In еarly 2006, federal and local authorities commenced Operation Brickhouse to combat drug trafficking in the Bromley-Heath Housing Project (Bromley-Heath) located in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts. The investigation snared the appellants Amos Carrasquillo and Nathan Garraste-guy through a series of controlled drug purchases executed by a cooperating witness. Faced with unshakable evidence of their illicit activities, the appellants pleaded guilty to several counts of distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and to conspiracy to distribute cocaine basе, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The issue of the drug weights involved in the offenses, however, was reserved and tried to a jury. 1
After a six-day trial, at which the appellants presented no evidence, the jury determined that the conspiracy involved between five and twenty grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the judge accepted the government’s sentencing recommendation, declined to give Carrasquillo any credit for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced him to 132 months of imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release. Garrasteguy received a sentence of tеn years followed by twelve years of supervised release. 2 As a special condition of supervised release, the sentencing court prohibited the appellants from entering Suffolk County, Massachusetts during the term of his supervised release, without prejudice to their right to return to the sentencing court to seek revision or rescission of this special condition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).
Carrasquillo appeals the denial of his acceptance of responsibility credit, and both appellants challenge the special condition of supervised release. We affirm.
I. Acceptance of Responsibility
We begin with Carrasquillo’s aсceptance of responsibility argument, *37 which, stripped to its essentials, is a request that he be permitted to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. In concrete terms, Carrasquillo believes that he is entitled to a two point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) — despite having gone to trial regarding drug weight — because he pleaded guilty to the rest of the indictment. This claim fails.
During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district court advised both defendants of the possibility that if a jury concluded that they were responsible for drug weights sufficient to trigger enhanced penaltiеs, it might not grant either of them any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court stated:
THE COURT: Now, again, I don’t mean this' in any way as a threat, you must understand that if we go to trial ... and [if] you lose, it’s more than five grams, and the government is put to the expense and time of the trial, there are situations, your lawyers will argue them to me, where I should still give some discount. And I have no hard and fast rule. But you understand that I’ll be keeping in mind that we’ve spent all the time and expense on a trial and you’ve been found guilty of more than five grams. And I will take that into account. I think under the law I’m required to.
Both defendants indicated that they understood the court’s warning. Despite the court’s statement, the defendants proceeded to try to a jury the issue of drug weight. During the course of this trial, the defendants did nothing more than cross-examine witnesses; the defense rested at the close of the government’s case. Within two hours of receiving the case, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants responsible for at least five grams of cocaine base.
After trial, the probation department, in its pre-sentence report (PSR), included a recommendation that Carrasquillo be given a two-level reduction in the offense level pursuant tо section 3El.l(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, bringing Carras-quillo’s total offense level to 27. The government objected, arguing that Carrasquil-lo’s demand for a jury trial on drug weight not only demonstrated a failure to accept responsibility for the full extent of his conduct, but also falsely denied the extent and nature of the relevant conduct.
At the sentencing hearing, Carrasquillo reiterated his desire for the acceptance of responsibility reduction. 3 The sentencing court considered Carrasquillo’s argument, but decided not to credit Carrasquillo with any reduction of the total offense level based on acceptance of responsibility. The court rested its decision primarily on the fact that Carrasquillo did not spare the government, from the time and expense of a trial. In reaching this conclusion, the district court remarked that the acceptance of responsibility provision is an “empty sophistry,” that should be viewed as a discretionary reduction in the total offense level to reward defendants who spare the government the expense of a trial. (“What [the acceptance of responsi *38 bility reduction] is is a discount that is usually granted, it’s in my discretion for sparing the government expense.”) Car-rasquillo’s argument on appeal is that the sentencing court’s comments constitute a misinterpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, and thus the sentencing court misapplied the Guidelines.
We review a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant accepted responsibility for clear error.
United States v. Glaum,
The Sentencing Guidelines recognize the “legitimate societal interests” in acceptance of responsibility and therefore allow sentencing judges to provide a measure of leniency to those defendants who accept responsibility for their actions. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. backg’d. The Guidelines therefore dispense credit for acceptance of responsibility in two flavors: a two-point reduction at the discretion of the sentencing court if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). And, if, in a serious offense, a defendant accepts responsibility at an early stage of the investigation, a defendant may be eligible for an additional one point reduction in the offense level. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b). This second reduction is available only to defendants who accept responsibility early enough to save the government the time and expense of preparing for trial, and consequently, this further reduction is only available “upon motion of the government.” Id.
