United States v. Rodney Vinson, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12560

Rodney M. Vinson was convicted in North Carolina under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14‑33(c)(2) for assaulting his wife; federal prosecutors later charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (possession of firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, “MCDV”).
The district court dismissed the indictment, holding the North Carolina statute was not a categorical MCDV because its elements need not include the use or attempted use of physical force.
The government appealed, arguing the North Carolina offense is divisible (different alternative elements for assault), so the court should apply the modified categorical approach to the charging documents to identify the specific conviction (completed battery) which qualifies as an MCDV.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the statutory text, North Carolina common‑law formulations of assault (attempted‑battery, show‑of‑violence, completed‑battery), jury‑instruction practice, and the charging magistrate’s factual statement that Vinson hit the victim in the face.
Applying Supreme Court precedents (Castleman on the degree of force needed for MCDV; Descamps on divisibility/modified categorical approach), the Fourth Circuit held the assault offense is divisible, the charging document shows a completed‑battery conviction, and that form categorically qualifies as an MCDV; it vacated dismissal and remanded to reinstate the indictment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Vinson)	Held
Whether N.C. § 14‑33(c)(2) is divisible so the modified categorical approach applies	NC assault comprises alternate elements (attempted‑battery, show‑of‑violence, completed‑battery); charging docs can be consulted to identify the variant (here, completed battery)	The statute/ common law is indivisible: different formulations are mere alternative means or ambiguously applied, so courts should not resort to modified categorical approach	The court held § 14‑33(c)(2) is divisible; modified categorical approach applies and the charging document shows a completed‑battery conviction that qualifies as an MCDV
Whether completed‑battery form of NC assault satisfies federal MCDV "physical force" element	Completed battery involves at least offensive touching and therefore meets Castleman’s common‑law battery standard	Vinson argued the broader statute can criminalize non‑force conduct, so categorical approach fails	Court held Castleman’s standard (offensive touching suffices) means completed battery categorically satisfies the MCDV physical‑force element

United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (relationship requirement for § 922(g)(9) is an element of the federal offense, but need not be an element of the state conviction)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes defined by alternative elements rather than alternative means)
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (§ 921(a)(33)(A)’s “physical force” is satisfied by the degree of force supporting a common‑law battery — offensive touching)
United States v. White, 606 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2010) (prior 4th Circuit interpretation treating "physical force" as violent force; discussed and effectively superseded by Castleman)
Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014) (distinguishes alternate elements from alternate means for Descamps analysis)
United States v. Cabrera‑Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2013) (categorical approach focuses on elements; divisibility requires at least one alternative to match the generic offense)
United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (Descamps analysis applies to common‑law offenses as well)
United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2013) (illustrates examining jury instructions/ state practice when resolving elements vs. means)
United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding divisibility where state law set out alternative, distinct definitions of battery)