United States v. Richard Hodge, Jr., 948 F.3d 160

Background:

In 2014 Richard Hodge was charged in the District of the Virgin Islands with multiple offenses including three § 924(c) counts for shooting armored‑vehicle employees and stealing money; a jury convicted him on two § 924(c) counts plus other federal and territorial crimes.
In 2015 the District Court imposed an aggregate 420‑month sentence on the two § 924(c) counts (under the pre–First Step Act “stacking” rules) and additional time on other counts.
On direct appeal this Court affirmed Hodge’s federal convictions and sentence but remanded to vacate two of three territorial firearms convictions and to conduct resentencing on the territorial counts only.
Before the District Court completed the limited remand proceedings, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum for first‑time § 924(c) offenders convicted of multiple counts in the same indictment (eliminating the prior “stacking” enhancement in some circumstances).
The central question: can Hodge — whose initial sentence was imposed before the First Step Act but who awaited resentencing on territorial counts when the Act became law — benefit from the reduced § 924(c) minimum?
The Third Circuit affirmed: because a sentence had already been "imposed" before enactment, the statutory text and precedent bar retroactive application of the reduced § 924(c) minimum; the District Court also lacked authority under the limited remand to alter the affirmed federal sentence, and § 2106 relief was denied.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the First Step Act’s reduced § 924(c) mandatory minimum applies when a defendant’s initial sentence was imposed before enactment but resentencing was pending	Hodge: He had not yet received a sentence "imposed" for the remanded proceedings, so the Act’s retroactivity clause covers him	Government: The Act applies only if no sentence had been imposed as of enactment; Hodge’s initial sentence had been imposed before the Act	Court: Held for Government — "imposed" means a sentencing order entered before enactment, so Hodge cannot benefit
Whether the District Court could revisit or reduce the affirmed federal § 924(c) sentence on remand	Hodge: District Court should reconsider federal § 924(c) sentence in light of the Act	Government: Remand was limited to territorial counts; revisiting affirmed federal sentence would violate the appellate mandate	Court: Held for Government — district court must follow the mandate and may not alter affirmed federal sentence
Whether equitable relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 should permit applying the Act anyway	Hodge: It would be unjust not to apply the newer, lower penalty because resentencing occurred after the law changed	Government: Line drawing by relying on initial‑sentence imposition is fairer and avoids manipulation by delay	Court: Held for Government — denied § 2106 relief; policy favors treating an already imposed sentence as the cutoff

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2019) (interpreting "imposed" in First Step Act retroactivity provisions)
United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a sentence is "imposed" when a district court enters a sentencing order)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (statutory changes to punishments apply retroactively only when Congress so intends)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (different statutory phrasing presumptively conveys different meaning)
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (identical words in different parts of a statute presumptively have the same meaning)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (background on § 924(c) stacking prior to First Step Act)
Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304 (1948) (mandate rule: lower courts must follow appellate court decrees)