*1 COUNTY, et SUFFOLK RUFO, SHERIFF OF al. SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL INMATES OF et al. 9, 1991 January 1992* Argued No. 90-954. October Decided 90-1004, Rapone, Correction Commissioner * Together with No. al., v. Inmates Jail et on certiorari Massachusetts also of Suffolk court. to the same *3 Rehnquist, Court, which White, J., opinion delivered O’Connor, J., JJ., Souter, filed J., Scalia, Kennedy, joined. C. Stevens, J., filed a concurring judgment, post, p. in the 393. opinion an Thomas, J., post, p. Blackmun, joined, 399. opinion, in which dissenting J., of the cases. part in the consideration or decision took no argued petitioners in No. the cause for A. Janiak
Chester Burns, D. were Thomas 90-954. him on the briefs With Merryfield, Schneider, Rufo, E. and Robert C. Peter J. Ann Attorney Montgomery, pro Gen- Assistant se. T First John argued petitioner in No. Massachusetts, cause for eral of *4 Harshbarger, him on the briefs were Scott 90-1004. With Attorney Barnico, A. Laramore, and Thomas General, Jon Attorneys Douglas Wilkins, H. Assistant General. and argued respondents in both Max D. the cause for Stern Weissberg Lynn and him on the cases. With brief † Morrison. Alan B. † Briefs filed for the State of New urging of curiae reversal were amici General, Sherwood, Abrams, by Attorney Solicitor
York O. Peter Robert Kahn, General, General, B. Deputy S. and Barbara Lawrence Solicitor by Butler, General; Attorney Tennessee et al. for the State of Assistant Catalano, Tennessee, Burson, W. Attorney of Michael Charles W. General Smith, General, Klein, Richard G. Attorney I. Paul M. and Deputy Joel opinion White delivered the of the Court.
Justice In these cases, the District Court denied a motion of the County, modify sheriff of Massachusetts, Suffolk a consent Alaska, Taranto, Attorney General of Colе, Woods, Attor- Charles Grant ney Arizona, Arkansas, General of Attorney General of Bryant, Winston Lungren, Attorney California, Norton, Attorney General of Dan Gale Colorado, Attorney General of III, General of Dela- Oberly Charles M. ware, Butterworth, Attorney Florida, General of Robert A. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney Georgia, General of Barrett-Anderson, Attor- Elizabeth ney Guam, Hawaii, General of III, Attorney General of Warren Price Larry EchoHawk, Attorney Idaho, Burris, Attorney General of Roland W. Illinois, Linley Indiana, General Attorney General of Pearson, E. Bon- Iowa, nie Campbell, Attorney Stephan, Attorney General of Robert T. Kansas, Cowan, Attorney Kentucky, General of General of Fred William Guste, Jr., Attorney Louisiana, General of Attor- J. Carpenter, E. Michael ney Maine, Attorney Mary- General of Curran, Jr., General of Joseph J. land, Kelley, Attorney Michigan, General Frank J. H. Hubert Hum- Attorney Minnesota, III, Moore, Attorney General of General phrey Mike Mississippi, Attorney Missouri, Webster, General of William L. Frankie Nevada, Attorney Attorney General of Papa, Arnold, Sue Del John P. Hampshire, General of Attorney New General of New Tufo, Robert J. Dd Jersey, Attorney Mexico, Lacy Udall, General of New Thornburg, Tom H. Attorney Carolina, General of Spaeth, Attorney North General Nicholas Dakota, Ohio, Fisher, Attorney North General of Henry, Lee Robert H. Attorney Oklahoma, Frohnmayer, Attorney General of General of Dave Oregon, Attorney Preate, Jr., Pennsylvania, General of Ernest D. Hector Rivera-Cruz, Attorney Rico, O’Neil, Attorney General of Puerto Jamеs E. Island, Medlock, Attorney General of Rhode General of South T. Travis Carolina, Attorney Dakota, Barnett, General of South “Barney” Mark Dam, Attorney Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy, Attorney General of Paul Van L. Vermont, Ballentine, Acting Attorney
General of General of the Rosalie Virgin Islands, Mary Terry, Attorney Virginia, General of Sue Ken Eiken- berry, Attorney Washington, General of Palumbo, Attorney Gen- Mario Virginia, eral Joseph Meyer, Attorney of West and Wyoming; General of B. City by for the of New York Kovner, Koerner, Fay Victor A. Leonard J. Leoussis, City for the International Timothy O’Shaughnessy; Man- J. agement by Association et Ruda, al. Fasman, Zachary Richard D. Ashe, Jr., Gerchick; Hampden County, and for MichaelJ. L. Sheriff of Mark by et al. McDonough, Edward J. Jr. urging
Briefs of amici curiae affirmance American were filed Civil Liberties Union et al. Powell, John A. Shapiro, Steven R. John *5 at the conditions to correct unconstitutional entered decree The Appeals County affirmed. of The Court Jail. Suffolk applied cor- the courts below isus whether issue before they denying did hold that We the motion. rect standard proceedings. further cases for remand these not and H-< litigation began the Suf when inmates sued in 1971 This County of for Correction sheriff, Commissioner folk city mayor Boston, and nine of Massachusetts, the State of yet claiming convicted of that inmates not councilors, being against uncon charged held under them were crimes then the Suffolk what was conditions stitutional facility, had been Jail, Street known as the Charles The Jail. large nu barred cells. The with tiers of in 1848 constructed jail, treated with had been whiсh deficiencies merous neglect,” “malignant Attor court described as a state what County, 625, Mass. ney 624, v. General of Sheriff Suffolk (1985), decision are documented E. 2d 477 N. County Jail Inmates the District Court. See of Suffolk (Mass. 1973). Supp. 679-684 Eisenstadt, 360 F. constitutionally jail at the held that conditions court deficient: presump- facility pretrial for the detention
“As a tively unnecessar- citizens, Charles Street Jail innocent unreasonably infringes upon ily basic lib- their most and among rights to reasonable freedom erties, them the Reinstein, Alexander, Freeman, P. and Alvin J. Bron- Alexa Elizabeth Guinier; stein; C. Lani by for Dispute for for Center Settlement Nickles, N. by Peter J. Bruce Facility the Inmates of the Lorton Central Pemberton; Kuhlik, A. Lawyers’ and Alan for the Committee for Civil Englander; John C. by Bar Rights Under Law the Boston Association Krantz. Sheldon for Allen F. et al. Breed Starr, Gerson, Attorney Deputy General Assistant General Solicitor Shapiro, Shapiro, Kopp, Robert E. Solicitor General Harriet S. Bondy M. United States as amicus Thomas curiae. filed brief *6 personal personal privacy. motion, cleanliness, and The quality court finds and rules that the of incarceration at ‘punishment’ is Charles Street of such a nature and de- gree justified by that it cannot be the state’s interest holding defendants for trial; therefore it violates process the due clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 686.1 permanently enjoined government
The court defendants: “(a) housing from at the Charles Street Jail after November any 30, 1973 in a cell with another inmate, inmate who is (b) awaiting housing trial and from at the Charles Street Jail any awaiting aftеr 30, June inmate Id., who trial.” appeal.2 691. defendants did not problems In 1977,with the of the Charles Street Jail still including unresolved, District Court ordered defendants, City steps expend the Boston Council, take such reasonably necessary existing funds to renovate another fa- cility as a substitute detention center. Inmates of Suffolk County Kearney, (Mass., v. Jail Civ. Action No. 71-162-G 1 The court was of the view that dealing pretrial cases with detention appropriately analyzed are more under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Eighth Amendment, Clause of the thought but that conditions at the Charles Street Jail were also vulnerable Eighth under the Amendment. County Eisenstadt, Inmates Jail v. Supp., 360 F. at 688. of Suffolk 2However, months, within five County Suffolk officials advised the court they that comply could not with the November 30 deadline for ending celling double at the Charles Street Jail. The District Court ordered the commissioner to transfer institutions, inmates to other and the commis appealed, claiming sioner power the court lacked the to order him to make the transfers. The First Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court, finding that the commissioner “major had statutory responsibil county jails ities” over and that appeal he had failed to the District Court’s holding decision that he proper party was a Inmates of to the lawsuit. Eisenstadt, Jail denied, 494 F. 2d cert. 419 U. S. Suffolk (1974). Appeals agreed 1977), App. The Court 22. June required: action was immediate years just district since the short of five
