444 F.Supp.3d 717
E.D. Va.2020Background
- In late 1996 Derrick Vincent Redd robbed three banks (and attempted a fourth) within ~45 minutes, obtaining about $5,465; no physical injuries occurred.
- Indicted on seven counts including three § 924(c) firearms counts; convicted and in 1997 sentenced to 603 months (63 months for robberies + 540 months for three consecutive § 924(c) sentences).
- Began serving sentence in 1997; by filing he had served ~23 years and was 64 years old. With good-time credits his release date would be in 2040.
- The First Step Act (2018) narrowed enhanced § 924(c) mandatory minimums for stacked counts and amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants (after BOP exhaustion) to move courts directly for compassionate release.
- Redd exhausted administrative remedies, moved under § 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking a reduction to time served based on the sentence disparity produced by the First Step Act; the government opposed.
- The Court granted relief: reduced Redd’s three § 924(c) sentences from 540 months (45 yrs) to 180 months (15 yrs), to run consecutive to the 63-month robbery sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Redd's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaustion of administrative remedies | Redd timely requested BOP relief and 30 days lapsed without action, so he exhausted | BOP later denied on merits but 30-day lapse sufficed | Court: exhaustion satisfied (30-day lapse/no timely BOP action) |
| Whether First Step Act–created sentencing disparity can be "extraordinary and compelling" | The dramatic reduction in § 924(c) penalties creates an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce an older, disproportionate sentence | Such statutory changes are non-retroactive; disparities alone don’t automatically qualify | Court: the legislative change and resulting gross disparity are extraordinary and compelling in this case |
| Whether courts are bound by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 limits (and the BOP Director) | Court may consider "other reasons" and independently determine extraordinary and compelling circumstances after First Step Act | Relief must be limited to categories in § 1B1.13 or require a BOP Director determination (Application Note 1(D)) | Court: § 1B1.13 (pre-First Step) is not an "applicable policy statement" that bars court-initiated relief; courts may find "other reasons" consistent with policy given statutory change |
| § 3553(a) factors / danger to community | Redd’s lengthy time served, advanced age, clean prison record, rehabilitation, and low recidivism risk support reduction | Emphasizes seriousness of offenses and need for deterrence / punishment | Court: § 3553(a) factors support reduction to 15 years on the § 924(c) stack; Redd not a danger, served substantial punishment, strong rehabilitation evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (two-step § 3582(c) inquiry: policy-statement consistency then § 3553(a) factors)
- Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (courts may consider mandatory § 924(c) minimums when sentencing predicate offenses)
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (pre-First Step precedent requiring consecutive enhanced § 924(c) sentences for multiple counts in same indictment)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Congress may amend or revoke Sentencing Commission policy statements)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Sentencing Guidelines commentary is authoritative absent conflict with statute)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (rule of lenity applied where criminal statute ambiguous)
- United States v. Cutler, 36 F.3d 406 (4th Cir. 1994) (rule of lenity may apply to Sentencing Guidelines ambiguities)
- United States v. Melvin, [citation="777 F. App'x 652"] (4th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act § 403 not retroactive to sentences already imposed under that statutory provision)