United States v. Mohamed Faraj, 701 F. App'x 427

Background

From 2009–2013 Mohamed “Mojo” Faraj led a marijuana and prescription‑drug distribution enterprise operating from homes in the Dearborn/Warrendale area of Detroit; operations used a dedicated drug phone, packaging in glass vials, tally sheets, and employed adult and minor runners.
Fouad Faraj owned the primary safe house(s) used for packaging, storage, meetings, and money collection; police recovered cash and a firearm at his residence in 2013.
Mohamed Ayoub served later as a “street captain,” supervising workers, collecting proceeds, and was frequently seen armed; police recovered drugs, cash, a scale, and a loaded pistol at his home.
Trials of Mojo, Fouad, and Ayoub produced convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances; Mojo was also convicted under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute and for use of a communication facility; Fouad’s CCE conviction was later vacated at Rule 29 and he was acquitted or not convicted on certain firearm counts.
On appeal the defendants challenged evidentiary rulings (recall of an accomplice witness, admission of an assaulted victim’s out‑of‑court statements, IRS nonfiling evidence), sufficiency of the evidence (CCE and conspiracy), and Guidelines calculations at sentencing (minor‑participant enhancement and drug‑quantity attribution).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Denial of motion to recall cooperating witness (Hammoud) to impeach with a domestic‑violence police report	Gov argued report was inadmissible extrinsic evidence and impeachment already accomplished on cross	Mojo/Ayoub argued they should recall Hammoud to impeach his "changed man" testimony with the report	District court did not abuse discretion: 608(b)/403 exclusion appropriate; cross‑examination had already undermined credibility
Admission of victim Harajli’s statements as excited utterances and Confrontation Clause claim	Gov argued statements were spontaneous excited utterances and nontestimonial medical statements	Mojo argued statements were not excited utterances and their admission violated the Sixth Amendment	Affirms admission: statements met excited‑utterance factors and were nontestimonial; no Confrontation Clause violation
Sufficiency of evidence for Mojo’s CCE and Fouad’s conspiracy convictions	Gov relied on racketeering of role, control, ordering, supervision, money flow, safe‑house use, and accomplice testimony	Mojo argued he was a buyer/seller, not an organizer; Fouad argued limited role and lack of proof of knowledge/participation	Affirmed: record showed Mojo exercised supervisory/organizer functions; Fouad’s ownership/use of safe houses, receipt of proceeds, and supervisory behavior supported conspiracy conviction
Sentencing: §2D1.1(b)(15)(B) two‑level minor‑participant enhancement and drug‑quantity attribution for Fouad	Gov applied minor‑participant enhancement and attributed conspiracy’s marijuana quantity to Fouad	Fouad argued enhancement required predicate §3B1.1 aggravating‑role finding (which was removed) and that quantity attribution lacked individualized findings	Vacated and remanded for resentencing: court erred by applying §2D1.1(b)(15)(B) without §3B1.1 predicate; on remand court must reconsider quantity attribution with Campbell findings

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
United States v. Barnes, 822 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2016) (definition of abuse of discretion reviewing district court evidentiary determinations)
United States v. Lopez‑Medina, 461 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006) (harmless‑error test for evidentiary rulings)
Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir. 1983) (excited‑utterance three‑part test framework)
United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007) (evaluating spontaneity and stress factors for excited utterances)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause—testimonial statements rule)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (nontestimonial statements in ongoing emergency context)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (primary‑purpose test for testimonial statements)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2002) (requirement for individualized drug‑quantity findings at sentencing)