“It is now time opinion all For was issued. court’s conditions re- plaintiff under the has been confined class pugnant all of that time de- For to the constitution. *7 of that fact. have been aware fendants present the uncon- of the record and the state “Given already plaintiffs delay endured in have scionable rights, we alterna- securing have no their constitutional prohibit order the district court’s but to affirm tive pretrial at the St. detainees Charles incarceration of Kearney, County Jail v. Inmates Jail.” of Suffolk (CA1 1978). 2d 99-100 98, F. Appeals Jail that the Charles Street ordered The Court of presented plan was 2,1978, unless closed on October be facility pretrial constitutionally adequate detain- for create a County. ees Suffolk plan days that formed deadline,
Four before was sub now before this Court consent decree basis for the Although plans for the new to the District Court. mitted jail complete, that “the the District Court observed sq. single of 80 cells confinement, such as features of critical safety, security, medical, recre fixed and inmates, are ft. visiting laundry, religious educational, kitchen, ational, unequivocal commit provisions, are included. There are which will meet constitu of confinement to conditions ments County Kear Jail Inmates tional standards.” of Suffolk 1978), (Mass., App. 51, ney, 71-162-G Oct. Civ. Action No. County to continue therefore allowed Suffolk The court 55. pretrial Jail. housing at the Street its detainees Charles consent entered a formal the court later, months Seven expressed government their defendants in which decree applicable operate provide, 'and maintain ... “desire jail County pretrial suitable and constitutional for Suffolk County Kearney, detainees.” Inmates Jail v. of Suffolk (Mass., 1979), May App. Civ. Action No. to Pet. 71-162-G p. specifically 90-954, for Cert. 15a. The decree incor No. porated provisions of the Suffolk Detention Cen Facility, Program, ter, Charles Architectural which— Street program in the words of the consent decree—“sets forth a constitutionally constitutionally adequate which is both required.” Id., at 16a. jail program,
Under terms of the architectural the new designed “[sjingle occupancy was to include a total of 309 square App. arranged rooms” of 70 feet, 73, 76,3 in modular units that included a kitchenette and area, recreation inmate laundry room, units, education and indoor and outdoor exer- g., jail See, id., cise areas. e. 249. The size was projected population, based on a decline in inmate from 245 prisoners present. male Id., 1979to 226 at at 69. Although program projected the architectural that con jail completed by 1983,ibid., *8 struction of the new would be facility by work on the new been Dur had not started 1984. ing years, intervening population outpaced the the inmate population projections. Litigation in the state courts en larger jail. sued, and defendants were ordered to At build torney County, General 624, 394 Mass. Sheriff of Suffolk
3The size of September plan. the cells was reduced from the The archi- program tectural noted that: single occupancy
“The rooms have been the minimum sized to meet stand- ards as following setting agencies. devised the standard The Massachu- Regulatiоns, Correction’s Code Human Services Department setts Chapter Facilities, County IX—Standards for Correctional Standard 972.3 square The Manual design. calls for a minimum of 70 feet for all new cell Facilities, Standards Adult Local Detention Standard as sponsored by requires the American Correctional Association at least 70 sq. ft. of space floor when per day.” App. confinement exceeds 10 hours 77-78. id., (listing
See also at 63-66 state and national standards consulted in preparation of the program). architectural (1985). prisoners, Thereupon, plaintiff with 2d 361 477 N. E. to mod- support the District Court moved sheriff, of the the Citing facility provide ify with 435 cells. the decree delay jail population unanticipated and the in increase “the jail,” completing modified the de- District Court the in jail capacity in permit to be increased of the new cree provided any amount, that:
“(a) occupancy single-cell under the de- is maintained facility; sign for the
“(b) specifications Ar- standards and under the proportion Program, the relative modified, as chitectural support space will remain same services of cell Program; Architectural it was “(c) incorporated any into new ar- are modifications plans; chitectural
“(d) delay steps and take all defendants act without carry provisions reasonably necessary out according to the authorized schedule.” Decree Consent Kearney, Action Jail v. Civ. Inmates of Suffolk 1985), (Mass., Apr. App. 110, 111. No. 71-162-G later increased to 453. Construc- number of cells was started in tion 1987. July jail new was still under construc- 1989, while the modify allow the consent decree to
tion, the sheriff moved to
thereby
bunking
cells,
in 197
of male detainees
the double
jail
raising
capacity
to 610 male detainees.
of the new
required
changes
argued
in law and
fact
The sheriff
change
this
in law was
The asserted
the modification.
(1979),
The new Suffolk
Jail
thereafter.
Appeals
“[W]e
stating:
affirmed,
The Court of
are in
agreement
opinion
with the well-reasoned
of the district
court and see no reason to elaborate further.” Inmates 4See,
Children,
g.,
e.
Carey,
New York State Assn.
Retarded
Inc. v.
(CA2)
J.),
Phila
(Friendly,
denied,
(1983);
Suffolk App. 1990), judgt. reported Pet. at 915 F. 2d order granted p. certiorari. 498 2a.5 We 90-954, in No. for Cert. (1991). U. S.
II moving the sheriff relied for of the 60(b), which in relevant of Civil Procedure on Federal Rule part provides: just, upon terms are the court motion and such as
“On
legal representative
party
party’s
or a
relieve
proceeding
judgment,
fol-
order,
a final
or
from
(5)
judgment
lowing
satisfied,
has been
reasons:
...
judgment upon
discharged,
prior
which
or
or a
released,
vacated, or
has
reversed or otherwise
it
it is based
been
longer equitable
judgment
should have
no
is
(6) any
justify-
application;
prospective
or
other reason
judgment.
ing
оperation
...”
relief from the
suggestion
no
in these cases that a consent decree
There is
60(b).
subject to Rule
A consent decree no doubt em
is not
respects
agreement
parties
and thus
some
bodies an
of the
agreement
it is an
that the
nature. But
contractual
parties
expect
and be enforce
in,
desire
will be reflected
judicial
subject
generally
the rules
able
decree that is
as,
Railway
applicable
judgments
to other
Em
decrees.
(1961).
Wright,
ployes
642, 650-651
The District
v.
U. S.
60(b)(5)
recognized held that
Court
much but
Rule
codified
wrong”
“grievous
standard of United States v.
&
Swift
supra, that a
Co.,
case for modification under this standard
County Jail,
overcrowding
at the new Suffolk
Because
sheriff
facility.
the new
prisoners
refused to transfer
female
He did
re
quest
subsequently
modification of
decree. The District Court
or
jail.
dered the sheriff
house female inmates
the new
The sheriff
Inmates
Jail
appealed, and the First Circuit affirmed.
of Suffolk
(1991).
