United States v. Raney, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21493

Kenneth Raney was convicted in 2001 of transporting a minor with intent to engage in a sexual act and attempting to manufacture child pornography; he served 145 months and began a 3‑year term of supervised release in 2012.
During supervised release Raney committed violations (possession of a memory stick, contact with a convicted felon) and was warned; later he took unauthorized day trips with a female acquaintance and her minor children, totaling about four months of access to minors without probation officer knowledge.
The district court revoked supervised release and imposed 9 months imprisonment plus 2 years of supervised release; this Court in Raney I vacated the sentence because the district court failed to explain the two‑year supervised‑release term.
On remand the district court reinstated the same sentence; Raney appealed again, challenging (1) the procedural reasonableness of the two‑year supervised‑release term and (2) Condition 11 requiring notification of third parties of risks arising from his criminal record/personal history.
The district court at resentencing discussed the original offenses, Raney’s status as a sex offender, deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation, risk of recidivism, and that it had considered Sentencing Commission policy statements.
The government conceded Condition 11 is vague under controlling precedent but argued Raney waived objection by failing to raise it at resentencing; the Court agreed and affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural reasonableness of two‑year supervised release	Raney: district court again gave insufficient explanation for imposing two years	Government: district court adequately considered §3553(a) factors and Guidelines policy statements	Affirmed — court provided enough reasons showing consideration of relevant factors; term not plainly unreasonable
Validity of Condition 11 (third‑party notification)	Raney: condition is impermissibly vague and invalid	Government: condition is vague but Raney waived objection by not raising it at resentencing	Affirmed — court held Raney waived the challenge by failing to object at resentencing

United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for supervised‑release revocation sentences)
United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2005) (court need not make explicit findings on each §3553 factor if record shows consideration)
United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2004) (Sentencing Guidelines policy statements inform but do not bind revocation sentencing)
United States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2015) (Raney I) (vacated sentence for lack of explanation for supervised‑release term)
United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2016) (certain third‑party notification conditions are unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2016) (waiver doctrine when defendant objects to some but not all supervised‑release conditions)
United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2016) (failure to object at sentencing results in waiver on appeal)
United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing knowing and intentional waiver of sentencing objections)