Defendants are not, hоwever, automatically entitled to even the two-point acceptance of responsibility reduction.
United States v. Franky-Ortiz,
We have further held that defendants who proceed to triаl and put the government to its proof normally do not qualify for any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Deppe,
Carrasquillo’s argument is that his guilty plea — rather than the trial — resulted in his conviction and that his testing of the government’s proof regarding drug weight should not alter the fact that in his guilty plea, he accepted responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, he argues that the sentencing court’s description of the acceptance of responsibility credit as “an empty sophistry” and the court’s further characterization of the credit as an expense calculation demonstrates that the sentencing court misapplied the guidelines.
The government responds that Carras-quillo’s challenge to the drug weight required it to introduce evidence regarding all of the elements of the crimes to which Carrasquillo pleaded guilty. Moreover, the government claims that the defendant’s rigorous challenge to the drug weight does not evince the candid acceptance of responsibility with “genuine contrition” that is a prerequisite to receiving a reduction.
See Franky-Ortiz,
In the circumstances of this case, we agree with the government and with the sentencing court’s implicit finding that Carrasquillo failed to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. He went to trial, and yet, he has adduced no evidence to rebut the presumption that his trial with respect to drug weight rendered him ineligible for any acceptance of responsibility-based reduction, nor has he so much as argued against the presumption. Furthermore, his actions in requesting a trial regarding drug weight were not consistent with acceptance of responsibility for relevant conduct.
See Glaum,
In a final attempt to gain traction, Car-rasquillo argues that the sentencing court’s characterizations of the acceptance of responsibility reduction suggest that the court did not properly apply this provision of the Guidelines.
The acceptance of responsibility reduction acknowledges legitimate societal interests. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt., backg’d. The provision also recognizes the longstanding judicial practice of more leniently sentencing defendants who evidence contrition and coopеrate with law enforcement.
See United States v. Frazier,
As we have noted, the sentencing court did consider the fact that Carrasquillo pleaded guilty, but also balanced that plea *40 against Carrasquillo’s pressing of the drug weight issue at trial, in which he challenged the evidence against him. Based on this balancing, the court concluded that Carrasquillo was not entitled to any credit for acceptance of responsibility. 5 Regardless of whether the sentencing court acknowledged all of the varied interests recognized by the acceptance of responsibility credit, the court nevertheless properly denied the credit to Carrasquillo.
II. Exclusion From Suffolk County
We now turn to the issue whether the sentencing court could impose a condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendants from entering an entire county during the full term of supervised release. The breadth and duration of this condition give us pause, but on this record we are unable to conclude that the district court plainly erred in imposing the special condition.
We review a sentencing court’s decision to impose special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Riccio,
Carrasquillo claims that he properly preserved his objection to the special condition of supervised release. 6 The government originally requested, in its sentencing memorandum, a special condition of supervised release ordering both defendants to stay outside the City of Boston. 7 In his sentencing memorandum, Carras-quillo objected to the government’s proposed condition primarily on constitutional grounds, claiming that the condition would impermissibly impinge on (unspecified) rights protected under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and that the condition would preclude Carrasquillo from being fully involved in raising his young son.
At sentencing, however, the district court appeared far more interested in the special condition of supervised release than Carrasquillo. The district court sua sponte noted that it was not familiar with such conditions, and engaged in a dialogue *41 regarding the condition with not only the prosecutor, but also a representative of the probation department to satisfy itself that the condition was reasonable and enforceable.
By contrast, at sentencing, Carrasquillo mentioned the special condition only in passing, and when he did discuss it he noted that the condition was unimportant:
The other thing I would just comment on very briefly is this issue of whether or not to be in Boston or not be in Boston. Winning that from our standpoint and not getting what we’re looking for in terms of the length of incarceration would be a Pyrrhic victory. It’s unimportant compared to the amount of time—
Carrasquillo’s counsel specifically termed the condition “unimportant” and remained focused on seeking a reduction in his sеntence. This amounted to at least a forfeiture of the objection, if not an outright abandonment of it.