Kearney,
“The distinction is between restraints that rights fully upon nearly perma- tion to accrued facts so substantially impervious change, nent as to be supervision changing those that involve the conduct provisional or conditions and are thus and tentative. .. . The consent is to be read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the if revision should future, in the to exact revision right be.” 286 to events to necessary become adaptation S.,U. at 114-115. conclusion that the reinforce the since
Our decisions Swift take was not intended to wrong” language “grievous Swift all efforts to off virtually a talismanic quality, wаrding on consent decrees. Railway Employes emphasized modify decrees, consent in administering need for flexibility sound judicial but that a “There is ... no stating: dispute of the terms of an call for discretion of law or if whether circumstances, decree injunctive have or at the time of its issuance fact, obtaining changed, *12 at 647. S., 364 U. new ones have since arisen.” last Term in was in our decision The same theme repeated Dowell, Schools v. Ed. Oklahoma Public City Board of of we the (1991), rigid in which rejected 498 U. S. 246-248 as a barrier of “grievous wrong” language use the Swift decree. a to dissolve a desegregation motion 60(b) is that Rule concluding There thus little basis for that modifications of and intended misread the opinion Swift the in were to be governed by consent decrees all cases Rule, in in That providing standard actually applied Swift. relieved from a be that, party on such terms as are just, it is no longer equitable a final or decree where judgment have permits the judgment prospective application, more flexible standard. stringent, less since Brown The in institutional reform litigation upsurge Education, the v. Board (1954), 483 has made 347 U. S. of in a decree response of district court to ability modify more Because important. circumstances all the changed of in for extended periods decrees often remain place such occurring time, during the likelihood of significant changes e. Philadelphia g., See, is increased. the life decree 2d 1114, F. Organization Shapp, v. 602 Rights Welfare (CA3 (1980), in which denied, 444 S. 1026 1979), 1119-1121 cert. U. was in of of a decree allowеd light consent in circumstances that were the defendants’ changes beyond and the control were not court or contemplated by par- ties when decree was entered.
The the District and experience Courts Courts Ap peals and has dem implementing such decrees modifying onstrated that a flexible essential approach often to achiev of reform ing goals See, e. New York State litigation. g., Children, Assn. Retarded Inc. Carey, v. The supra.6 for Courts have also observed Appeals interest public is a reason particularly for a flexible mod significant applying ification standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees “reach beyond involved parties directly suit on the impact to the sound and public’s right efficient its operation institutions.” Heath v. De Courcy, (CA6 1989). 2d Accord, F. New York State Assn. Children, Retarded Inc. Carey, 969. supra,
6 Carey, sought state defendants modification of a consent decree designed empty mentally a state school for the retarded that had 6,000 people squalid housed over judgment conditions. consent contemplated transfer community placements of residents to or of 15 fewer 2d, beds. F. at 959. urged revising Defendants the decree to placement allow larger community of some residents in residences would both expedite their transfer from higher the state school allow for *13 quality Friendly, care. Judge writing Circuit, for the Second allowed the modification:
“Here, Swift, inas the modification proposed by is the defendants. But not, Swift, it in derogation is as in objeсtive of the primary decree, the namely, empty ; to such a mammoth . institution . . indeed defendants that, offered substantial again evidence Swift, to modifica- contrast the tion attaining was essential to goal any reasonably early that at To date. sure, change be objective the does run counter to another of the namely, place occupants to ... in small bearing facilities some resem- home, blance any to normal but perforce modification will alter some aspect Id., decree.” at 969. In ruling, so recognized the court that power equity “[t]he of a court of to modify injunctive a decree of long-established, broad, relief is and flexi- Id., ble.” at 967. present urges are these factors Rufo that
Petitioner support He of the decree. modification before us cases improve actually conditions would asserts that modification in the pretrial cannot be housed detainees, who now some for County to other are transferred and therefore Jail Suffolk legal family counsel. members and farther from facilities, petitioners that detainees assert facilities, these transfer than conditions under less desirable be double celled celling were allowed at the if double that would exist those that Rufo also contends Petitioner new Jail. Suffolk crowding implicated public because here interest is pretrial facility the release of some has necessitated the new halfway houses, from the transfer of others detainees and many escape. which points insufficient rea- Court,
For the District these 60(b)(5) “authority modify because its under Rule son legal requirements by [was] for modi- limited the established Supp., as Court, The District at 566. . . .” 734 F. fication . suggested would above, noted also held proper flexible more standard not be even under the changed of the cir- in some other Circuits. None followed it violate because would warranted modification cumstances pro- primary purposes was to decree, which one of the [which] al- separate “[a] has for each detainee cell vide sought ways important the relief this element of been an important Id., litigation perhaps element.” even the most — appearing opinion, this was in this For reasons later at 565. requested adequate denying modification. basis for not an 60(b)(6) provided no also held that Rule The District Court and the Court Court, The District basis for relief. more rigidity recognize Appeals is nei- well, that such failed appropriate of in- required in the context nor ther Swift litigation. stitutional reform “grievous any urged rule other than It is Swift litigation parties
wrong” such as would deter standard destroy negotiating the util- and hence settlements this from *14 ity Obviously of consent decrees. that would not be the case government insofar as the state or local officials are con- plaintiffs cases, they cerned. As for the in such know that they litigate win, resulting judgment if to conclusion and give constitutionally adequate or decree will them what perhaps they hoped They time but less than for. also prospective judgment know that effect of such a or de- open equitable cree will be to modification where deemed 60(b). they bargain under Rule Whether or not for more they might get trial, they than what after will be in no worse position they if settle and have the consent decree entered. they litigation perhaps At least will avoid further will negotiate providing a decree more than what would have government's And, been ordered without the local consent. course, they litigate, they may if lose. III Although we hold that a district court should exercise flexibility considering requests for modification of an in stitutional reform consent it does not follow that a modification will be warranted in all circumstances. Rule 60(b)(5) provides party may that a obtain relief from a court longer equitable judgment order when "it is no prospective application," longer should have not when it is no convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree. Ac cordingly, party seeking of a consent decree establishing significant change bears the burden of that a circumstances warrants revision of the decree. If the mov ing party standard, meets this the court should consider proposed suitably whether modification is tailored to the changed circumstance.7 applies party 7 Thestandard we set forth when a seeks modification of arguably
a term of a consent decree that relates to the vindication of a right. showing necessary implement constitutional changes Such a is not minor in extraneous details that have been included in a decree (e.g., paint dеsign building's facade) color or of a but are unrelated to
A may meet seeking decree party a consent A change showing significant in by either a burden its initial or in law. conditions factual when be warranted a consent decree
