United States v. Palomar-Santiago
593 U.S. 321
SCOTUS2021Background
- Palomar‑Santiago, a Mexican national, was ordered removed in 1998 after a California felony DUI conviction; he waived appeal and was deported.
- In 2004 this Court decided Leocal v. Ashcroft, holding DUI is not a "crime of violence" and therefore not an aggravated felony that supports removal.
- Palomar‑Santiago was found back in the U.S. in 2017 and indicted for unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. §1326(a).
- AEDPA §1326(d) bars collateral attacks on prior removal orders unless the defendant shows (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies, (2) deprivation of opportunity for judicial review, and (3) that the order’s entry was fundamentally unfair.
- The Ninth Circuit (following its precedent) excused the first two §1326(d) showings for defendants removed for offenses later held non‑removable and affirmed dismissal; the Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding each §1326(d) requirement is mandatory and not excused merely because the underlying conviction later proves non‑removable.
Issues
| Issue | Palomar‑Santiago's Argument | United States' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1326(d)’s three prerequisites are mandatory when the underlying removal is later shown substantively invalid | §1326(d) should not require exhaustion/opportunity for review if the conviction never made him removable | §1326(d) requires proof of all three elements before collateral attack | All three §1326(d) requirements are mandatory; no exception based solely on later substantive invalidity |
| Whether administrative remedies are "available" when an IJ erroneously says a conviction is removable | An IJ’s legal error makes administrative appeal practically unavailable because defendants won’t know to appeal | Administrative review is available to correct merits errors and thus exhaustion is required | Administrative review is "available" despite IJ error; exhaustion is not excused for that reason |
| Whether §1326(d) applies differently to claims of substantive invalidity vs. procedural defects | A substantively invalid order is void and thus not a ‘‘collateral attack’’ requiring §1326(d) showings | A substantive‑invalidity claim is still a challenge/collateral attack subject to §1326(d) | Challenges to substantive invalidity are collateral attacks and fall under §1326(d)’s prerequisites |
| Whether constitutional‑avoidance requires reading a §1326(d) exception | The statute should be construed to avoid due‑process/separation‑of‑powers problems | The statute is unambiguous; canon does not apply | Canon of avoidance inapplicable because §1326(d) is unambiguous; no judicial exception created |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (DUI not a "crime of violence" for aggravated‑felony removal)
- Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016) (administrative exhaustion mandatory; availability assessed by real‑world capability)
- United States v. Mendoza‑Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (due‑process requires collateral attack when deportation eliminates judicial review)
- United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (constitutional‑avoidance canon applies only to ambiguous statutes)
- Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298 (1994) (judicial statutory construction applies retroactively)
- United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916) (canon favoring constructions that avoid grave constitutional doubts)