United States v. Morgan
255 F. Supp. 3d 221
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Defendant Charles Morgan was indicted on nine counts, including failure to register as a sex offender (18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)), kidnapping and related violent/offense counts, and sentencing enhancements tied to sex-offender registration status. The registration-related counts rely on a 1991 conviction for Rape while Armed and alleged conduct in 2015–2016.
- SORNA (42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq.), enacted in 2006, requires sex offenders to register and directed the Attorney General to specify applicability to pre‑SORNA convictions (§ 16913(d)).
- The Attorney General issued a 2007 Interim Rule, 2008 Final Guidelines, and a 2010 Final Rule addressing applicability to pre‑Act offenders; the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Ross invalidated the 2007 and 2008 actions under the APA but did not invalidate the 2010 Final Rule.
- Morgan moved to dismiss all registration‑related counts on APA, non‑delegation, Ex Post Facto, and Commerce Clause grounds.
- The court denied the motion, holding: (1) Ross’s APA invalidation of earlier actions did not control the 2010 Final Rule; (2) the SORNA delegation to the Attorney General satisfies the intelligible‑principle test; (3) applying SORNA and related sentencing enhancements to pre‑SORNA offenders does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (4) § 2250(a) and § 16913 fall within Congress’s Commerce and Necessary and Proper powers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| APA validity of AG rulemaking applying SORNA to pre‑Act offenders | Government: 2010 Final Rule valid and supports prosecution | Morgan: AG’s actions (Interim/Guidelines/Rule) violated APA; thus SORNA can’t be applied to him | Court: Ross invalidated 2007 Interim Rule and 2008 Guidelines but not the 2010 Final Rule; 2010 Final Rule contains discretionary judgment and survives APA challenge |
| Non‑delegation | Government: §16913(d) legitimately delegates to AG within intelligible principle | Morgan: Congress gave AG unbounded authority without guiding policy | Court: Delegation meets Mistretta intelligible‑principle test (policy statement in §16901 and boundaries of authority) |
| Ex Post Facto Clause (registration & enhancements) | Government: statutes apply to post‑SORNA conduct; enhancements penalize current conduct | Morgan: Applying registration, §2250(a), §2250(d), and §2260A to pre‑SORNA offenders is retroactive punishment | Court: Registration requirement is retroactive but non‑punitive (Smith); criminal penalties are punitive but not retroactive because they punish post‑enactment conduct or are recidivist enhancements (Gryger) — no Ex Post Facto violation |
| Commerce Clause power for §2250(a) | Government: §2250(a) targets offenders who travel in interstate commerce — falls within Lopez channels/instrumentalities and Necessary and Proper support | Morgan: Failure to register is intrastate and does not affect interstate commerce | Court: §2250(a) valid under Commerce Clause (targets travelers) and registration statute is rationally related and proper under Necessary and Proper Clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (U.S. 2012) (SORNA’s applicability to pre‑Act offenders depends on AG specification)
- United States v. Ross, 848 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidated 2007 Interim Rule and 2008 Guidelines under APA)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (Alaska registration statute held nonpunitive for Ex Post Facto purposes)
- Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (U.S. 2010) (elements of §2250(a) require post‑SORNA travel and post‑travel failure to register)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (U.S. 1989) (intelligible‑principle test for non‑delegation)
- Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (U.S. 1948) (recidivist sentencing enhancements punish the current offense, not prior convictions)
- Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1994) (enhancement statutes do not change penalty for earlier convictions)