See United States v. Walker,
Moreover, even though the defendants now argue that the special condition’s geographic scope (all of Suffolk County) was impermissibly broad, neither of them advanced a narrоwer area of exclusion to the sentencing court. Similarly, the defendants were entirely silent regarding the particulars of this condition, including the availability of exceptions, as well as the scope and breadth of the condition. Consequently, the sentencing court did not have the opportunity to evaluate alternatives that might make the exclusion more acceptable. It would be both unfair and an inappropriate deployment of limited judicial resources to permit the defendants to raise such specific concerns on appeal.
Cf. United States v. Dietz,
District courts have significant flexibility to impose special conditions of supervised release. A district court may impose as a condition of supervised release most discretionary conditions identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b),
8
or any other condition the court deems appropriate. All such conditions, however, must be “reasonably related” to the factors set forth in § 3553(a),
9
may involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary” to achieve the purposes of §§ 3553(a)(2)(c), (a)(2)(D),
(viz.
to protect the public and promote the rehabilitation of the defendant), and must be consistent with any pertinent policy statement of the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d);
see also United States v. York,
*42
Any conditions of supervised release that a sentencing court chooses to impose must, of course, be supported by the record.
United States v. Scherrer,
The government advanced several reasons for excluding the defendants from the City of Boston. The government noted that the Bromley-Heath project is a refuge of affordable housing for families of modest means, and that it has been beset with an exceedingly high level of gun and drug crimes. The government argues that the sentencing court, pursuant to sections 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C), properly took into account the effects of the defendants’ offenses on the Bromley-Heath community. Furthermore, the government noted that both defendants had repeatedly disregarded Boston Housing Authority’s (BHA) “no-trespass” orders denying them permission to enter Bromley-Heath. Finally, the government noted Carrasquillo ignored a prior state court probation condition ordering him to stay out of all BHA properties. In the face of these orders, the defendants sold crack cocaine several times at or near Bromley-Heath. The government therefore argued that the defendants had to be excluded from a larger geographic area. The sentencing court, without objection from the defendants, appears to have concluded that Suffolk County represents a sufficient geographic exclusion and is administratively feasible to enforce, without elaborating on the deprivation of liberty this exclusion entails.
Although we have never before passed on a special condition of supervised release that bars an individual from entering an entire county, two circuits have upheld similar conditions.
10
In
United States v. Sicher,
the Third Circuit approved, on plain error review, a special condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from entering the Allentown, Pa., metro area, which consists of two counties, for a period of ten years.
11
Similarly, in
United States v. Cothran,
the Eleventh Circuit, on an abuse of discretion review, upheld a special condition of probation that prohibited a defendant from entering Fulton County, Georgia during the first two years of probation.
The cases permitting exclusion from a defined geographical area do not entirely ease our doubts about the breadth and duration of the supervised release condition imposed here. Most courts have not authorized a blanket exсlusion from a particular area lasting as long as the exclusions in the present case (eight and twelve years). Moreover, such conditions have tended to be imposed after a substantial reduction of a defendant’s sentence, which also did not occur here.
We are even more uneasy over the fact that the condition in this case is not subject to any qualification. Exclusion conditions approved elsewhere have permitted defendants to seek authorization from probation officers for entry into the geographical areas from which the defendants are excluded. Here, however, the sentencing court imposed an unqualified banishment from Suffolk County for a period of as long as twelve years with only the possibility of seeking a modification of the condition from the court itself at some later date, pursuant to section 3583(e). 12 Given its importance as a government center where a citizen may be required to conduct business with government officials, the defendants could well have significant reasons for entering Suffolk County. Moreover, at this early juncture, it is impossible to ascertain the level of either defendant’s rehabilitation, which might impaсt a decision to permit the defendants to enter Suffolk County.
Additionally, the evidence justifying the imposition of the present condition is not as stark as in other cases upholding exclusions. It is true that Garrasteguy and Carrasquillo had at the time of their convictions previously violated BHA-imposed “no trespass” orders at Bromley-Heath, and that Carrasquillo was subject to a wider order prohibiting him from entering any public housing project in Boston. But this case does not include the fulsome record present Sicker, nor do the appellants’ records evince the same level of criminali *44 ty that the Sixth Circuit found sufficient to support a prohibition from entering the defendant’s reservation in Alexander. Thus, exclusion from all of Suffolk County could be a large leap, if the sentencing court had evidence regarding the suitability of a more circumscribed geographic boundary.
