies in capital sentencing)
- Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585 (7th Cir.) (no constitutional right to standby counsel; hybrid representation not required)