FOREMOST INSURANCE CO. ET AL. v. RICHARDSON ET AL.
No. 80-2134
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 12, 1982—Decided June 23, 1982
457 U.S. 668
Arthur H. Andrews argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Dorsey C. Martin III argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether the collision of two pleasure boats on navigable waters falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
I
Two pleasure boats collided on the Amite River in Louisiana, resulting in the death of Clyde Richardson. The wife and children of the decedent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging, inter alia, that petitioner Shirley Eliser had negligently operated the boat that collided with the vessel occupied by the decedent.1 Respondents also named petitioner
In ruling on petitioners’ motion, the District Court found the following facts to be undisputed:2
“(1) One boat was used for pleasure boating, such as boat riding and water skiing, and at the time of the accident the boat was actually pulling a skier on a zip sled;
“(2) The other boat was used exclusively for pleasure fishing and was described as a bass boat;
“(3) Neither boat had ever been used in any ‘commercial maritime activity’ before the accident;
“(4) At the time of the accident neither boat was involved in any ‘commercial maritime activity’ of any sort;
“(5) Neither of the two drivers of the boat were being paid to operate the boat nor was this activity in any way a part of their regular type of employment;
“(6) None of the passengers on either boat were engaged
“(7) Neither of the boats involved were under hire in any traditional maritime form;
“(8) There is no evidence to indicate that any ‘commercial activity‘, even in the broadest admiralty sense, had ever been previously engaged in by either of the boats in question, and in fact the two boats would have to be classified as ‘purely pleasure craft‘, not in any way ‘involved in commerce‘, and,
“(9) There was no other instrumentality involved in this accident that had even a minor relationship to ‘admiralty’ or ‘commerce‘, i. e. a buoy, barge, oil drilling apparatus, etc.” 470 F. Supp. 699, 700 (1979).
After reviewing decisions of this Court and the Fifth Circuit, as well as relevant commentary, the District Court found that there must be some relationship with traditional maritime activity for an injury sustained on navigable water to fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction. The District Court held that commercial maritime activity is necessary to satisfy this relationship, and granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the collision of these two pleasure boats did not involve any commercial activity.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 641 F. 2d 314 (1981). The Court of Appeals agreed that Executive Jet, supra, and relevant Fifth Circuit decisions establish that “admiralty jurisdiction requires more than the occurrence of the tort on navigable waters—that additionally there must be a significant relationship between the wrong and traditional maritime activity.” 641 F. 2d, at 315. It disagreed with the District Court, however, on the application of this principle to the undisputed facts of this case. Relying on the fact that the “Rules of the Road” govern all boats on navigable waters, and on the uncertainty that would accompany a finding of no admiralty jurisdiction in this case, the Court of Appeals held
II
Prior to our opinion in Executive Jet, there was little question that a complaint such as the one filed here stated a cause of action within federal admiralty jurisdiction. Indeed, the Executive Jet Court begins its opinion by observing that, under the traditional rule of admiralty jurisdiction, “[i]f the wrong occurred on navigable waters, the action is within admiralty jurisdiction.” 409 U. S., at 253 (citing Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13,902) (CC Me. 1813) (Story, J., on Circuit). See also The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 36 (1866) (“Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance“). Under this rule, an action arising out of a collision between two pleasure boats on navigable waters clearly falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. When presented with this precise situation in the past, this Court has found it unnecessary even to discuss whether the district court‘s admiralty jurisdiction had been properly invoked, instead assuming the propriety of such jurisdiction merely because the accident occurred on navigable waters. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U. S. 648, 651 (1953). See also Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383 (1941) (injury to guest from carbon monoxide poisoning in the cabin of a pleasure boat). Cf. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U. S. 406 (1943). In light of these decisions, we address here only the narrow question whether Executive Jet disapproved these earlier decisions sub silentio.