But the defendants did not offer any of these arguments below, nor did they suggest any alternative, more limited, exclusion boundary to aid the district court in the exercise of its discretion. Therefore, as we have noted, the condition of supervised release is subject only to plain error review, and the condition meets this minimal hurdle. In order to show a district court committed plain error, a defendant must demonstrate (1) the existence of an error; (2) that it is plain; (3) that such plain error affected substantial rights; and (4) that left uncorrected, such error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
United States v. Carrasco,
Although it is axiomatic that the constitutional rights of supervised releasees and probationers are limited,
United States v. Knights,
Accordingly, we affirm the deniаl of credit for acceptance of responsibility with respect to defendant Carrasquillo, and, noting again that the supervised release condition is without prejudice to their rights to petition for modification of the condition, we affirm the condition of supervised release with respect to both defendants.
It is so ordered.
Notes
. The default statutory maximum in crack cocaine cases where the jury does not find a quantity of drugs, or in which the drug quantity is undetectable, is twenty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). But if a défendant is convicted of possessing at least five grams of cocaine base, the statutory maximum sentence is enhanced to forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)( 1 )(B)(iii).
. Garrasteguy was also denied credit for acceptance of responsibility, but he does not appeal that issue, because such credit cannot reduce his mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. Garrasteguy qualifies for a mandatory minimum sentence due to a previous felony conviction for illegal sales of controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. § 851.
. At sentencing, counsel for Carrasquillo repeated the arguments in favor of the acceptance of responsibility credit contained in the PSR, which he first made in his sentencing memorandum, and emphasized Carrasquillo’s position that he was entitled to the acceptance of responsibility credit. ("Even if your Honor's not giving him the acceptance of responsibility, he admitted' to that.’’). Thus, Carrasquillo’s claim is preserved.
See United States v. Gonczy,
. It should be noted, however that a defendant is not required to volunteer or affirmatively admit relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction to obtain an acceptance of responsibility reduction. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. (n.l(a)). Similarly, а defendant "may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction” for acceptance of responsibility. Id.
. The district court had previously noted that it had "no hard and fast rule" regarding an acceptance of responsibility reduction if the defendants contested the drug weight at trial, but cautioned the defendants that it would "be keeping in mind that we've spent all the time and expense on a trial and you've been found guilty of more than five grams. And I will take that into account. I think under the law, I'm required to.” Thus, while it is true that the district court, in its characterization of the Sentencing Guidelines overlooked differences between the two sections on acceptance of responsibility, one for actual acceptance and the other for early acceptance, nonetheless the basis for denying a downward departure was sound, and the district court certainly did not commit clear error in making such a denial.
. Appellant Garrasteguy claims that he preserved by relying on co-defendant Carrasquil-lo's objection, weak as it may have been. Given our disposition on the merits, we needn’t tаrry over Garrasteguy’s dubious contention that his claim has not been forfeited.
. When it imposed the condition the district court sua sponte and without comment expanded the scope of the condition to include all of Suffolk County, which includes not only the City of Boston, but also the communities of Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop. Neither the government nor the defendants objected to this enlargement of the scope of the condition.
. Specifically, the court can impose any condition set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20).
. The factors include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and thе history and characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); (3) the need to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c); and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
. The Sixth Circuit has also upheld a related special condition requiring a defendant, who had a history of 38 prior criminal convictions and who repeatedly violated the conditions of his then pending period of federal supervised release, live in a city away from his home for a period of one year.
United States v. Alexander,
. This condition of supervised release was imposed as part of the district court's decision to grant the defendant’s motion for a sentence modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which reduced the defendant's six-year sentence to time served (approximately 10 months).
Sicher,
. The showing required for a defendant to obtain a modification of a condition of supervised release pursuant to section 3583(e)is an open question in this circuit.
Compare United States
v.
Smith,
In light of the potential consequences that could flow from a complete inability to enter Suffolk County, a somewhat relaxed showing might suffice to obtain a modification of the supervised release condition here.