United States v. Michael Anglin
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1299
7th Cir.2017Background
- On Dec. 9, 2013 Michael Anglin, his brother Dave, and Michael Green committed an armed robbery in Milwaukee; Anglin shot a victim.
- Green (an associate and federal supervised-release resident) informed ATF, became a confidential informant, and provided identifying details about the Anglins, vehicles, and an imminent armed robbery.
- ATF corroborated many details, monitored movements, and recorded Green; agents observed Anglin pick up Green in a silver Acura and follow the route toward the target area.
- Police attempted a traffic stop; Anglin fled (U-turn and evasive driving) and was ultimately stopped and arrested; a nine-millimeter pistol was later found in the Acura.
- Anglin was indicted on Hobbs Act robbery, §924(c) (discharging a firearm during a crime of violence), conspiracy, and felon-in-possession counts; convicted on all counts and sentenced to 230 months (120 months mandatory §924(c) consecutive to 110 months).
- Anglin appealed: (1) suppression for lack of probable cause, (2) §924(c) invalid predicate argument (Hobbs Act robbery not a crime of violence), and (3) sentencing challenges (including supervised-release conditions).
Issues
| Issue | Anglin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause for arrest | Green was an untested, unreliable informant; arrest required suppression. | Corroboration of Green’s details plus observed conduct (pickup, route, flight) gave probable cause. | Probable cause existed; suppression properly denied. |
| §924(c) predicate: Is Hobbs Act robbery a "crime of violence"? | Hobbs Act robbery does not necessarily require use/threat of physical force and thus cannot qualify. | Hobbs Act robbery requires actual or threatened force or fear of injury and fits the elements (force) clause. | Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under §924(c)(3)(A) elements clause; §924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is void. |
| Sentencing — trial penalty / diminishing-returns argument | Judge failed to consider that government’s recommendation penalized Anglin for going to trial and that additional years have diminishing marginal utility. | Judge considered and rejected those arguments; stated he does not penalize defendants for exercising trial rights. | No procedural error; the district court adequately considered and addressed these arguments. |
| Supervised-release conditions — procedural and substantive challenge | Judge failed to orally pronounce conditions and did not give meaningful opportunity to object; some conditions are vague/overbroad. | Many conditions were standard; defendant had the presentence report and could have objected. | Failure to orally pronounce and to provide meaningful opportunity to object was plain error; supervised-release conditions vacated and remanded for oral pronouncement and (if needed) modification. |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (Totality-of-circumstances test for informant tips and probable cause)
- United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.) (standard for reviewing probable cause)
- United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603 (7th Cir.) (corroboration of informant details supports probable cause)
- United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir.) (fear of bodily harm is fear of physical force; elements-clause analysis)
- United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir.) (residual clause of §924(c) is unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir.) (requirements for orally pronouncing supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir.) (when incorporation-by-reference of probation report suffices and when a defendant waives objections)