The express holding of Executive Jet is carefully limited to the particular facts of that case. However, the thorough discussion of the theoretical and practical problems inherent in broadly applying the traditional locality rule has prompted several courts and commentators to construe Executive Jet as applying to determinations of federal admiralty jurisdiction outside the context of aviation torts. See, e. g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F. 2d 520 (CA5 1973); Calamari, The Wake of Executive Jet—A Major Wave or a Minor Ripple, 4 Maritime Law. 52 (1979). We believe that this is a fair construction. Although Executive Jet addressed only the unique problems associated with extending admiralty jurisdiction to aviation torts, much of the Court‘s rationale in rejecting a strict locality rule also applies to the maritime context. Indeed, the Executive Jet Court relied extensively on admiralty and maritime decisions of this Court and on congressional action ex-
We recognize, as did the Court of Appeals, that the Executive Jet requirement that the wrong have a significant connection with traditional maritime activity is not limited to the aviation context. We also agree that there is no requirement that “the maritime activity be an exclusively commercial one.” 641 F. 2d, at 316. Because the “wrong” here involves the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters, we believe that it has a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction in the District Court.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ argument that a substantial relationship with commercial maritime activity is necessary because commercial shipping is at the heart of the traditional maritime activity sought to be protected by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all admiralty suits. This argument is premised on the faulty assumption that, absent this relationship with commercial activity, the need for uniform rules to govern conduct and liability disappears, and “federalism” concerns dictate that these torts be litigated in the state courts.
Although the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce, petitioners take too narrow a view of the federal interest sought to be protected. The federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdic-
Yet, under the strict commercial rule proffered by petitioners, the status of the boats as “pleasure” boats, as opposed to “commercial” boats, would control the existence of admiralty jurisdiction. Application of this rule, however, leads to inconsistent findings or denials of admiralty jurisdiction similar to those found fatal to the locality rule in Executive Jet. Under the commercial rule, fortuitous circum-
Finally, our interpretation is consistent with congressional activity in this area. First, Congress defines the term “vessel,” for the purpose of determining the scope of various shipping and maritime transportation laws, to include all types of waterborne vessels, without regard to whether they engage in commercial activity. See, e. g.,
In light of the need for uniform rules governing navigation, the potential impact on maritime commerce when two vessels collide on navigable waters, and the uncertainty and confusion that would necessarily accompany a jurisdictional test tied to the commercial use of a given boat, we hold that a complaint alleging a collision between two vessels on navigable waters properly states a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O‘CONNOR join, dissenting.
No trend of decisions by this Court has been stronger—for two decades or more—than that toward expanding federal jurisdiction at the expense of state interests and state-court jurisdiction. Of course, Congress also has moved steadily and expansively to exercise its Commerce Clause and preemptive power to displace state and local authority. Often decisions of this Court and congressional enactments have been necessary in the national interest. The effect, never-
Today‘s Court decision, an example of this trend, is not necessary to further any federal interest. On its face, it is inexplicable. The issue is whether the federal law of admiralty, rather than traditional state tort law, should apply to an accident on the Amite River in Louisiana between two small boats. “One was an eighteen foot pleasure boat powered by a 185 h.p. Johnson outboard motor that was being used for water skiing purposes at the time of the accident. The other was a sixteen foot ‘bass boat’ powered by an outboard motor that was used exclusively for pleasure fishing.” 470 F. Supp. 699, 700 (MD La. 1979). It also is undisputed that both boats were used “exclusively for pleasure“; that neither had ever been used in any “commercial maritime activity“; that none of the persons aboard the boats had ever been engaged in any such activity; and that neither of the boats was used for hire. Ibid. The Court of Appeals conceded that “the place where the accident occurred is seldom, if ever, used for commercial activity.” 641 F. 2d 314, 316 (CA5 1981).
