144 F. Supp. 3d 928
N.D. Ohio2015Background
- Jay Nagy was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm; sentenced in 2013 to 180 months under the ACCA mandatory minimum.
- At sentencing the court treated six prior state convictions as ACCA predicates, which produced the 15‑year mandatory minimum.
- Nagy filed a § 2255 motion after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson (2015), which invalidated the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.
- The government conceded Johnson is retroactive to ACCA cases and that three of Nagy’s six prior convictions relied on the residual clause.
- The remaining three potential predicates were: (1) Ohio aggravated robbery (second degree, 1996 conviction), (2) Ohio domestic violence (third degree), and (3) a combined domestic violence/abduction conviction.
- The district court concluded robbery did not qualify as a force‑based ACCA predicate under the categorical/modified categorical approach, but the Sixth Circuit decision in Gatson required treating Ohio domestic‑violence convictions as violent felonies; as a result Nagy no longer had three valid ACCA predicates and his sentence was vacated and case set for de novo sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Nagy) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nagy still qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal after Johnson (2015) | Johnson voids the residual clause; several prior convictions cannot count, so Nagy lacks three predicates | Johnson retroactive but some priors still qualify, so ACCA could still apply | Court: Nagy lacks three valid ACCA predicates after analysis; ACCA no longer applies |
| Whether 1996 Ohio aggravated robbery is a § 924(e)(2)(B)(I) "violent felony" (force element) | Robbery should not count because the statute (as charged/recorded) did not establish the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical (violent) force | Government argued the record shows Nagy was convicted under the subsection involving inflicting or attempting to inflict physical harm or otherwise qualifies | Held: Robbery conviction does not qualify — statute/divisible alternatives and available record do not establish the necessary violent‑force element |
| Whether Ohio domestic‑violence conviction is a violent felony | Nagy disputed ACCA applicability generally; challenged some priors | Government relied on Sixth Circuit precedent finding Ohio domestic‑violence qualifies as a violent felony | Held: Court bound by Sixth Circuit in Gatson — domestic violence counts as a predicate |
| Remedy: What relief is appropriate if ACCA predicates are insufficient? | Nagy asked to vacate sentence and receive de novo resentencing | Government opposed vacatur or argued remaining priors still support sentence | Held: Sentence vacated and case set for de novo sentencing (§ 2255 relief granted) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as violent force for ACCA purposes)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explaining categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limiting documents courts may consult under modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Gatson, 776 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding Ohio domestic‑violence felony is a violent felony under ACCA)