United States v. Michael Smith
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12126
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- In July 2012 Omaha police helicopters were illuminated by a green laser; officers traced the beam to Michael A. Smith standing in his backyard pointing a laser at the aircraft.
- Smith told officers he had been shining the laser at aircraft he believed were far enough away that the beam would not reach them, and denied aiming at the police helicopter.
- A grand jury indicted Smith under 18 U.S.C. § 39A(a) for "knowingly aim[ing] the beam of a laser pointer at an aircraft . . . or at the flight path of such an aircraft."
- The district court construed "knowingly aim" to mean knowingly pointing or directing the laser at an aircraft (knowledge of the target), not an intent for the beam to strike the aircraft, rejected Smith’s mistake-of-fact instruction, and excluded expert testimony about atmospheric scattering and perceived beam range.
- A jury convicted Smith; he appealed arguing the statute requires an ‘‘intent to hit’’ (so his reasonable belief the beam could not reach the aircraft would be a defense) and that the excluded expert testimony and jury instruction should have been admitted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "knowingly aims" in 18 U.S.C. § 39A(a) | "Aims" requires an intent to hit the aircraft; reasonable belief the beam could not reach the aircraft negates culpability | "Aims" means directing or pointing the beam at the aircraft; no separate intent-to-hit element required | Court held "knowingly aims" means knowingly directing/pointing the beam at an aircraft; no intent-to-hit requirement |
| Admissibility of expert testimony on perceived beam range | Testimony that the beam can appear to stop due to atmospheric scattering was relevant to mistake-of-fact and mens rea | Testimony irrelevant if statute requires only knowing direction, not intent to strike; mistake-of-fact instruction not applicable | Exclusion affirmed as irrelevant under correct statutory reading |
| Jury instruction on mistake-of-fact (reasonable belief beam would not reach aircraft) | Jury should be instructed that reasonable belief beam could not reach aircraft negates the "knowingly aims" element | No instruction required because statute criminalizes knowingly directing the beam regardless of belief about reach | Rejection of Smith's proposed instruction affirmed |
| Application of rule of lenity | Smith contends ambiguity favors construction requiring intent to hit | Government contends statute plainly covers directing the beam and gives fair warning | Court found no grievous ambiguity and did not apply lenity; plain meaning controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (statutory interpretation starts with text)
- Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (textual clarity ends inquiry)
- Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (mens rea modifier presumptively applies to each element)
- Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (statutory design and purpose inform textual reading)
- United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (fair warning principle in criminal statutes)
- Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (lenity requires grievous ambiguity)
- United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (reading mens rea across elements)
- United States v. Zaic, 744 F.3d 1040 (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (reliance on plain meaning over selective legislative history)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (caution against overreliance on limited legislative statements)