United States v. Oscar Harris
853 F.3d 318
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Oscar Harris was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm; originally sentenced under the ACCA residual clause, later resentence to 115 months after the residual clause was invalidated.
- The district court treated two prior Michigan felonious-assault convictions as "crimes of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause, which raised Harris’s base offense level and determined his Guidelines range.
- Harris challenged the classification on appeal, arguing Michigan felonious assault does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of "physical force" as defined by the Guidelines.
- Michigan felonious assault (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82) requires (1) an assault (attempted battery or conduct causing reasonable apprehension of immediate battery), (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) intent to injure or place the victim in apprehension of immediate battery.
- Michigan law treats battery as a "forceful or violent touching" and defines a dangerous weapon as an object used in a way likely to cause serious injury or death.
- The Sixth Circuit held that, because the statute requires at minimum threatened or attempted offensive touching with a dangerous weapon, the offense involves violent force and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Michigan felonious assault categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ elements clause | Harris: statute can be satisfied by offensive touching or minimal conduct that does not constitute "violent force" under Johnson | Government: statute requires assault with a dangerous weapon—necessarily involves attempted/threatened use of force capable of causing pain or injury | The Sixth Circuit: affirmed—statute categorically requires use/attempted/threatened violent force and is a crime of violence |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "violent force" as force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes divisible statutes and explains categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (applies categorical approach to nondivisible statutes)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (foundational categorical-approach methodology)
- United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (aggravated/battery-with-weapon offenses qualify as crimes of violence)
- United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2016) (deadly-weapon element can elevate general force to "violent force")
- United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010) (assault with a weapon threatens force capable of causing injury)
- United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (applies Ramon Silva reasoning to state aggravated battery)
- United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2015) (assault-with-weapon statute in Massachusetts is a crime of violence)
- United States v. Dominguez, 479 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (assault-with-weapon statutes treated as violent felonies)
- United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar treatment of weapon-enhanced assaults)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (categorical approach requires realistic probability of state applying statute to nonqualifying conduct)