Modification of compliance decree changed with the make conditions factual ap substantially was a modification onerous. Such more litigation when by in 1985 proved this District Court in provide jail plans did not apparent the new for it became space. Jail v. Inmates cell sufficient of Suffolk (Mass., 1985), Apr. 11, Kearney, 71-162-G Action No. Civ. appropriate when a App. decree is also 110.8 Modification obstacles, unforeseen proves because of to be unworkable Carey, Children, Inc. v. Retarded York Assn. New State (modification could not where State 2d, at 969 allowed 706 F. patients); housing appropriate for transfer facilities find Organization Shapp, Philadelphia Rights 602 F. Welfare (modification where could not allowed State at 1120-1121 2d, targets); en or when clients to meet decree find sufficient would be detri of the decree without modification forcement public Elrod, 760 F. 2d interest, Duran v. mental to the Ordinarily, par- underlying remedying the constitutional violation. changes. If modifying a to allow such a ties should consent decree moving party a basis for party refuses to consent and the has reasonable request, modify In these cases the entire its the court should the decree. binding program part on the local au- architectural became decreе Hence, any technically required change program a thorities. change program certain provision exempting in the absent changes. provision by the 1985 modification of the Such was furnished course, necessity changing a insignifi- decree. Of decree allow changes entering overly could be avoided an cant detailed decree. opposition city This modification was entered over the of the Boston councilors, parties litigation who were to the the District Court. 1985) (modification (CA7 pretrial to avoid allowed 759-761 felons). violent of accused release only urge Respondents should be allowed that modification unforesee- change is both “unforeseen in facts when Respondents would a standard 35. Such Brief for able.” flexibility exacting we provide test; than the less even Swift *16 anticipate required Litigants adopt to are not decline to it. conceivably during exigency the life every arise could decree. a consent granted Ordinarily, not be modification should however, actually upon antici party events that relies where pated Twelve John into a decree. See at the time it entered App. 62, 65-66, C. Columbia, 274 U. S. D. District Does v. (1988); Lynaugh, 856, 811F. 2d Ruiz v. 295, 298-299 861 F. 2d 1987). (CA5 anticipated party If it is clear that 862-863 performance of the de changing make that would conditions agreed decree, the to but nevertheless more onerous cree satisfy heavy convince party burden to have would good agreed made a faith, in to the decree that it a court comply and should be with effort reаsonable 60(b). undertaking under Rule relieved consider Accordingly, should remand the District Court on County popula- upsurge inmate in the Suffolk whether the by petitioners. The District Court foreseen tion was April course of when, in the in on this issue touched litigation, requested denying in this the modification overcrowding problem faced that “the court stated ongo- been an unforeseen. It has is neither new nor Sheriff litigation, during ing problem before the course of this Supp., 564. entry 734 F. of the consent decree.” after program incorporated in the de- However, the architectural jail projections specifically that the set forth cree in 1979 Signifi- years.9 subsequent in population would decrease the consent decree cantly, modified District Court when the necessary are the “modifications found that 1985, the court in population jail unanticipated in increase meet the jail.” delay completing Inmates in of Suffolk (Mass., Apr. 11, Kearney, 71-162-G Action No. Civ. Jail added). it assert that 1985), (emphasis App. Petitioners began, July only construction 10 months after was 400 and pretrial exceeded detainees the number jail. Brief approach new began the number of cells p. 90-954, 9. No. Petitioner Rufo increasing rapidly strange, aif somewhat It strikes us as respondents contemplated, that jail population been had jail been that would have for a new settled would have adequate pretrial doubt There no detainees.10 to house projections: following program included The architectural Population Projections Year *17 243 1980 241
1981 239
1982 238
1983 236
1984 232
1986-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999 App. 69. daily provided Respondents the District Court have been with and 1990). (Mar. 30, during litigation. this See Tr. 82 prison population data parties alarm over in these The fact that none of the showed fluctuations ongoing population in argument data undermines the dissent’s “reasonably post, at 406. crease was foreseeable.” See sig- “reasonably differs We note the dissent’s foreseeable” standard By nificantly adopted by today. invoking from that this stand- Court focusing exclusively following developments on modification of the ard 1986, post, jumps to decree in see the conclusion that dissent any full petitioners responsibility responding assumed for increase in jail, by increasing capacity potentially infi- detainee numbers of the that, nitely. agreement we of a But do not think the absence clear originally that the decree, as for modified, issued and called facility single a with cells. Inmates Jail of Suffolk 1985), Kearney, (Mass., Apr. Action No. Civ. 71-162-G App. apparent, 110.11 It is that the decree however, itself expressly agreement by peti- nowhere orders or reflects an provide jail having single tioners to facilities cells sufficient pretrial large to accommodate all future detainees, however might agree- the number of such detainees be. Petitioners’ appear only pro- ment and the decree to have bound them specified single petitioners vide number of If cells. facility providing to build a second new double cells that they would meet it standards, constitutional is doubtful that would have violated the consent decree. undertaking by peti-
Even if the decree is construed as an provide single pretrial tioners to re- detainees, cells for petitioners promise changed lieve from that condi- based on necessarily purpose tions does not the basic of the violate purpose provide remedy decree. That was what had variety including found, factors, been based on double celling, obtaining to be unconstitutional conditions If Charles Street Jail. modification of one term of a consent purpose obviously decree defeats the modifi- impossible. cation would be all but That cannot be rule. holding The District was thus in that even Court error under more flexible standard than its version of re- Swift quired, single requirement modification of the cell was neces- sarily forbidden. *18 record, fully developed
a impose this Court should on a local burden government by assuming “reasonably change that a in circumstances was anticipating responding foreseeable” and that change and to such a was responsibility petitioners. the sole of 11 of One the conditions of the modification ordered 1985 was “single-cell facility.” occupancy design is maintained for the under the App. 111. if, as it later modified must of course be
A consent decree placed upon obligations the one or more out, turns impermissible But parties under federal law. has become when the be warranted a consent decree of modification legal changed statutory make what law to or decisional has prevent. designed was the decree Railway Employes Wright, 364 v. was the case This (1961). were sued for railroad and its unions U. A S. § seq., Railway violating 151 et Act, Labor 45 U. S. C. the employees, against nonunion discrimination which banned prohibited parties such a decree that the entered consent and Railway Act was amended the Labor Later, discrimination. sought shops, a the union modification to allow union and require, Although but amendment did not the decree. purposely permitted, shops, this held that union Court parties to the modification because union was entitled pro- correctly recognized the consent decree that what had Railway illegal Labor Act as it then under hibited was to further must be free continue read and because “court objectives provisions th[e] its are amended.” Act when Firefighters supra, Railway Employes, v. 651. See also (1984). Stotts, 9, 583, n. 17 561, 576, n. U. S. urges Rapone more, 1979deci- without our that, Petitioner change in law in Bell 441 U. S. was Wolfish, sion governing requiring construction of the decree disagree. Bell made clear Jail. We Suffolk celling announced: that double what the Court had before surely did not cast unconstitutional. But it not in all cases single celling, petitioners legality doubt on undoubtedly they signed pending when that Bell was aware judged on the basis that Thus, the case must be the decree. celling might petitioners double be it was immaterial to they preferred event e., even in that constitutional, ruled i. only single providing agree decree which called for jail cells in the to be built.
