United States v. Melendez
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24213
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- DEA reverse-sting: undercover agents posed as Colombian suppliers; Rafael Guzman agreed to buy five kilograms of cocaine (paying for three up front, two later). Melendez agreed to supply the money and intended to distribute the cocaine.
- Guzman arrived with Melendez; undercover agent confirmed the deal and signaled arrests; officers seized two firearms and about $92,000 in cash.
- Indictment: conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); jury convicted on the conspiracy count and acquitted on the firearms count.
- During deliberations, the jury asked two questions: (1) whether both conspirators must agree on the drug quantity to hold both responsible, and (2) whether unanimity is required on all counts; the district court answered both questions after consulting counsel.
- Sentencing: court applied a total offense level yielding a Guidelines range of 151–188 months but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 144 months. Melendez objected to (a) the sufficiency of jury findings on individual drug weight under Alleyne, and (b) denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Melendez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instructions and supplemental answers diluted the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement for drug-quantity element | Jury instructions (as a whole) made drug-weight an element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt | The court’s response to jury question about conspiratorial agreement failed to restate the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and could have diluted it | Affirmed: instructions read as a whole sufficiently conveyed that drug weight is an element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (no plain error) |
| Whether supplemental instruction about unanimity suggested unanimity was optional | Unanimity is required; encouraging continued deliberation is permissible and not coercive here | The court’s use of “should” made unanimity appear aspirational, risking a nonunanimous verdict | Affirmed: multiple instructions required unanimity; supplemental remark encouraging deliberation was proper and non-coercive |
| Whether Alleyne required an individualized jury finding of drug weight attributable to Melendez | Jury verdict on two-person conspiracy necessarily allocated the five-kilogram quantity to each conspirator | Melendez argued the jury found only a conspiracy-wide quantity, not an individualized drug-weight triggering the mandatory minimum | Affirmed: in a two-person conspiracy the jury’s finding as to the conspiracy necessarily attributes the quantity to Melendez (no Alleyne error; issue waived at sentencing) |
| Whether district court erred in denying a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction | The government argued denial was proper because Melendez contested the core issue (drug weight) at trial | Melendez argued he admitted guilt in filings and at times, disputing only weight, so he merited the reduction | Affirmed: denial not clearly erroneous—proceeding to trial and contesting drug weight (core of case) justified refusal to grant reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (facts that raise mandatory minimums are elements that must be proved to a jury)
- United States v. Paladin, 748 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2014) (in a two-person conspiracy, a conspiracy-level quantity finding attributes that amount to the defendant)
- United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2014) (drug-weight is an element that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reduction proper where defendant disputes drug quantity at trial)
- Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (unanimous jury finding required for conviction)
- United States v. Figueroa-Encarnación, 343 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (encouraging continued deliberation without coercive Allen elements permissible)