United States v. Rodney Vinson
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19169
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Police discovered a rifle and ammunition during a consensual search of Rodney Vinson’s residence; Vinson had a prior North Carolina conviction and was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV).
- Vinson’s prior conviction was under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(2) for assault on a female by a male at least 18 — North Carolina treats assault, assault and battery, and affray under common-law definitions.
- The district court dismissed the indictment, holding that § 14-33(c)(2) did not categorically qualify as an MCDV because North Carolina assault need not include the § 921(a)(33)(A) “physical force” element.
- The government appealed, arguing the North Carolina assault formulations are divisible (alternate elements), permitting the modified categorical approach; the charging document, it said, shows a battery of Vinson’s wife and thus an MCDV.
- The Fourth Circuit, after reconsideration prompted by a rehearing petition, held that none of North Carolina’s assault formulations categorically requires the intentional “use” of physical force as defined by Leocal (and the court’s prior decisions), because North Carolina allows conviction based on culpable negligence, which can be less than recklessness.
- Conclusion: Because no form of North Carolina assault necessarily has the federal “use of physical force” element, § 14-33(c)(2) does not qualify as an MCDV and the indictment dismissal is affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Vinson) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Vinson’s § 14‑33(c)(2) conviction qualifies as a federal MCDV under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) | § 14‑33(c)(2) does not categorically include the required use of physical force; dismissal proper | § 14‑33(c)(2) is divisible: alternate assault formulations permit using the modified categorical approach and charging papers show an MCDV (battery of wife) | Held for Vinson: none of NC assault formulations categorically requires the federal “use” element, so conviction is not an MCDV; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the modified categorical approach applies because North Carolina assault contains alternate elements | N/A (argued that categorical approach fails) | Crime is divisible because assault can be committed via alternate formulations (attempted battery, show of violence, completed battery) | Even assuming divisibility, each alternative can be based on culpable negligence (less than recklessness), so none meets the federal intentional-use standard; modified categorical approach inapplicable to obtain an MCDV |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (§ 921(a)(33)(A) “physical force” satisfied by offensive touching supporting common‑law battery)
- United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (domestic relationship need not be an element of the state offense for § 922(g)(9))
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes where elements create distinct crimes)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting “use” of force to require intentional availment of force; negligent or accidental conduct insufficient)
- United States v. White, 606 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2010) (previous Fourth Circuit view that “physical force” meant violent force; later superseded by Castleman)
- United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2013) (categorical approach focuses on elements, not underlying conduct)