389 Neither Bell nor the Federal Constitution forbade this course of conduct. Federal courts not order States or governments, objection, local over their to undertake a curing course of not conduct tailored to a constitutional vio adjudicated. Bradley lation that has been See Milliken v. (Milliken (1977). II), 433 U. 281 But 267, S. we have no expense, doubt “save that, time, themselves the and inevi litigation,” table risk of United States v. Armour Co.,& 402 (1971),petitioners dispute U. 673, S. could settle the over proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had by undertaking been found do more than the Constitution (almost requires any beyond itself affirmative decree a direc obey that), necessarily tive to the Constitution does but also more than awhat court would have ordered absent the set Accordingly, tlement. the District not Court did abuse its entering agreed-upon clearly discretion in which was related to the found to conditions offend the Constitu (Milliken I), Bradley tion. Milliken v. 418 U. S. (1974). Dowell, See also S., 498 U. at 246-248. Cf. Fire (1986).12 fighters Cleveland, 478 U. S. automatically opens To hold that clarification in the law relitigation every the door for of the merits of affected con- finality agreements sent decree would undermine the of such negotiation and could serve as disincentive to of settle- litigation. position urged ments in institutional reform The by petitioners 12Petitioner Rapone required that the District was contends Court
modify the consent decree because “the violation underlying constitutional disappeared decree has and will not recur” and that “no constitutional alleged” jail, violation [is] even at the “so no new there is constitutional predicate violation to serve a for the federal court’s continued exercise equitable 90-1004, of its power.” pp. Brief for Petitioner in No. 36-37. argument His not well taken. District findings is Court did make on issues, celling these and even if it jail had ruled double at the new granted, constitutional and the modification should be we do not question have before us the the entire be whether decree should vacated. only legally imply necessarily “would *20 enforce by obligation under the consent state assumed able achieving ultimately minimal consti that of decree was Substantively, this would prison . . . standards. tutional parties that of the intention obvious violence to the do by obligations the state were assumed decretal require meeting constitutional minimal confined necessary, Procedurally, as this would make it ments. every time an a decision illustrates, constitutional case modify the decree to enforce or made either effort was Ply by judicial Evatt, 1321, 1327 924F. 2d action.” ler v. 1991). (CA4 in not, law will and of that clarifies the
While a decision modifying provide a it consti- decree, a could itself, basis for support change modifica- in that would a circumstances tute agreement parties on a misunder- if had based their tion the standing governing instance, in For Pasadena law. (1976), City Spangler, 424, 437-438 we 427 U. S. Bd. Ed. v. a should have been ordered when that modification held equitable ambiguous parties interpreted an decree had contrary interpreta- ultimate to the District Court’s manner contrary interpretation was tion and the District Court’s intervening Collins, in Nelson v. decisional law. And (1981) (en banc), the Fourth Cirсuit va- 2d 428-429 F. assumption equitable on the an order that was based cated bunking prisoners per se that double was unconstitutional. if Thus, the sheriff and commissioner could establish on parties decree remand that the consent believed that pretrial single celling of detainees was mandated the Con- misunderstanding stitution, this law could form a basis again, connection, modification. In this we note see supra, at that the decree itself recited that it “sets forth constitutionally adequate program which is both and con- added.) stitutionally required.” (Emphasis B moving party establishing has met Once a its burden of change warranting either a fact or law a consent the district court determine should proposed suitably whether the modification is tailored to the changed evaluating proposed circumstance. modifica- tion, three matters should be clear. perpetuate course,
Of a modification must not create or a constitutional violation. Petitioners contend that double celling inmates at the Suffolk would Jail be constitu- Respondents tional under Bell. counter that Bell is factu- ally distinguishable celling jail and that double at the new *21 rights pretrial would violate the constitutional of detainees.13 If this the District is case—the Court did not decide this Supp., at issue, 734 F. 565-566—modification should not be granted. proposed
A modification should not strive to rewrite a con- sent it decree so that conforms the constitutional floor. changed Once a court has determined that circumstances a warrant a modification in consent the focus should proposed be on the whether modification is tailored to re- problems by change solve created the the in circumstances. A more, court should do no for a consent is decree a final judgment reopened only eq- be to the extent that uity requires. inquire The court should not “turn aside to provisions upon [the separate decree] whether some of of the distinguished joint opposed from action could have been 13 Court, respondents In the District report introduced of an archi tectural proposed consultant who claimed that modification would violate the standards of the American Correctional Association and the Capital Division Planning by Massachusetts of and Operations leaving cell, dayroom, inadequate detainees with space. and outdoor exercise See Bell, (“[W]hile App. S., 544, 146-179. See 441 U. at n. 27 the recommenda groups may tions of these various cases, be instructive in they certain minima”). simply do not establish the constitutional opposition.” offered if the defendants had with success 116-117. S., at Swift, U. “[c]onsid- public constraints, the interest and these
Within powers our federal on the allocation of within based erations require supra, system,” the district Dowell, 248, government administrators, who have defer to local court assessing, elucidating, responsibility “primary problems solving” reform, to resolve the of institutional implementing a Brown v. decree modification. intricacies of (1955). also Education, 349 U. See Board S. (1990); II, Jenkins, 495 U. S. 50-52 Milliken Missouri Although and local state may аgree officers S., at 281.14 U. litigation charge to do more than of institutional minimally by required the Constitution to set- that which litigation, surely avoid further court should tle case and ruling request keep public interest in on mind change making modify based on a conditions it substan- tially decree. To refuse modi- more onerous abide State, is to bind all future officers of the fication of a decree necessity regardless view the one or their relief from might provisions of a decree that not have been entered more litigated been to its conclusion. The District had the matter problems of the view seemed be Court only marginally relevant to fiscal officers of the State were *22 request Supp., at for modification in this case. 734 F. may justify not be used to Financial constraints 566. they perpetuation but violations, or of constitutional creation government legitimate a defendants institu- are concern that we concurrence mischaracterizes the nature the deference stated, government we have see local administrators. As would accord supra, party establishing moving bears the burden of that at modification of a consent de significant change circumstances warrants However, inquiry. in this threshold once No deference is involved cree. warranted, that has that a modification is we think a court determined require to simple sense the court principles of federalism common weight government who to the views of the local officials give significant any implement modification. must litigation apрropriately
tional reform and therefore are con- tailoring sidered in a consent decree modification.
IV conclude, "grievous wrong" To we hold that the Swift apply requests modify standard does not to consent de- stemming litigation. crees from institutional reform Under adopt today, party seeking the flexible standard we modi- significant fication of a consent decree must establish that a change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and proposed suitably is tailored to the changed circumstance. We vacate the decision below and proceedings remand the cases for further consistent with opinion. this
It i~ so ordered. part Justice Thomas took no in the consideration or decision of these cases. O'Connor, concurring judgment.
Justice in the agree I these cases should be remanded so that modify District Court reconsider whether the decree. separately emphasize I write the limited nature of our review; clarify why, despite review, our limited the cases Court; explain my should be returned to the District and to portions opinion. concerns with certain of the Court's
I may modify judgment, judg- A court a final such as the issue, ment embodied in the consent decree where longer equitable judgment court finds that "it is no prospective application." should have Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(5). Determining "equitable" necessarily what is discretion, particularly task that entails substantial in a case one, complex like this where the District Court must make of a host of fac- n requiring balancing decisiоns the sensitive *23 primar- appellate examine result, an court should tors. As a ily its dis- exercises in which the District Court the method District Court outcome cretion, not substantive the rele- account into District Court takes If the reaches. (all likely suggest the to of which are considerations vant result) way, in them a reasonable accommodates same judgment of an abuse will not be the District Court’s then regardless court would an appellate discretion, of whether its first instance. Cf. in the the same outcome have reached (“In (1973) shaping Kurtzman, 192, 200 411 U. S. Lemon v. discre- equity with broad court is vested decrees, the trial narrow”). correspondingly tionary power; appellate review of its discre- to exercise deference the District Court's Our litigation, heightened District where, as in this tion is large public effectively overseeing institu- a been Court has period Judge long su- Keeton has been of time. tion over a implementation 1979; he pervising of this decree since developed understanding involved the difficulties an has jail appellate constructing managing court, that an in hope possible briefing, could never with the best even judgment, reviewing ac-we the District Court’s match. judge’s cordingly trial substantial deference “the owe problem years experience at hand.” Hutto with (1978). Finney, 437 U. S. elaborating much attention to
The Court devotes of its apply cases this kind. “standard” for lower courts product of this Ante, I am not certain that 378-384. party seeking decree modification of a consent effort—“A by showing significant change its burden meet initial ante, at 384—makes law,” either factual conditions or any general language equally clearer than the matters 60(b)(6). guidance I more think we would offer Rule many to the other courts burdened here, and District Court complex administering one, we like this if decrees with simply dis- exercise of its review the District Court’s would
395 specify any shortcomings might cretion in the we find by method which the court reached its conclusion. I
I my view, District took narrow a view of Court too reasoning, its expressed own The discretion. court’s as opinion, its was flawed three law, different errors of each portion range options of which excised a available erroneously to the court. I the sum of believe these self- imposed limits constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion. First, the court relied on Co., United v. 286 States & Swift (1932), U. S. to determine that “new and unforeseen prerequisite any conditions” a modification. In Kearney, Supp. mates Jail 734 F. of Suffolk (Mass. 1990). Because the court found that the over crowding jail at the was at foreseen, id., 564, the court barring viewed As the ex modification. Court Swift plains today, ante, 379-380, at the District Court erred in respect. overcrowding this That was foreseen should dispositive a have been factor the court’s Modi decision. conceivably “equitable” fication could still be Rule under 60(b)(5) population even if the rise in inmate had been fore danger community pretrial seen; to the from the release example, might outweigh petitioners’ inmates, for fail ure to accommodate even a foreseen increase the inmate population.
