United States v. Michael Bernard
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4157
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Appellant Bernard, with a long history of mental illness, sought to represent himself at trial after being found competent to stand trial.
- The district court held two competency hearings, found Bernard competent to stand trial, and allowed him to waive counsel and proceed pro se with standby counsel.
- During trial Bernard opening statements, testimony, and some trial actions were permitted, but he did not object to much of the Government’s case or call witnesses.
- A sentencing hearing revealed that Bernard’s mental condition had deteriorated, leading to a re-sentencing event after treatment began.
- Bernard challenged the self-representation decision as contradicting Edwards v. Indiana, alleging a higher competency standard was required for pro se defense when mentally ill.
- The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision, applying the standard that Edwards permits discretion but does not mandate a higher standard in all cases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Edwards requires a higher competency standard for pro se defense | Bernard: Edwards mandates a higher standard for gray-area defendants seeking self-representation. | United States: Edwards permits discretion; no universal higher standard required if competent to stand trial. | Edwards grants discretion, not a duty; district court acted within permissible discretion. |
| Whether the district court erred by not sua sponte reconsidering competence to stand trial and waive counsel during trial | Bernard argues the court should have reassessed competency mid-trial. | United States argues no plain error occurred given trial conduct and observations. | No plain error; the district court’s decisions were within its discretion. |
| Whether defense counsel's ineffective-assistance claim is cognizable when he argued Edwards-standard | Bernard contends counsel erred in arguing the same standard for standing trial and waiving counsel. | United States argues Edwards does not conclusively govern ineffectiveness and the record does not show clear error. | No conclusive showing of ineffective assistance based on record; Edwards not directly implicated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dusky v. United States, 362 F.2d 402 (Dusky) (test for competent present ability to consult with counsel and understand proceedings)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence to waive counsel aligns with trial competence; not higher for waiver)
- Edwards v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (permits discretionary higher standard for gray-area defendants seeking pro se defense)
- Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2001) (trial court discretion in competency decisions; deference to district court observations)
- United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) (defers to district court on competency indicia and observations)
- United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming deference to trial court's competency determinations)
- Erskine v. United States, 355 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2004) (analogous discussion on preservation of Faretta-waiver issues and plain error)
- United States v. DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizes Edwards creates discretion, not a mandatory standard)