The absence of “commercial activity” on this waterway was held by the Court of Appeals to be immaterial. While recognizing that there was substantial authority to the contrary, the court held that federal admiralty law applied to this accident. This Court now affirms in a decision holding that “all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform [federal] rules of conduct,” conferring federal admiralty jurisdiction over all accidents. Ante, at 675 (emphasis deleted). In my view there is no substantial federal interest that justifies a rule extending admiralty jurisdiction to the edge of absurdity. I dissent.
I
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249 (1972), established that admiralty jurisdiction does
Executive Jet‘s recognition that “[t]he law of admiralty has evolved over many centuries,” id., at 269, provides the appropriate understanding of that case‘s “traditional maritime activity” test. Admiralty is a specialized area of law that, since its ancient inception, has been concerned with the problems of seafaring commercial activity.2 As Professor Stolz
This case involves only pleasure craft. Neither of these boats had ever been used in any commercial activity. There is, therefore, no connection with any historic federal admiralty interest. In centuries past—long before modern means of transportation by land and air existed—rivers and oceans were the basic means of commerce, and the vessels that used the waterways were limited primarily to commercial and naval purposes.4 “Pleasure boating is basically a
The jurisdictional issue has both a constitutional and a statutory element, since both Art. III and
The Court‘s justification for extending federal admiralty jurisdiction to the use of millions of small pleasure boats on the countless rivers, streams, and inlets of our country is the need for “uniform rules of conduct.” Ante, at 675. I agree, of course, that standard codes should govern traffic on waterways, just as it is crucial that certain uniform rules of traffic prevail on neighborhood streets as well as interstate highways. But this is no reason for admiralty jurisdiction to be extended to all boating activity. Congress has provided some rules governing water traffic, just as it has done for some land traffic. See
State courts are duty bound to apply federal as well as local “uniform rules of conduct.” See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947). The Court does not suggest that state courts lack competency to apply federal as well as state law to this type of water traffic. And this Court stands ready, if necessary, to review state decisions to ensure that important issues of federal law are resolved correctly. As Judge Thornberry said in dissent in this case, “the desire for certainty cannot alone justify the assumption of federal control over matters of purely local concern....” 641 F. 2d, at 317. Consequently the Court‘s premise that there is a need for uniform traffic rules fails to support its conclusion that federal jurisdiction must be extended to cover the type of activity that typically involves small pleasure craft.
In an effort to rescue its logic, the Court refers to the “potential disruptive impact of a collision between boats on navigable waters....” Ante, at 675. Yet this reasoning is
For me, however, this example illustrates the substantial—and purposeless—expansion of federal authority and federal-court jurisdiction accomplished by the Court‘s holding. In this respect I agree with Chief Judge Haynsworth:
“The admiralty jurisdiction in England and in this country was born of a felt need to protect the domestic shipping industry in its competition with foreign shipping, and to provide a uniform body of law for the governance of domestic and foreign shipping, engaged in the movement of commercial vessels from state to state and to and from foreign states. The operation of small pleasure craft on inland waters which happen to be navigable has no more apparent relationship to that kind of concern than the operation of the same kind of craft on artificial inland lakes which are not navigable waters.” Crosson v. Vance, 484 F. 2d 840 (CA4 1973).
The Court‘s opinion largely ignores the fact that expansions of federal admiralty jurisdiction are accompanied by application of substantive—and pre-empting—federal admiralty law. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 214-218 (1917); see Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 738-742 (1961).9 “The chief objection to application of admiralty law to pleasure boating is that it implicitly prohibits the exercise of state legislative power in an area in which local legislatures have generally been thought competent and in which Congress cannot be expected either to be interested or to be responsive to local needs.” Stolz, 51 Calif. L. Rev., at 664. For me, this federalism concern is the dominating issue in the case. I agree that “the law of pleasure boating will develop faster and more rationally if the creative capacities of the state courts and legislatures are freed of an imaginery [sic] federal concern with anything that floats on navigable waters.” Id., at 719.
Federal courts should not displace state responsibility and choke the federal judicial docket on the basis of federal con-