Second, it District Court concluded that lacked au- thority petitioners’ budget to consider the in de- constraints termining equitable. whether modification would be legally supportable court held: “It is not a basis for modifica- public having a tion of consent au- decree officials fiscal thority provide adequate have chosen not to resources for comply with the terms of the consent Sheriff decree.” Supp., again, I F. 566. Here think the court took too authority. govern- narrow a view own of its State and local responsible providing range are ments for wide of services. operate difficult fiscal con- within officials often Public purpose every spent a dollar for one dollar straints; something the lack spent While else. for cannot be obey constitutional failure never excuse resources can concluding provide that con- requirements, basis it can longer obligation is no compliance with a decree tinued *25 obligation to turns out be “equitable,” if, instance, the for anyone anticipated. expensive significantly than more apply purported although to the the District Court Third, petitioners, proposed by the court de- the “flexible standard” sought type “[t]he modification of because nied modification purpose comply the con- of with the overall here would obligations of that decree.” aside the decree; it would set sent deprives literally, the conclusion Taken this at 565. Id., by any every meaning; modification, “flexible standаrd” obligation a decree. The court definition, will alter an plaintiff class would may the more than that have meant no single celling, agreed but, to a decree without never have petitioners taking to it held the word, at its court any permit decree. that would never standard my Court, in District was another instance where This authority grant erroneously to lacked the found that it view, by petitioners. requested the relief respects, felt itself bound the District Court In these three by do not know not exist. We constraints that fact did extent, have modified whether, and what the court would authority. placed on its own the decree had it not these limits accordingly the District these cases so that I would remand may the full measure of its discretion. Court exercise doing emphasize we find fault I so, however, would by only which the District Court reached with the method justi- may been District well have its conclusion. The Court by suggested in re- fied, for the reasons Stevens, Justice fully fusing modify free, when and the court exercising reach the on remand. discretion, its same result satisfactory jail is a case no outcome. The new This is with simply suffer, likely too small. Someone has to and it is not government responsible to be the officials for underestimat- ing population delaying the inmate the construction jail. Instead, likely it is to be either the inmates of Suf- County, folk who will be double celled in an institution de- signed single ceiling; yet the inmates in counties not sub- ject supervision, to court who will be double celled with the County; inmates transferred from Suffolk or members of the public, who be the victims of crimes committed county comply inmates is forced to release in order with the consent decree. The District Court has an extraor- dinarily difficult decision to make. We should not be in- second-guess judgment clined to the court's sound in decid- ing who will bear this burden.
III opinion today The Court's removes what I see as the three erroneously placed barriers the District Court in its own *26 path. Ante, (distinguishing Swift); ante, at 379-380 at 386- (explaining applied impossibly that the court an strict petitioners' proposed standard"); version of the "flexible ante, (permitting peti- at 392-393 the court to consider the constraints). tioners' fiscal But what the Court removes hand, replaces with one it with the other. Portions of the opinion might place Court's be read to new constraints on are, my view, just the District Court's discretion that in misplaced as the ones with which the District Court fettered itself the first time~ significantly,
Most the Court observes the District recognized single ceiling important Court as "`the most ele- Ante, (quoting Supp., ment" of the decree. at 382 734 F. at 565). adequate But the Court decides that "this was not an denying requested Ante, basis for the modification." at 382. unsupported by any authority. Instead, This conclusion is reasoning: the Court offers its own "If modification of one decree, n purpose term of a consent decree defeats the impossible. obviously would all but That be modification Ante, at the 387. cannot be rule.” logically sweeping me as both strikes conclusion This legally the modification of one It be that erroneous. purpose always the the defeat term of a decree does supra, hardly it follows that the at 396. But decree. See single of a never defeat the decree’s term can important purpose, especially “the most ele- if that term is instance, If, for the District Court ment” of the decree. respondents never have consented finds the would relief) (and obtaining delay without the decade decree single celling, guarantee the think that court I should it to that modi- its discretion were conclude would not abuse inequitable. permit celling be double would Simi- fication to jail larly, to find the was constructed court assumption that each cell would hold small cells on the with would exceed inmate, I that the District Court but one doubt 60(b)(5)by concluding authority it that would its under Rule respondents. inequitable cell To extent to double be suggests it limits the District Court’s otherwise, the Court think is and ill-advised in what I an unwarranted discretion fashion. that the District same is true of the Court’s statement government . should “defer to local administrators . .
Court implementing to resolve the intricacies a decree modifica- defer, Ante, sure, To be should tion.” 392. courts problems prison resolving day-to-day administrators prison; problems exper- managing these fall within prison g., Thornburgh See, Abbott, 490 tise of officials. e. (1989). disagree S. 407-408 But I with notion U. *27 prison resolving must to that courts defer administrators modify ques- how whether and to consent decree. These management, prison tions involve but at bot- details they “equitable” require tom a determination of what is to parties all to a lawsuit concerned. Deference one of usually path equity; is not the these surest deferenсe
399 particular petitioners, who do not have a model record of compliance previous case, particu- with court orders in this is larly unlikely equitable to lead to an result. The inmates prison have as much claim as the officials to an understand- ing equities. The District Court should be free to account, being take the views of both sides into without grant forced to more deference to one side than to the other. STEVENS, joins, JUSTICE with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting.
Today the Court endorses
the standard
for modification of
by Judge Friendly
consent decrees articulated
in New York
Children,
Carey,
State Assn. for Retarded
Inc. v.
706 F. 2d
(CA2),
denied,
(1988).
agree
cert.
I
determines,
trial,
When a district
court
after a contested
guilty
persistent
that a state institution
is
of a serious and
Constitution,
typically
violation of the Federal
it
fashions a
remedy
simple
directing
is more intrusive
than a
order
illegal
the defendants
to cease and desist
from their
conduct.
lenburg
Ed.,
See Swann v. Charlotte-Meck
Bd. of
402 U. 5. 1
(1971).
duty
remedy
A district
court has a
to command a
effective,
enjoys
equitable
authority
and it
the broad
necessary
obligation.
id.,
15-16;
to fulfill this
See
Brown
Education,
(1955);
v. Board of
349 U. S.
see also
Jenkins,
(1990).
