United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
793 F. Supp. 2d 164
D.D.C.2011Background
- This RICO case against tobacco defendants includes a Remedial Order #1015 issued after a 2006 liability finding and a 2009 DC Circuit affirmation with remand directions.
- Defendants seek to insert a broad enforcement-related paragraph into Order #1015, including exclusive jurisdiction, standing to enforce, and a meet-and-confer requirement.
- Defendants frame the relief as a Rule 60(b) motion, arguing the order should be modified to address enforcement across courts and potential Engle-progeny litigation.
- The Government and PHI oppose, arguing no extraordinary change in fact or law justifies altering Order #1015 and that advisory opinions should be avoided.
- The court analyzes whether to treat the motion as a Rule 60(b) request and evaluates three proposed changes: jurisdiction, standing, and meet-and-confer.
- The court denies the motion, concluding there is no extraordinary basis to amend Order #1015 and that post-judgment enforcement issues can be addressed in context if and when they arise.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to enforce Order #1015 | Defendants seek exclusive enforcement jurisdiction for this case only. | Order #1015 should be modified to state exclusive jurisdiction and enforcement by this court only. | Denied; court declines abstract advisory modification of jurisdiction. |
| Standing to enforce Order #1015 | Government retains standing to enforce the order; Engle plaintiffs could rely on it. | Only the Government should enforce, preventing chaos from multiple enforceors. | Denied; issue speculative and not ripe; no amendment needed. |
| Meet-and-confer requirement before enforcement | LCvR 7(m) meet-and-confer should govern enforcement actions. | Such language would impede enforcement; meet-and-confer not necessary here. | Denied; not an extraordinary circumstance warranting Rule 60(b) relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (clarifies limits of 60(b) relief and enforcement context)
- Salazar v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (sparing use of 60(b) relief; not extraordinary in this context)
- Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (advisory opinions and context limits for federal courts)
- Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (prohibition on advisory opinions; respect for context)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (U.S. 1997) (change in law supports relief under Rule 60(b)(5))
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1992) (exemplars for prospective relief modification under 60(b)(5))
- W. Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (courts may modify their own injunctions)
- Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (see above; related to 60(b) relief and enforcement)