United States v. Patricia Aruda
993 F.3d 797
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- Patricia Aruda pled guilty in 2015 to possession with intent to distribute ≥500 g methamphetamine and was sentenced to 130 months' imprisonment plus five years supervised release.
- In June 2020 Aruda moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing COVID-19 risk at her facility and her medical conditions.
- The district court found Aruda’s circumstances met the Sentencing Commission’s "extraordinary and compelling" categories (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)) but denied relief after applying the Sentencing Guidelines policy statement § 1B1.13, concluding release was unwarranted based on the § 3553(a) factors and a dangerousness finding under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
- The core legal question was whether the current U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (which references only motions by the BOP Director) is an "applicable policy statement[] issued by the Sentencing Commission" for defendant-filed § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions after the First Step Act allowed defendants to file such motions directly.
- The Ninth Circuit held § 1B1.13 is not an applicable/binding policy statement for defendant-filed motions, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded for reassessment under the proper legal standard; the panel did not decide the merits and noted the Sentencing Commission has not updated § 1B1.13.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is an applicable, binding policy statement for defendant-filed § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions after the First Step Act | § 1B1.13 governs and is binding (district court/U.S. position) | § 1B1.13 applies only to BOP-initiated motions and is not binding on courts hearing defendant-filed motions | § 1B1.13 is not an "applicable" binding policy statement for defendant-filed motions; it may inform discretion but is not binding |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying release based on § 1B1.13 dangerousness and § 3553(a) application | Denial was proper under § 1B1.13, § 3553(a), and dangerousness analysis | Reliance on § 1B1.13 was legal error; court must reassess under correct standard | Vacated and remanded for the district court to reassess the motion without treating § 1B1.13 as binding; merits left to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (general rule that courts may not modify imposed sentences except as statute permits)
- United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2013) (abuse of discretion standard for § 3582(c) sentence reductions)
- United States v. Washington, 971 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2020) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (§ 1B1.13 not applicable to defendant-filed compassionate-release motions)
- United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (same)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (same)
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (same)