United States v. Riley, 635 F.Supp.3d 411

Defendant Travel Alvin Riley was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a loaded Glock 23 and 13 rounds after a felony conviction; items were allegedly left in a FedEx satchel on May 19, 2022.
Surveillance video and facility employee reports allegedly show Riley placing the bag, coworkers handling it, and Riley later returning, denying knowledge, and fleeing when confronted; the bag also contained court papers, lottery tickets linking it to Riley, and residue of a white powder.
Riley has a lengthy criminal history involving firearms, drug-distribution convictions, supervised-release violations, and prior abscondence.
A magistrate ordered Riley detained pending trial; Riley moved to revoke detention (seeking home confinement with his wife as third‑party custodian) and separately moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds after Bruen.
The Court conducted a de novo § 3142(g) analysis, found the government had shown at least a flight risk and clear-and-convincing danger to the community, and denied both the motion to revoke detention and the motion to dismiss the indictment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Riley)	Held
Whether pretrial detention should be revoked and replaced with home confinement under third‑party supervision	Evidence and history show serious danger and flight risk; video and prior conduct justify continued detention	Stable employment, first supervised‑release violation since 2018, suitable third‑party custodian, voluntarily appeared — detention unnecessary	Detention upheld: § 3142(g) factors (offense seriousness, weight of evidence, criminal history, danger) favor detention; alternatives insufficient
Whether § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under Bruen’s text‑and‑history test	§ 922(g)(1) targets non‑law‑abiding persons and aligns with historical traditions excluding dangerous individuals; Fourth Circuit precedent upholding statute remains controlling	Bruen’s historical test displaces prior means‑end balancing and no clear founding‑era analogue disarming felons; § 922(g)(1) therefore unconstitutional	Denied: Court reads Bruen as consistent with Heller’s recognition that prohibitions on felons are presumptively lawful; Fourth Circuit precedent (e.g., Moore, Pruess) controls and § 922(g)(1) stands

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (individual right to bear arms recognized; noted longstanding prohibitions on felons’ possession are "presumptively lawful")
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment against the states; reiterated Heller’s point about prohibitions on felons)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (rejected means‑end scrutiny; adopted text‑and‑history/analogy test for firearms regulations)
United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012) (upheld § 922(g)(1); treated felony‑possession prohibition as consistent with Heller)
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (articulated two‑step historical inquiry pre‑Bruen for Second Amendment challenges)
United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012) (reaffirmed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in Fourth Circuit)
United States v. Carpio‑Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012) (found historical analogues supporting disarmament of non‑law‑abiding individuals)
Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussed historical tradition excluding felons from firearm rights)