Missouri
II petitioners’ finding incarceration after that 1973, June In pretrial violated con- Street Jail detainees the Charles of appropriately en- standards, the District Court stitutional injunction “beyond simple proscription tered an against that went pursued.” precise previously the National conduct Society Engineers States, v. 435 U. S. United of Professional (1) (1978). petitioners required 679, 698 It to discontinue practice celling pretrial the of double detainees after Novem- (2) the Street 30, 1973, ber the use of Charles Jail pretrial 30, after Inmates detention June 1976. of Suffolk (Mass. 1973). County Supp. 691 Eisenstadt, 676, 360 Jail v. F. injunction. appeal
Petitioners did not from that When double-celling pro they comply found it difficult to with the they postpone hibition, however, asked the District Court requirement. that court refused and or enforcement of The petitioners to to other institutions. dered transfer inmates County Appeals The Court of affirmed. Inmates of Suffolk (CA1), Eisenstadt, denied, 419 2d 1196 cert. Jail F. (1974). they petitioners that could not S. When found U. comply injunction, part Dis the second of the 1973 with postponed closing Jail, Street trict Court Charles petitioners’ compliance. firm While but set another date for pending, parties appeal that order entered into from was negotiations produced the 1979 consent decree. Appeals the District After the Court affirmed Court’s yet closing order and set another firm date for the County Jail, Kear Charles Street Inmates Jail v. Suffolk (CA1 1978), ney, parties agree 98, 101 F. 2d reached plan ment on entered the District as a was Court Kearney, consent Jail v. Inmates Suffolk (Mass., 1979), May App. Pet. Civ. Action No. 71-162-G p. 90-954, for Cert. in No. 15a. facility described in the 1979 decree was never con- petitioners plan completed,
structed. Even before was recognized larger jail required. was June the sheriff filed a motion in the District Court for an order *29 permitting celling double in the Charles Street Jail. The parties negotiated agree- motion was denied. The then an providing larger jail ment for a new and for a modification they agreement, respond- of the 1979decree. After reached presented modify, ents a motion to which District Court granted April 11, on 1985. The court found that modifica- “necessary unanticipated tions were to meet the increase in jail population delay completing jail origi- and as nally contemplated.” App. 110. The District Court then nothing prevent ordered that in the decree should petitioners capacity increasing facility the new
“from if the following are conditions satisfied:
“(a) occupancy single-cell is maintained under the facility; design for the
“(b) specifications under the of the Ar- standards and Program, proportion modified, chitectural the relative space support cell same services will remain the Program as it was in the Id., . .” at Architectural . . 110-111. appeal
There was no from that modification order. Indeed, although City objected the Boston Council to the modifica- appears product agreement it tion, to have been the of an respondents petitioners. between years respondents jail In 1990,19 after filed suit, new completed compliance was in substantial with the terms of decree, consent as modified in 1985.
II I It is the terms the 1979 consent as modified petitioners modify. reaffirmed in now seek to negotiated against background 1979 decree was in which important propositions already certain had been settled. litigation First, the had established the existence a serious period five Second, for a of almost violation. constitutional injunction entry un- was years of the 1973 after —which any petitioners had waived questionably and which valid violating right challenge petitioners the Con- were still — injunction. Inmates as the See stitution as well of Suffolk although Kearney, Third, 99. 2d, F. Jail willing respondents they already prevailed, had closing agree postponement of the Charles to another approved, petitioners the court submitted, and Jail if Street facility. adequate plan a new an satisfy Obviously plan any constitutional would have to equally of features that a number It was obvious standards. facility particu- plan, or its new as the site of the *30 such constitutionally design, man- would not be lar architectural duty provide discharge to an ade- to their In dated. order facility, quate the risk of stern sanctions also to avoid and outstanding order, years noncompliance court with an of for propose entirely appropriate petitioners a for be it would by remedy the minimum mandated that exceeded the bare or “floor” Indeed, as “minimum” terms such Constitution. remedy helpful particularly The in this context. not are perpetuate requirement a con- that it not the constrained does in this sense the Constitution violation, stitutional Beyond however, the provide constraint, a “floor.” underlying give remedy's attempt expression con- to the quantitative evalua- lend itself to value does not stitutional complexity the institutions involved of tion. In view of necessity affording relief, the remedial of effective many, highly detailed commands. contain decree will often any might of these the failure to fulfill one It well be that specific requirements an inde- have constituted would pendent would the absence violation, nor constitutional necessarily any ineffective. render the decree one element duty the decree is not to formulate of the District Court provisions, the various inter- but to consider with the fewest discretion, in the sound exercise its and, ests involved remedy Similarly, fashion the that it believes to be best.2 a parties’ understanding consent decree reflects of the best remedy, subject judicial approval, parties and, to a enjoy consent decree at least as broad Dis discretion formulating trict Court the remedial Fire decree. Cf. (1986). fighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 525-526 respondents’ point though they From view, even had they might reasonably prepared their won case, be to surren- they unquestionably der some of the relief to which enforcing closing entitled—such as the deadline on exchange Charles Street Jail—in for other benefits to be in- remedy, appropriate in an cluded each even if such benefit might constitutionally required. example, not be For an agreement facility, library, adequate on an exercise or an placе worship might approved by be the court in con- if sent even each individual feature were not essen- tial to the termination of the constitutional violation.
2 is the difficulty determining prospectively It which remedy is best justifies relationship flexible standard of modification. This be tween the litiga characteristics of a remedial decree in structural reform tion and the standard explained passage flexible of modification is in the Judge Friendly found to be the best applicable statement legal standard: “ judge ‘The search remedy, judgment must for the “best” since but his *31 incorporate open-ended must such considerations as and fair effectiveness ness, and since the and threat constitutional value that inter occasions the can great precision, vention never defined with be the intervention can any always never be defended with It open certitude. must be to revi sion, strong showing required even without the traditionally for modifica decree, namely, causing grievous hardship. tion of that the choice first is justified A is if the remedy working effectively revision is not or unnec is essarily Children, burdensome.’” New York State Assn. Retarded for (CA2 1983) Carey, 956, Fiss, (quoting Supreme Inc. v. 706 2dF. 970 The Justice, Court —1978 Term —Foreword: The Forms of 93 Harv. Rev. L. (1979)). 49 justification modifying The for a consent decree is not that the did decree much,” circumstances, in light remedy “too but that later modified original better the goals. would achieve decree’s overriding apparent two that the it is action fact, in this interim purposes the District Court’s both that informed prohibition respondents’ negotiatiоns the remedy were and jail. closing celling The of the old against double ultimately accepted, as the terms of plan as well that was designed to serve consent decree entered in purposes. these two incorporated the details of
The all consent decree program. agreed upon recital in the decree A architectural constitutionally adequate and program “both refers as constitutionally course, does not required.”3 recital, of That thought parties that or the either the court indicate that any specific its every indeed, or, detail of the settlement — required.” adequate “constitutionally An provisions—was required, parties remedy constitutionally and the was program was this constitution- the court were satisfied ally adequate. assuming that the for that is not basis But including any provision decree, parties of the believed constitutionally celling, prohibition against was double the required.4 passage in full: The relevant reads litigation parties agree purposes this all that for “And whereas Center, Facility, Architec- Street Detention Charles the Suffolk below, and, paragraph modified in Program which is attached tural program which is both constitu- incorporated in this sets forth a Cert, App. to Pet. for tionally constitutionally required." adequate and 90-954, 16a. p. in No. 4Consider, following example, provisions decree: “(d) page changed is Lobby/reception’ on paragraph The headed ‘A.l.a. (100) by increasing to one-hundred and the the number of visitor lockers paragraph changed read: tenth sentence fountain, vending ‘Lobby drinking ma- public telephones, include should chines and bulletin boards.’ page 37:
