United States v. Melgar-Cabrera
892 F.3d 1053
| 10th Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2009 Melgar-Cabrera participated in two armed restaurant robberies; during the second robbery a co-defendant fatally shot a waitress.
- He was indicted on Hobbs Act robbery counts and firearms charges including 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) (death caused during a § 924(c) violation). He fled to El Salvador and was extradited in 2013 only for certain offenses permitted by the treaty; the government then proceeded on counts allowed by extradition, including a § 924(j) felony-murder charge.
- The district court dismissed counts barred by the Salvadoran court’s extradition decision, tried Melgar-Cabrera on two Hobbs Act robbery counts and a § 924(j) count, convicted him on all counts, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the § 924(j) count.
- On appeal Melgar-Cabrera argued Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). The panel also sua sponte addressed whether § 924(j) is a separate crime or merely a sentencing enhancement in light of prior Tenth Circuit precedent.
- The court concluded that § 924(j) should be treated as a discrete offense (overruling United States v. Battle to that extent) because later Supreme Court decisions (Apprendi/Ring/Alleyne) require elements that increase the statutory maximum to be treated as elements for jury determination.
- The court also held Hobbs Act robbery qualifies categorically as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), because the robbery definition requires violent force (including indirect applications of force or threats that can cause bodily injury).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) is a separate offense or merely a sentencing enhancement to § 924(c) | Melgar-Cabrera did not press this on appeal; prior Tenth Circuit (Battle) treated § 924(j) as a sentencing enhancement | Government initially charged § 924(j) as a separate offense and prosecuted elements to the jury | Court overruled Battle: § 924(j) is a discrete offense (elements that increase statutory maximum must be treated as elements for jury) |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements/force clause) | Melgar-Cabrera: Hobbs Act/ common-law robbery can be satisfied by mere offensive touching or fear without violent physical force, so it fails § 924(c)(3)(A) categorically | Government: Hobbs Act robbery tracks common-law robbery requiring violence or intimidation; threats and indirect force qualify as physical/violent force | Court held Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); "physical force" means violent force and indirect force/threats that can cause bodily injury qualify |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Battle, 289 F.3d 661 (10th Cir. 2002) (earlier Tenth Circuit holding that § 924(j) functions as a sentencing enhancement)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (same Sixth Amendment principles applied to death-penalty aggravating factors)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (held "physical force" in ACCA means violent force)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (held "force" in § 921(a)(33)(A) encompasses the common-law notion of offensive touching; clarified indirect force can qualify)
- Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978) (recognized § 924(c) as creating an offense distinct from the underlying federal felony)
- United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluded robbery statutes tracking common-law robbery satisfy Johnson’s violent-force requirement)