United States v. Nature's Way Marine, L.L.C.
904 F.3d 416
5th Cir.2018Background
- In Jan. 2013 a Nature’s Way–owned tug was pushing two non-self-propelled oil barges owned by Third Coast when a barge struck a bridge and spilled ~7,000+ gallons of oil.
- Coast Guard designated Nature’s Way and Third Coast as OPA “responsible parties.” Nature’s Way paid ~$2.99M for cleanup; governments spent an additional ~$792K.
- Nature’s Way sought reimbursement from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and requested liability be limited to the tug’s tonnage (not the barges’); NPFC denied reimbursement, finding Nature’s Way an “operator” of the barge.
- The United States sued to recover the government cleanup costs; Nature’s Way counterclaimed under the APA challenging the NPFC’s “operator” determination.
- District court granted partial summary judgment for the government that “operating” under OPA includes a tugboat that had exclusive navigational control over a barge; Nature’s Way appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nature’s Way was an OPA “operator” of the oil barge | Nature’s Way: merely moved the barge per owner’s directions and did not manage the barge’s environmental affairs; thus not an “operator” | Government/NPFC: exclusive navigational control equates to operating under the ordinary meaning of the term | Court: Affirmed — exclusive navigational control constituted “operating” the barge |
| Whether the NPFC’s use of Coast Guard Marine Casualty Investigation Report was permissible | Nature’s Way: NPFC improperly relied on report and APA was violated | Government: NPFC treated reports as usable in internal NPFC claims; NPFC relied on report | Court: Did not resolve admissibility issue; noted statutory text suggests reports are inadmissible in "any civil or administrative proceedings" and flagged potential procedural questions for another case |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to NPFC’s interpretation | Nature’s Way: sought to challenge NPFC interpretation and procedural process to avoid deference | Government: argued NPFC interpretation entitled to deference | Court: Did not decide Chevron applicability because it found the ordinary meaning compelled the result under de novo review |
| Whether Bestfoods/CERCLA precedent governs OPA’s “operator” meaning | Nature’s Way: urged narrower reading from Bestfoods text about more than mechanical acts | Government: Bestfoods supports ordinary meaning including direction/piloting | Court: Applied Bestfoods’ ordinary-meaning analysis to OPA and held piloting/navigation fits “operating” |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (construing “operator” in CERCLA as one who directs or manages the affairs of the facility)
- Buffalo Marine Servs., Inc. v. United States, 663 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 2011) (standards for APA review and de novo review of agency legal conclusions)
- MS Tabea Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. KG v. Board of Comm'rs of the Port of New Orleans, 636 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (appealability of certain admiralty orders)
- Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982) (wrong on navigable waters falls within admiralty jurisdiction)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes may receive deference)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits on when agency interpretations merit Chevron deference)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (Chevron deference unwarranted where agency regulatory action is procedurally defective)