“(j) following paragraph shall be added access and laundry permit be convenient ‘Inmate rooms shall located laundry placement rooms re- supervision. and the number staff Room laundry phase. Each inmate quired during design resolved shall be
405 IV modify ultimately grant The motion to led our July certiorari I cases, was filed on 1989. As view these proponents of that motion had the burden of demonstrat- ing changed justified conditions between 1985 and 1989 changes a further the consent decree. The already that occurred between 1979and 1985were reflected petitioners acquiesced in the 1985 modification. in Since they argue that modification, cannot now be heard to pre-1985 developments in the law inor the facts— —either provide modifying a basis for the 1985 order. It is that petitioners’ obligation order that defined to construct and to operate adequate facility. an
Petitioners’ reliance on Bell v. Wolfish, U. S. (1979), constituting change plainly a relevant in the law is misplaced. pending That case was in this Court when the authority consent decree was entered in 1979. It was the sought permission on which the sheriff relied when he double cell in it 1984, and, course, was well known to all parties when the decree was modified in It 1985. does not qualify changed as a circumstance.5 high quality room shall contain washing drying equipment, and clothes sink, sorting table, Id., 17a, storage ironing board.’” at 18a. agrees As the Court that Bell сhange v. did not constitute a in Wolfish decree, ante, law requiring modification of the see the Court does changes define further the kind of in law that merit modification. particular, In the Court has no occasion to draw a distinction between the type change recognized Railway Employes Wright, law (1961), change petitioners U. S. 642 and the in law that assert was effected significant Bell. The distinction is nevertheless and deserves mention. Railway suit, Employes, plaintiffs originally brought alleging that against employees, railroad and its unions discriminated nonunion practice prohibited by Act, § Railway seq. Labor 45 U. S. C. 151 et The defendants into a promising entered consent to refrain from such Congress subsequently discrimination. When amended the Act to permit shops, union allowing the Court concluded that a modification union shops granted statutory purpose. should be so as to further the In con presented Railway Employes, trast to the situation it cannot be con *33 pretrial average detainees of number in the The increase change the size of that in- a of fact. Because is, course, of appropriate anticipated it was 1979, in had not been crease steady pro- modify 1985,the But in decree in 1985.6 the surely it foresee- population made gression in the detainee growth District Court’s would continue. that this able by overcrowding problem the finding faced Sheriff that “the Inmates unforeseen,” is neither new nor of Suffolk (Mass. 1990), amply Kearney, Supp. is 561, 564 v. 734 F. Jail by supported record. the population continuing had in inmate increase if the
Even rеasonably actually foreseeable. was foreseen, it not been foreseeability anwas event that that it in the sense Mere during conceivably of the consent de- the life arise” “could disqualify an not, course, should of ante, 385, at cree, see - justifying unanticipated development a modification. from charged parties of those events with notice be But the should contemplate reasonably litigants when prudent would today’s soci- negotiating of the realities a settlement. Given con- ety, surprising found a that the District Court it is not celling. of policy in favor double tended that Bell expressed preference States, appearing as ami- by United is This distinction well described cus curiae: constitutionality to the “Bell rejected challenge Wolfish..., which endorsing such hous- double-celling, represent policy decision of did Act, weighed contrast, amending Railway Congress In Labor
ing. shops. union policies specifically endorsed merits of various labor prohibition decree’s conflicted-with the consent The amendment thus Bell, contrast, propriety on the cast no doubt such clauses. agreed.” had Brief for parties here single-cell requirement to which 20, Amicus Curiae n. 9. United States as ante, Court, 386, figures that the cited It should be noted (The projection 9, projection prepared before 1979. n. are drawn from a 69.) 61, By App. January 1979. See published report in a dated projections underestimated 1982, respondents that the 1979 believed Record, peti 2 App. See 642-648. population. future inmate prisoners detained average number of male knew that the tioners Id., at 642-650. projected number of 236. been 320 instead of the had petition- population be within growth in inmate tinued contemplation. ers’ against important counsel concerns
Other history noncompliance Petitioners’ decree. this consent for insist- injunction provides reason an added the 1973 after Peti- they recent commitments. ing their most honor hardly are new. limitation of fiscal claims tioners’ current *34 previous petitioners’ re- pleas of a continuation reflect These adequate the initial consti- budget avoid funds to to luctance noncompliance prolonged with or to avoid violation tutional claims of original continued decree. The the terms of the petition- support provide for should financial constraint requests.7 ers’ modification finality protecting of strong public the in interest against always modifications. Cf. counsels decrees
court (1989) opin- (plurality Teague Lane, 288, 489 U. S. 308-310 v. (1971) ion); Mackey 682-683 States, 667, 401 U. S. v. United dissenting judgments part (Harlan, concurring in in J., is this interest part). decree, context of a consent in In the pro- favoring of by policy the settlement the reinforced litigants are allowed litigation. To the extent tracted par- for motivation commitments, the their solemn to avoid reliability compromised, and the will be ticular settlements process will suffer. of the entire 7 in mind” “keep public interest the need to the refers to The Court Ante, certainly It is modify a decree. 392. deciding when whether properly powers, courts should exercising equitable their true that when Education, v. Board “public.” See Brown interests of the consider the of (1955). noted, however, that a remedial It must be U. S. 300 unpopular; requirement of provisions that are may well contain decree example of jail might be an expenditures improve conditions additional suffi not constitute a unpopularity Mere does unpopular such an order. explained in Brown: “Courts the Court for modification. As cient reason it public But may properly take into account the interest.... equity of principles vitality of these constitutional saying without that the go should with them.” yield simply disagreement because of cannot allowed to be Ibid.
It a strict standard to- important apply particularly that undermine the when considering requests New in of a consent decree. his opinion central purpose Carey, Children, Inc. York Assn. Retarded State (CA2 the 1983), analyzed requested 2d Judge Friendly F. “of transfer modifications the the central light purpose living whose con Willowbrook, ring squalid population recited, court to facilities of more ditions this has already Id., at 967. The human as dimension quickly possible.” to be consistent with were found changes approved action, In this entire purpose. history central dou against demonstrates that the litigation prohibition ble was a central of the relief ordered purpose celling 1979 and negotiated District Court bargain and of the order embodied in consent original seek More- modify. entered in 1985 that now petitioners over, found, during history as the District Court have to rеsort various been able litigation, petitioners *35 to bail reviews by measures such “transfers state prisons, a release Court, controlled pretrial pro- Superior 734 F. to the gram” respond overcrowding problem. 565. The fact that affords Supp., celling petition- at double ers the easiest and least method of expensive responding justifi- is not an reasonably problem adequate foreseeable In cation for central of decree. compromising purpose this in its misses the observation point Court regard, modification of one term of a consent decree defeats “[i]f would of the modification be obviously purpose Ante, all It is true that but 387. certainly impossible.” be if the modification of consent decree would impossible any one term deemed to defeat pur- that some terms However, recognize decree. pose thwart the cen- are so critical that their modification would render the decree immu- tral the decree does not purpose will table, rather assures that a modification frustrate but legitimate expectations parties neither the of the nor goals core remedial of the decree. judicial finding petition-
After a of constitutional violation, place pretrial single ers were ordered 1973to detainees in petitioners benefits, cells. return for certain committed compliance single- themselves in 1979to continued with the celling requirement. They promise reaffirmed this in 1985. clearly It was not an abuse of discretion for the District petitioners require Court to honor this commitment. judgment Appeals. I would affirm the Court